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Up from Calandra: The Exclusionary Rule as
a Constitutional Requirementt
Thomas S. Schrock* and Robert C. Welsh**
This Article is dedicatedto C. Herman Pritchett.
In United States v. Calandra' the Supreme Court held that
a grand jury witness may not refuse to answer questions merely
because they are prompted by illegally obtained evidence.2 The
argument of Justice Powell's majority opinion is elegantly
simple. His major premise is that suppression is justified if and
only if it would deter "unreasonable governmental intrusions int The authors are indebted to William Barnhart for research assistance; to John Hanson for indispensable intellectual and moral support; to Stanley Goldman and Ronald Collins for bibliographical assistance; and to the Academic Senate Committee on Research, University
of California at Santa Barbara, for financial aid.
*
Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University
of California at Santa Barbara.
** Lecturer, Department of Political Science University of California at Santa Barbara.
1. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
2. Federal agents obtained a search warrant directed at Calandra's
place of business and specifying discovery and seizure of bookmaking
records and wagering paraphernalia as the object of the search. In the
course of their search, the agents found a card indicating that a Dr.
Loveland, known by one of the agents to be a loan-shark victim, had
been making periodic payments to Calandra. The agents seized this card
and other business records found on the premises.
Some months later a special grand jury was convened to investigate
allegations of extortionate credit transactions. It subpoenaed Calandra
and asked him questions based on the seized records. When Calandra
invoked his fifth amendment right against self-incrimination, the Government recommended that he be granted transactional immunity pursuant to the Act of June 19, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. 3, § 802, 82
Stat. 216 (repealed 1970), see 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-05 (1970). Calandra then
moved to suppress the records on the ground (one of two argued) that
the agents had exceeded-the scope of the warrant. The district court
granted the motion and declared that Calandra need not respond to questions based on the suppressed records. 332 F. Supp. 737 (N.D. Ohio
1971). The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district
court's ruling that a witness before a grand jury may invoke the exclusionary rule to bar questioning based on evidence obtained by illegal
search and seizure. 465 F.2d 1218 (6th- Cir. 1972). The Supreme Court
granted certiorari and reversed, Justice Powell writing for the-majority
and Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Douglas and Marshall, writing
a dissent.
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to the privacy of one's person, house, papers, or effects," 3 provided that the harm done to useful institutions by suppression
does not outweigh the beneficial effect of the deterrence. 4 In
the context of Calandra,his minor premise is that "any incremental deterrent effect which might be achieved by extending
the [exclusionary] rule to grand jury proceedings is uncertain
at best," 5 whereas the fact and extent of harm is certain. "[T]he
damage to . . .[the] institution [of the grand jury] from the . . .

[enforcement in its proceedings] of the exclusionary rule...
outweighs the benefit of any possible incremental deterrent effect."6 Therefore, the rule should not and will not be enforced
in grand jury proceedings.
Writing for the three-man minority, Justice Brennan argues
that Justice Powell's major premise is faulty, and that judicial
rather than police integrity is the historical and true objective
of the exclusionary rule.7 Justice Brennan also argues that
Calandrais a classic occasion for application of Justice Holmes's
derivative-use maxim that "[t] he essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not
merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court
but that it shall not be used at all."18 Finally, Justice Brennan
bespeaks his "uneasy feeling that today's decision may signal
that a majority of my colleagues have positioned themselves to
... abandon altogether the exclusionary rule in search-andseizure cases .... 9
In this Article we shall not ask whether Calandraerodes the

rule against derivative use of illegally obtained evidence; our interest is in the principles regulating any kind of use, direct or
derivative, of illegally obtained evidence. Justice Powell tells us
that "[t] he same considerations of logic and policy apply to both
the fruits of an unlawful search and seizure and derivative use
of that evidence, and we do not distinguish between them."' 0 Our
concern is with those "considerations of logic and policy," or,
more precisely, the constitutional principles that govern both
direct and derivative use. Justice Powell does distinguish, how3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
251 U.S.
9.
10.

414 U.S. at 354.
Id. at 349-52.
Id. at 351.
Id. at 354.
Id. at 357, 360.
Id. at 362, quoting Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States,
385, 392 (1920).
414 U.S. at 365.
Id. at 354-55.
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ever, between the use of unlawfully seized evidence before grand
juries and the use of such evidence at trial, and he makes assurances that there is no adverse implication in the grand jury
case of Calandra for the longevity of the exclusionary rule at
trial." In this Article we shall assume that he takes this distinction and makes these assurances seriously. We prefer not to
speculate about the ingenuousness of the distinction or about
campaigns and tactics the majority may have in mind-there is
more to be learned from premises than from motives. We think
that it is of greater moment that Justice Powell's major premise
leaves the exclusionary rule vulnerable to repeal than that a majority of the Court might actually be plotting to repeal the rule.
Calandradeserves study less as a bellwether case or for its factual novelty than because of the clear and open doctrinal opposition in it between Justices Powell and Brennan. One can learn
something about constitutionalism and the rule of law from the
opinions in the case. That is why we propose to comment here,
not on Calandraitself, but on the constitutional premises informing the theories of the exclusionary rule favored by the two
Justices writing in Calandra. Indeed-to keep attention focused
on these premises-our discussion will uniformly presuppose the
simpler non-Calandrafactual situation of a search victim as criminal defendant seeking to exclude the evidence from his trial.
Calandrawas the occasion for a clear encounter between rival accounts of the exclusionary rule. Each of the opinionwriting Justices, in full awareness of the other's rationale, intransigently states his own as if it were the sole and sufficient justification for the rule. According to Justice Powell, "the [exclusionary] rule is a judically created remedy designed to safeguard
Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect,
rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved."' 12 To Justice Brennan this is "serious error," because
"[t] he exclusionary rule... [is meant to accomplish] the twin
goals of enabling the judiciary to avoid the taint of partnership
11. Id. at 349-52, 354. Justice Powell can consistently affirm both
that the same considerations govern the use of fruits as evidence and
derivatively and that different results shall obtain at trial and in grand
jury questioning. There is no inconsistency because the fundamental assumption or "consideration" that governs both evidentiary and derivative
use is that neither raises a constitutional issue. The fundamental assumption is that the Supreme Court is at liberty in the exercise of its
supervisory discretion to require suppression of the evidence in both settings, to allow its direct and/or derivative use in both, or to suppress

it in one and allow its use in the other. See note 108 infra.
12. 414 U.S. at 348.
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in official lawlessness and of assuring the people .. . that the
government [will] not profit from its lawless behavior, thus minimizing the risk of seriously undermining popular trust in
government."' 13
While Justice Brennan's way of accounting for the exclusionary rule is different from Justice Powell's, Brennan does not
actually affirm what Powell denies, i.e., that the aggrieved party
has a personal right to suppression. 14 We think this omission
is fatal to any slight hope Justice Brennan might have had of
forestalling what he takes to be the Court's desire to repeal the
exclusionary rule. This Article is an attempt to supply the deficiency. We begin by characterizing the different models of
judicial responsibility tacitly assumed by Justices Powell and
Brennan. We then probe the weaknesses of Powell's deterrence
and Brennan's integrity rationales. Next we note that, though
their conceptions of judicial responsibility differ, the Justices
seem to employ the same supervisory theory of judicial power
in accounting for the exclusionary rule. Finally, building on Justice Brennan's view of judicial responsibility, and opposing the
Justices' shared conception of judicial power, we advance two
reasons for the exclusionary rule-different in kind and more
adequate than those urged by Powell and Brennan. Indeed, our
proposals are so different that they are not really reasons for
the rule. Rather, they are descriptions of the rule as the only
means to accord what in opposition to both Powell and Brennan
we believe are two "personal constitutional right[s] of the party
aggrieved."' 5
I.

JUDICIAL RESPONSIBILITY: TWO VIEWS OF
A GOVERNMENT AND OF A PROSECUTION

In his CaZandra dissent, Justice Brennan boldly juxtaposes
what he takes to be the two basic justifications for the exclusionary rule, i.e., the new "deterrence" rationale of Justice Powell
and the old "judicial integrity" rationale of the "framers of the
rule." Underlying these two rationales are two different concep13. Id. at 357.
14. Those statements in Justice Brennan's opinion that can be construed as references to a personal exclusionary right are offhand and remote from the core of the opinion. See, e.g., id.at 360, 364. But see
Parts VI and VII infra, where we shall argue that an exclusionary right
is implied by Justice Brennan's statements.
15. The language is Justice Powell's. See text accompanying note
12 supra. Concerning the "two rights" thesis of this Article, see text accoinpanying notes 138-39 infra.
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tions of judicial responsibility---"fragmentary" and "unitary." We
shall consider these opposed conceptions and signify our belief
in the superiority of the "unitary" model, reserving for Part III
our first sustained discussion of the defendant's constitutional
right to insist that the court fulfill its responsibilities.

A. THE FRAGMENTARY MODEL
The deterrence theory of the exclusionary rule is a natural
concomitant of what we shall call the common-law, "fragmentary" model of a prosecution. According to the fragmentary
model, more widely known as the "fair trial doctrine," the court's
sole task is to hold a fair trial. There is no way that a court
can implicate itself in extra-courtroom executive misconduct just
by performing its truth-seeking function within the adversary
system. In particular, admission of reliable evidence, which is
the court's duty par excellence, cannot properly be construed as
a condonation of past, or an encouragement of future, illegal seizures. Being neither retrospectively nor prospectively a party
to wrongdoing, and having an affirmative responsibility of its
own to see that the jury views all extant reliable evidence and
that justice is not sidetracked by collateral issues, the court not
only may but must admit illegally obtained evidence. As Wigmore put it in his recapitulation of the common law, "the admissibility of evidence is not affected by the illegality of the means
through which the party has been enabled to obtain the evience"' 6-and this is so even when "the party" is the government. A criminal court is morally separate from and indifferent
to the conduct of the rest of the government. The court acts
as a neutral conduit of the evidence, its self-imposed ignorance
in effect "laundering" whatever "taint" might have accrued from
16. Wigmore, Using Evidence Obtained by Illegal Search and
Seizure, 8 A.B.A.J. 479 (1922) [hereinafter cited as Wigmore]. Wigmore's is the classic nonjudicial critique of the exclusionary rule. It has
been vastly influential and the gist of it should be noted in any discussion of the exclusionary controversy. In compressed form, Wigmore's
position can be described in terms of the quality he most valued in a
criminal judge-single-mindedness. The good judge does not turn aside
to address collateral issues, and he does facilitate a pursuit of all evidence bearing immediately on guilt or innocence. The exclusionary
judge on the other hand does turn aside to what Wignore considered
a collateral matter and he does not press for or accept all immediately
relevant evidence. The exclusionary judge may be said to offend triply:
not only does he turn aside to do incidental justice, and not only does
he reject urgently relevant evidence, but he attempts to do incidental
justice by turning away relevant evidence, thereby frustrating the
truth-seeking function of the court and thwarting substantial justice. -
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the seizure and thereby rendering all reliable and relevant evidence homogeneous for judicial purposes. In Wigmore's words,
17
"[t] he illegality is by no means condoned; it is merely ignored."
The proposition that there is no condonation problem which
cannot be overcome by ignoring it is only one interesting assumption incorporated by the fragmentary model. Another significant
assumption is that the government can be treated for evidentiary
purposes the same way the common law treats a private party.
This assumption is potentially at odds with the precepts of constitutional government and judicial review.' 8 Finally, there is
the casually tendentious presupposition of the common-law or
fragmentary model that there are only two constitutional wrongs
possible within the search and seizure context-judicial violation
of a person's fair trial rights, or police violation of his privacy.
The adoption of this twofold alternative amounts to a denial that
admission or use of unconstitutionally seized evidence could itself
be a violation of the Constitution. Given just these two rights,
a defendant cannot be regarded as having a constitutional right
to exclusion because the admission of unconstitutionally seized
evidence is not a violation of the judge's duty to hold a fair trial.
Fair trial rights have to do with calm and accurate fact-finding
in the accusatorial system and by the adversary method. The
exclusion of competent evidence inhibits that fact-finding, as critics of the exclusionary rule never tire of telling us. We think
it is simply an error to insist that any right a defendant might
have to exclusion of relevant and reliable evidence would be a
fair trial right. Such an exclusionary right would not be to a
fair trial, even though it would come due at the trial. But, as
long as a trial is understood, in the fragmentary manner, as an
inquiry constitutionally and morally unrelated to the governmental conduct that preceded it, no exclusionary right can come
due: the existence of such a right is barred by the initial twofold
assumption of the fragmentary model.
Having correctly found no judicial fair trial duty to exclude
unconstitutionally seized evidence, and having by implication
denied that the exclusionary rule can be the expression of any
other kind of constitutional duty on the courts, both the admissionists and the deterrence exclusionists conclude that the rule
can only have a deterrence, or what has been called a "quasiconstitutional,"' 9 purpose; it can only be a means contrived by
17. Id. See text accompanying notes 190-99 infra.
18. See text accompanying notes 241-48 infra.
19. See note 109 infra.
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the judges to stop some other agency-the police-from violating
its constitutional duty to respect the right of privacy.

B. THE

UNITARY MODEL

A competing view of a court's responsibilities supports the
judicial integrity rationale invoked by Justice Brennan in Calandra. The "unitary" model of a government and a prosecution
tries to avoid the fatal characterization of exclusion as either a
remedy for police violation of the right of privacy, or as a "fair
trial" right. Within the "one-government" conception, exclusion
is seen as the way the court itself avoids committing a wrong
by violation of the rule of law. According to this model, exclusion is the only appropriate and timely meth6d the court has
to show its respect for the rule of law. The court does nothing
gratuitous because, strictly speaking, it does nothing at all.
Rather, it refrains from doing a wrong itself. And by its forbearance the court stops the entire government, of which it is a part,
from consummating a wrongful course of conduct-a course of
conduct begun but by no means ended when the police invade
the defendant's privacy.
The unitary model is manifest in Justice Brennan's manner
of speaking when he says that exclusion assures the people "that
the government would not profit from its lawless behavior, thus
minimizing the risk of seriously undermining popular trust in
government. '20 It is also implicit in the common undifferentiating use of the third person plural pronoun in governmental contexts, as Monrad Paulsen shows in a statement supportive of the
judicial integrity rationale:
When the police themselves break the law and other agencies of
government eagerly reach for the benefits which flow from the
breach, it is difficult for the citizenry to believe that the government truly meant to forbid the conduct in the first place.
In our common speech we often refer to our officials with words
of "otherness." How often do we say, "they" will tax us, "they"
will appoint the police chief, or "they" will pass a law. It is
corrosive of the vitally necessary trust in government if we all
understand that "they" do not abide by the law which "they"
assert. The conviction that all government is staffed by
self21
seeking hypocrites is easy to instill and difficult to erase.
In the eyes of those accepting the unitary model, the admissionist court stands accused of complicity in governmental
wrongdoing from which the incantation of the slogan that "[t] he
20. 414 U.S. at 357 (emphasis added).
21. Paulsen, The Exclusionary Rule and Misconduct by the Police,
52 3. Caml. L.C. & P.S. 255, 258 (1961).

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:251

illegality is by no means condoned . . . [but] merely ignored"
will not exculpate it. 22 By asserting an indissoluble institutional
and moral tie between the courts and the executive, the unitary
model places a responsibility on the courts for the way the evidence they use is obtained-a responsibility which the frag23
mentary model disavows by denying the existence of the tie.
Those favoring the unitary model argue that the governmental action for which a criminal court incurs responsibility
is not merely the trial but the whole course of conduct called
the prosecution. The trial is a part of the whole prosecution,
just as the court is a part of the whole government that is investigating, charging, judging, and sentencing the individual. There
is in the unitary model an incipient "fair prosecution" doctrine
that is meant to challenge the responsibility-limiting "fair trial"
doctrine of the fragmentary model.
The best known presentations of the unitary model are in
the Olmstead24 dissents of Justices Brandeis and Holmes. Their
thesis is that when a court adequately understands its place in
the government and its role in a prosecution it will feel obligated
to exclude evidence illegally seized by the government. 25 But,
though they share this ultimate thesis and many presuppositions,
their one-government arguments in favor of the exclusionary
thesis differ in significant and interesting ways.
Justices Brandeis and Holmes begin their respective analyses
on the assumption that the police are mere employees or agents;
they agree that the primary impropriety occurs at the prosecutorial and judicial levels. This is in sharp contrast to the fragmentary model, where it is thought that the only impropriety
is committed by the police officer. In addition, Brandeis and
22. See text accompanying note 17 supra.
23. See note 115 infra for some cautionary remarks about judicial
responsibility.
24. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
25. The paradigm from which we are working involves a violation
by the "one government" of its own (usually constitutional) law in its
prosecution of the defendant. It is awkward to use the Olmstead dissents
in support of an argument based on this paradigm because the federal
officers in that case violated no federal statute and were deemed by the
majority of the Supreme Court not to have violated the United States
Constitution. But despite the nonparadigmatic fact pattern of Olmstead-and the consequence that the dissents there are more vulnerable
to cavil than, say, the opinion in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383
(1914), which is based on a paradigmatic fact pattern-we nevertheless
lean unashamedly on Brandeis and Holmes. We do this not merely for
the undeniable comfort of having their great authority on our side, but
also because they make so vivid the unitary thinking pioneered in Weeks.
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Holmes agree that the government, as principal,' is authoritatively
represented by both the prosecution and the court. 26 Their disagreement concerns the conditions that must obtain for the officer's conduct to implicate the government in his wrongdoing.
According to Justice Brandeis, acceptance of the evidence by the
court consummates the initial wrong as a governmental wrong
by retroactively investing the officer's unauthorized act with
governmental character. In Holmes's account, on the other
hand, acceptance of the evidence is a virtual judicial warrant to
-break the law or violate the Constitution while securing evidence
in the future.
Because officers cannot be authorized to make illegal seizures, Justice Brandeis denies that the government can be
implicated, except retrospectively by "ratification," 27 whereas
Justice Holmes assumes that the government is prospectively implicated in the practice of illegal seizure through the tacit encouragement communicated by the prosecutor and the court
when evidence illegally seized is submitted and not suppressed. 28
26.

277 U.S. at 470, 483.

27. When these unlawful acts were committed, they were
crimes only of the officers individually. The government was
innocent, in legal contemplation; for no federal official is authorized to commit a crime on its behalf. When the Government, having full knowledge, sought, through the Department
of Justice to avail itself of the fruits of these acts in order to
accomplish its own ends, it assumed moral responsibility for the
officers' crimes ....

And if this Court should permit the Gov-

ernment by means of its officers' crimes, to effect its purpose
of punishing the defendants, there would seem to be present all
the elements of a ratification. If so, the Government itself would
become a lawbreaker.
Id.at 483. See also text accompanying note 244 infra.
28. If [the government] pays its officers for having got evidence by crime I do not see why it may not as well pay them
for getting it in the same way, and I can attach no importance

to protestations of disapproval if it knowingly accepts and pays
and announces that in future it will pay for the fruits.
277 U.S. at 470. An eloquent recent statement of the Holmes conception
is this by Professor Amsterdam:

[S]urely it is unreal to treat the offending officer as a private
malefactor who just happens to receive a government paycheck.
It is the government that sends him out on the streets with the
job of repressing crime and of gathering criminal evidence in
order to repress it. It is the government that motivates him to
conduct searches and seizures as a part of his job, empowers him
and equips him to conduct them. If it also receives the products
of those searches and seizures without regard to their constitutionality and uses them as the means of convicting people whom
the officer conceives it to be his job to get convicted, it is not
merely tolerating but inducing unconstitutional searches and
seizures.
Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment,'58 MrNN. L. Rv.
349, 432 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Amsterdam].

See note 111 infra for
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But, differing with Holmes penultimately, Justice Brandeis
comes to the same ultimate conclusion, because he insists that
prosecutorial and judicial decisions to use evidence extend prosecutorial and judicial responsibility back to the misconduct of
the officer. 29 Although both the prosecution and the courts commit independent wrongs in using the evidence, they are also, as
it were, principals after the fact to the officer's wrong, and vicariously responsible for it.

C. THE "FAIR TRIAL" DOCTRINE AND THE NECESSITY FOR CHOICE
By what could have been a harmless convention, the phrase
"fair trial" is invoked to protect the adversary, accusatorial, and
general truth-seeking characteristics of the trial itself. It is not
a harmless convention because, as employed in connection with
the fragmentary model, "fair trial" has conveyed the natural impression that the court need feel responsible only for the conduct
of the trial and that its use of evidence does not implicate it
in the manner of acquisition. The error consists in trying to
make the term "fair trial" solve a constitutional problem "by definition." While retaining its literal signification-referring only
to the immensely important cluster of "inquiry" rights 30-the
term "fair trial" has also been allowed a connotation of constitutional definitiveness, as if the inquiry rights exhaust the universe
of rights owed at the trial. But this is incorrect: the category
of rights to a fair trial is not coterminous with the category of
rights that come due at the trial. And therefore this whole
maneuver begs the central question of the exclusionary controversy: to what extent can a judge be implicated in the misconduct of the police in the investigative stage of a prosecution that
culminates in a trial over which he presides? If discussion is
begun by assuming, as in the fragmentary model, that the trial
is a separate, hermetically sealed occurrence, the fairness of
which furthermore is the only due process concern, the question
of judicial responsibility for the treatment of illegally obtained
evidence is also sealed. This intellectual procedure is what
Justice Holmes had in mind when he characterized the "often
repeated statement that in a criminal proceeding the Court will
comments on the way Amsterdam builds or, as the case may be, fails
to build on this insight. See note 150 infra for a comparison of Holmes
and Amsterdam on a related point.
29. See note 27 supra.
30. E.g., the rights to notice, counsel, confrontation, and impartial-
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not take notice of the manner in which papers offered in evidence
have been obtained" as a "somewhat rudimentary mode of dis31
posing of the question."
It will not do, however, to insinuate that fragmentary model
theorists have a monopoly on the appearance of arbitrariness or
circularity. As Holmes himself made a point of saying, "we are
32
free to choose" what to do about illegally obtained evidence.
He also said that "[f] or those who agree with me [in this choice],
no distinction can be taken between the Government as a prosecutor and the Government as judge.13 3 Holmes here comes
31. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470-71 (1928).
32. Id. at 471.
33. Id. at 470. Quotation of Holmes's forceful words along with
our use of the term "unitary" may suggest to some readers that we want
to replace the separation of powers with a totalitarian monolith. If that
is the impression our terminology leaves, we shall gladly change it, so
long as the substitute language conveys the Holmesian conception of judicial responsibility for which we are arguing. Holmes assumes that the
government as prosecutor is culpable for commissioning illegal procurement of evidence or for accepting evidence thus procured. He then says
that he does not see any difference between the government as judge
and the government as prosecutor-meaning, of course, for the limited
and well-defined purpose of assigning responsibility for traffic in illegally obtained evidence. Neither do we, and that is all we mean to convey by the term "unitary".
If it is contended that sinister monolithicity is implicit in this onegovernment argument, the best answer is probably to ask which is the
more reassuring or less Kafkaesque-Holmes's statement that there will
not be a distinction between the prosecutor and the judge, or Wigmore's
that the judge does not condone the illegality, he merely ignores it. It
will not make a defendant an admirer of the separation of powers to
tell him that he is its beneficiary because what is happening to him is
really a series of discrete events occuring in insular governmental agencies, none of which is or should be responsible for the acts of the others.
From the point of view of the defendant who has a harrowing, revealing,
and significant exchange with the government, the unitary model would
seem preferable because it assigns to one body-the judiciary-the responsibility for reviewing the conduct of the whole government and the
whole prosecution. Only the unitary model insists that the procedural
buck stops in a definite place and that an accountable agency has the
last word on due process. The most dangerous kind of monolith is one
that does not know or will not admit that it is a whole.
In this Article we argue for judicial review of executive conductor that exclusion of evidence is a form of judicial review. But judicial
review is impossible without the separation of powers: there must be
a part of the government set apart and independent, with the responsibility of reviewing the conduct of the other parts. This "stands to reason" and it is also vouched for by the history of the English people, who
discovered judicial review and passed it along without keeping any for

themselves.

(See E. CORWIN,
AmERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

THE

"HIGHER

LAW"

BACKGROUND

OF

51 (1955) for a crisp reference to the
conceptual and practical difficulties facing Coke because he lacked the
doctrine and the reality of the separation of powers.)
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close to suggesting that mere preference and agreement, rather
than reasoning, decide the issue; or perhaps, that the decision
about illegally obtained evidence is inseparable from the decision
about what institutional model to adopt. If this is his suggestion,
it could in turn be understood as meaning that there is no independent theoretical perspective from which one can reason in a
nontendentious way to the correct conclusion about admission
and exclusion. And it does indeed seem to be the case that, because the opposed conclusions are so obviously contained in the
opposed institutional premises, one cannot really adopt a model
without prejudicing the issue of admission. Perhaps the best one
can do is to work for awareness that a question exists, by making
it clear that there are two available institutional models, and that
the choice of model determines one's stand on the question of
admission.
One hopes, however, that there is some nonarbitrary vantage
point from which the two models or institutional premises can
be judged. We suspect Justice Holmes believed that there is;
for, although he wrote his Olmstead dissent with intellectual
modesty, neither his exclusionary conclusion nor his attachment
to the unitary model is declared as if it were the result of mere
preference.3 4 And we think the spirit in which Holmes wrote
is the proper spirit to emulate, although, to be sure, we in our
many pages no more than he in his few paragraphs manage fully
to articulate a theoretical defense of the unitary model. All we
have sought to do thus far is to echo the gist of the simple, but
not necessarily "rudimentary," Holmes-Brandeis proposition that
the government is an indivisible entity, the prosecution is a single
process, and there is no honest way to give the court a moral
release for wrongful conduct on the part of the executive in a
prosecution made possible only by the participation of both the
court and the executive.
In sum it can be said that the separation of powers is a prerequisite
to judicial review but that too much or the wrong kind of separation,
as in Wigmore's view, is antithetical to judicial review. For more dis-

cussion of judicial review, see Part VI infra, and for additional discussion
of the general problem of judicial responsibility, see note 115 infra.
34. Holmes, curiously enough for a man whose life was so
heavily influenced by the metaphor of battle, could rise above
it and entertain a conception of government, in its prosecutorial
aspect, which . . . did not cast government merely in the role
of enemy to the criminal classes ....
Griffiths, Ideology in Criminal Procedure or A Third "Model" of the
Criminl Process, 79 YALE L.J, 359, 385 n.95 (1970),
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NOTES ON THE "INTEGRITY" AND "DETERRENCE"
PREMISES OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE

By opposing the judicial integrity rationale of the "framers
of the rule" to Justice Powell's deterrence rationale, Justice
Brennan in effect accuses the Calandramajority of initiating a
departure from the "original understanding." We consider it
more accurate to say that Calandra merely takes the last step
in a movement that had nearly run its course in the Warren era.
Deploring with Justice Brennan the Court's apparent indifference to "the imperative of judicial integrity, '3 5 we nevertheless do not think Justice Powell seriously violates the spirit of
the Warren Court opinions on the exclusionary rule. To be sure,
Brennan can truthfully say that
[f ]or the first time, the Court ... [in Calandra] discounts to
the point of extinction the vital function of the rule to insure

that the judiciary avoids even the slightest appearance of sanc3
tioning illegal government conduct.L
6
But this is true only because Justice Powell does not make a
single favorable reference to judicial integrity, whereas in Linkletter v. Walker,37 to take a Warren Court example, there is still
a ritual reference to "the imperative of judicial integrity. '3 8 But
it is only ritual, for as Justice Brennan mildly admits, deterrence
was "a prominent consideration" 39 in Linkletter. From other
Warren Court exclusionary cases we sense that while Powell's
ruthless desertion of judicial integrity is indeed not in the spirit
of those opinions, the opinions nonetheless were so indefinite
about the controlling combination of rationales 40 that deterrence
35. 414 U.S. at 360, quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206,
222 (1960).
36. 414 U.S.at 360.
37. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
38. Id. at 635, quoting Mapp v.Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961) and
Elkins v.United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960).
39. 414 U.S. at 359. In the first place, Justice Clark isvery open
inLinkletter about the decisive role played by the deterrence rationale
throughout the Warren era: "[A] ll of the cases since Wolf requiring the
exclusion of illegal evidence have been based on the necessity for an
effective deterrent to illegal police action." 381 U.S. at 636-37. In the
second place, the concern for "judicial integrity," a rationale one would
expect to support retroactive application of the exclusionary rule, undergoes a transformation in the course of Justice Clark's Linkletter opinion,
and its successor rationale militates against retroactive application.
"[T]he imperative of judicial integrity," id. at 635, becomes "interests
in the administration of justice and the integrity of the judicial process
... [which have to be taken into account by the Court because] [t]o
make the rule of Mapp retrospective would tax the administration of justice to the utmost." 381 U.S. at 637.
40. For example, in Elkins v, United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960),
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could become the sole rationale by default. In CalandraJustice
Powell simply ratifies that result.
Assuming there to have been a single "original understanding" among Justice Day in Weeks v. United States41 and Justices
Brandeis and Holmes in Olmstead v. United States42 (a proposition we shall dispute), such "understanding" lost its hold on the
judicial mind in the Warren Court cases. The Warren Court persistently relied on an unstable combination of arguments, as if
suspended between the judicial integrity and the deterrence rationales or, being unsure about the strength of either, hopeful
that by heaping them together a sufficient justification for the
exclusionary rule would result. This indecision left the justification for the rule in doubt: nobody knew if it was judicial
integrity alone, deterrence alone, or both; hence nobody knew
what kind of minor premise might prove fatal to the rule.
But people could make informed guesses. For example, one
influential commentator opined that, whatever the rhetorical
ring of the judicial integrity rationale, "it is doubtful that this
argument decides cases."'4 3 We shall now indicate why he is correct-why the judicial integrity argument as articulated by
Justice Brennan and his doctrinal forebears, Justices Holmes and
Brandeis, cannot be depended upon to "decide cases" without the
Justice Stewart for the majority invoked both deterrence, id. at 217, and
judicial integrity, id. at 222-23. In Mapp Justice Clark managed to rely
on no less than four theories-deterrence, 367 U.S. at 648; judicial integrity, id. at 659-60; the fourth and fifth amendments in combination, id.
at 646-47, 657-58; and the fourth amendment alone, id. at 648-49. On
the other hand, in Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963), Justice Clark
for some reason mentions only the fourth-fifth amendment theory. Id.
at 30; see note 97 infra.
41. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
42. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
43. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure,
37 U. Cm. L. REv. 665, 669 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Oaks]. While
Professor Oaks doubts that the judicial integrity rationale decides cases,
he neither explains the weakness of that rationale nor accounts for the
greater case-deciding power of the deterrence rationale. Instead, he is
content to note that the courts themselves apparently do not take the
judicial integrity rationale that seriously, or at any rate do not consistently decide cases as the rationale would seem to require:
Despite bold pronouncements about not being a "party to lawless
invasions," federal courts have not yet been forbidden from entering a valid judgment of conviction against a defendant who
was brought before the court by illegal means such as kidnapping, arrest without probable cause, or arrest upon a warrant
that wns illegal or insufficient.
Id., citing Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S.
436 (1886); and other cases. These cases embarrass not only the judicial
integrity rationale for the exclusionary rule, but also any constitutional
theory of the rule. See note 276 infra.
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additional recognition of a personal constitutional exclusionary
right.
The question is how we can in good conscience derive satisfaction from the shining purity of our courts when they are surrounded by squalid and frightening crime-crime the government cannot combat because of the courts' preoccupation with
their own integrity. The weakness of the judicial integrity argument is that it asks us to be guided by what seems like judicial
squeamishness; or, failing that, it asks us to engage in speculations about the remote consequences of judicial complicity in lawless governmental action. Although in our opinion the judicial
integrity argument deserves respectful attention, we nevertheless
empathize with those participants in the exclusionary rule controversy who have found it hard to take this rationale seriously.
Viewed as an end in itself, dissociated from the harsh realities of crime and punishment, judicial integrity seems a bootless
and rarefied essence. 44 This explains why proponents of the integrity rationale sooner or later feel driven to augment the appeal
for rectitude as an end with an appeal for rectitude as a meansa means to avoid setting "contagious" examples of lawlessness.
One could illustrate this shift of emphasis from end to means
by citing Justice Brandeis's Olmstead dissent, 45 but there is an
illustration closer to hand in Justice Brennan's Calandradissent.
He speaks of the "twin goals" of the rule, one of which he describes as "avoid[ing] the taint of [judicial] partnership in official lawlessness. ' 4 6 This is presumably not the description of
a desired effect, but rather the specification of what righteous
courts do, and is thus a way of saying that exclusionist courts
which understand what they are doing treat judicial integrity
as an end in itself. The other use of the rule, by contrast, is
instrumental, for the court is also said to suppress unconstitutionally seized evidence in order to "minimiz[e] the risk of
seriously undermining popular trust in government. '47 Partisans of the integrity rationale are induced by the vulnerability
of the first argument to move to the second, and to shift their
44. Indeed, to the extent that judicial integrity is a quest for "splendid isolation," it is a fragmentation of government. See notes 100, 115,
and 288 infra.
45. On the one hand is Justice Brandeis's concern about "contamination." 277 U.S. at 484. On the other hand is his wish "to maintain
respect for law ... [and] to promote confidence in the administration
of justice." Id.
46. 414 U.S. at 357. See text accompanying note 7 supra.
47. 414 U.S. at 357.
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But in so doing

they begin to play their opponents' game, which, for emotional
and rhetorical reasons, they are bound to lose.
The trouble is that in any real contest between "Law and
Order" or "Crime Control" 48 on the one hand, and the "Rule of
Law" or "Due Process" 49 on the other, "Law and Order" has the
immense advantage of appealing simultaneously to fears, to instinctive "utilitarianism," and also to instinctive "retributivism."
Edward Barrett, for example, has demonstrated the weakness of
the judicial integrity rationale simply by asking a question:
Suppose a policeman by an illegal search has obtained evidence
which establishes the defendant as a peddler of narcotics to
juveniles. Where lies the duty of the judge? Can we assume
from any general social point of view that the policeman's conduct is so much more reprehensible than the defendant's, that
the duty ofo the judge is to reject the evidence and free the
defendant?5
If one is not prepared to recognize a personal constitutional right
in the party aggrieved, one stands exposed to Barrett's appeal
to the "general social point of view." If one is also reluctant to
rely on the deterrence argument, it becomes necessary to argue
in effect that judicial lawlessness is contagious and threatens our
institutions. We ourselves think that there is much plausibility
in this latter claim, but we also feel obliged to acknowledge that
it is a speculation-which, furthermore, can be countered by another claim, perhaps equally speculative, but more than equally
compelling. If proponents of the exclusionary rule say judicial
lawlessness is a societal menace, the rejoinder is, why not risk
that menace rather than the far worse danger of lawlessness in
the streets? After all, the effects of governmental lawlessness
are remote and easily overlooked. Even now one may safely
assume that Americans are more afraid of the corner mugger
than they ever were of the entire "Watergate Gang." For every
Brandeis or Brennan who sees the government "imperilled if it
fails to observe the law scrupulously," 5 ' or believes the repeal
of the exclusionary rule would threaten "the very foundation of
our peoples' trust in their Government on which our democracy
48. See H. PACKEr, THE LimITs
(1968) [hereinafter cited as PACKER].
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49. Id.
50. Barrett, Exclusion of Evidence Obtained by Illegal SearchesA Comment on People v. Cahan, 43 CALmF. L. REv. 565, 582 (1955)
[hereinafter cited as Barrett].
51. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis,
J.).
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rests,"52 one can find a Burger who speculates, at least as persuasively,
that we may have come the full circle from the place where
Brandeis stood, and that a vast number of people are losing
respect for law and the administration of justice because
53 they
think that the Suppression Doctrine is defeating justice.
Few are bold enough to deny that something serious is happening
when "a majority-or even a substantial minority-of people in
any ... community ... come to believe that law enforcement

is being frustrated by what laymen call 'technicalities.' "24 Few
would deny that the resulting "sour and bitter feeling . . . is

psychologically and sociologically unhealthy."55
52. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 360 (1974)

(Brennan,

J.).

53. Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchman?, 14 Amr. U.L. REV. 1,
22 (1964).
54. Id.
55. Id. John Kaplan has more recently said:
The solid majority of Americans rejects the idea that "[the
criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered." Indeed, this public dissatisfaction has recently become a major political force. Public opinion polls have shown an extremely high
rate of disapproval of the courts for their role in "coddling criminals," and the prototype of these complaints is enforcement of
the exclusionary rule.

Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAI. L. REv. 1027, 1035-

36 (1974) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter cited as Kaplan]. Kaplan
makes explicit what is implicit in the Chief Justice's statement, namely,
that the "need for retribution" can be the factual premise of a utilitarian
argument against the rule. As Kaplan says:
[O]ne must acknowledge that the exclusionary rule often allows
a criminal to escape punishment. Though one may scoff at the
need for retribution as irrational hypocritical, and old-fashioned,
it seems to lie deep within the human psyche. The frustration
of a popular need for retribution is another factor that must be
considered in making a utilitarian calculation of the cost of the
exclusionary rule.
Id. at 1035.
We agree with Kaplan that a government ignores the punitive impulse at its peril. We are tempted to say in addition, however, that Kaplan's apology for the "need for retribution" as possibly "irrational" suggests that the phenomenon he has in mind is as much the desire for
vengeance as it is the need to punish. If this is his thought, there is
reason to resist a simple capitulation to the impulse and to demand that
some attention be given by the government to educating the people about
the rule of law and the meaning of punishment-and that the government also try to meet the conditions any government must fulfill to qualify itself as an authority dispensing punishment rather than as a mere
power or enemy committing "acts of hostility." See, e.g., T. HoBBEs,
LIx THAw 202-09 (Oakeshott ed. 1947). And, it might be suggested,
lawful conduct by the government in its criininal prosecutions is one of
those conditions. We suspect, however, that Kaplan would be impatient
with the tendency of this suggestion. For, if one pursues it, it will be
seen to eventuate in a call for the exclusionary rule as one of the ways
courts, as part of the government, help the government to maintain its
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In sum, then, when judicial integrity is promoted as an end
in itself it can be made to seem like irresponsible puerility, and
when an appeal to consequences is made it can be met with
lawfulness and hence its genuine authority and right to punish. But the
exclusionary rule frustrates the need for retribution and agitates public
opinion, and Kaplan is more worried about public opinion than about
formal "moral authoritativeness." Kaplan is concerned about real problems of politics and government-the "silent majority" and the angry police, Kaplan, supra at 1038, "reality on the streets," id., and the longterm "political trend," id. at 1040-42. Given these concerns (and, one
supposes, a healthy fear of the mob violence, assassination squads, and
men-on-horseback that are the natural sequelae of public disquietude
about crime, see A. Lincoln, The Perpetuation of Our Political Institutions, in ABPRAAm LINCOLN: HiS SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 76 (R. Basler
ed. 1946), it is surely understandable why Kaplan and any other sensible
person might be impatient with a theory of the exclusionary rule which
denies courts the constitutional freedom to judiciously and prudently employ, amend, suspend, or repeal the exclusionary rule in the interest of
deterring the police, if that be possible, or of avoiding political backlash.
Kaplan has written his article to claim such a freedom for the courts,
and to give them advice in the use of it.
Kaplan dismisses arguments for the exclusionary rule based on "fundamental constitutional implications." Kaplan, supra at 1030. He insists
that
[t]he argument for the exclusionary rule must stand or fall
simply on the basis of its demonstrated utility.... [T]he exclusionary rule is merely one arbitrary point on a continuum
between deterrence of illegal police activity and conviction of
guilty persons. As a stopping point, it can be justified solely on
the ground that it achieves a better balance between these twin
goals than would other points. If another stopping point does
the job better, it should replace the current exclusionary rule.
Id. at 1029-30. The utility of the rule is its efficacy as a deterrent discounted by its deleterious side effects. Thus "the exclusionary rule
[is worse than useless because], as structured today, its benefits in protecting the privacy of the citizen are outweighed by its associated costs
in political hostility and reduced crime control." Id. at 1032.
But apprehension about the political repercussions of employment
of the rule does not prompt Kaplan-as it does Chief Justice Burger,
see Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388, 420 (1971) (dissenting opinion)-to call for blanket repeal
of the rule. He proposes instead to restructure the rule to protect privacy without exacerbating political hostilities-to repeal it selectively
and save the remainder for what he thinks can be a salutary role. He
would forestall political backlash by admitting illegally obtained evidence "in the most serious cases-treason, espionage, murder, armed robbery, and kidnapping by organized groups," Kaplan, supra at 1046, reserving exclusion for lesser but more numerous crimes, id. at 1048, including those "nonvictim crimes" which most frequently provoke invasions of privacy. Id. at 1048-49.
The thesis of this Article is that proposals like Kaplan's are grounded
on a faulty premise. We shall argue that, unless "the Constitution is
what the judges say it is," it does not leave the Court at liberty to take
or leave just so much of the exclusionary rule as it pragmatically
chooses. We shall argue that the exclusionary rule is a fundamental constitutional implication and that it is therefore not susceptible of repeal-
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equally damaging speculation from the other side. 56 Considering
the weakness of the integrity argument as it stands, one can see
why it gives way to the deterrence argument. In defense of this
succession, it can be said that at least the deterrence rationale
does not seem puerile, and that the evils of police misconduct
it proposes to ameliorate are more palpable and less speculative
than the evils addressed by the judicial integrity rationale. But
it is precisely this forthright relationship of the deterrence rationale to police behavior which can turn the rationale into a
threat against the exclusionary rule. Calandra shows that the
very features of the argument which served the Warren Court
in implementing the rule can serve the Burger Court in dismantling it.
The exclusionist court leaves itself vulnerable to two lines
of attack by adopting the deterrence rationale. The first weakness of this rationale derives from its being a concomitant of the
fragmentary model. The core implication of the fragmentary
model is that courts have no constitutional duty to exclude evidence. So, to be honest and consistent with their model, deterrence theorists must acknowledge that they regard the exclusionary rule as what Justice Powell calls a "judicially created
[deterrence] remedy. ' 57 But, this acknowledgment means that
evidence is being excluded and prosecutions are being thwarted
by something like judicial fiat. Disclaiming any constitutional
duty to exclude unconstitutionally seized evidence, deterrence
theorists like Justice Powell create a doubt about the court's
authority to employ the remedy it has created. When the court
acknowledges that it has no constitutional business excluding evidence, the suspicion naturally arises that it has no business at
blanket or selective. In short, we shall defend a way of looking at the
rule which-in contrast to the view of Kaplan, Justice Powell, and the
great majority of commentators, see note 109 infra-can be characterized
as rigid and impolitic.
See Part VIII infra for some remarks on constitutional rights and
public necessities. See note 276 infra, where we discuss Kaplan's reasons
for believing the exclusionary rule is not a "fundamental constitutional
implication."
56. One can be sure that prophecies of evil consequences which
sound the least bit portentous will be ridiculed by critics of the judicial
integrity rationale. For example, in CalandraJustice Powell takes note
of Justice Brennan's concern "that today's decision will betray 'the imperative of judicial integrity,'. .. and even 'imperil the very foundation
of our people's trust in their Government.'" 414 U.S. at 356 n.1l. Powell
responds that "there is no basis for this alarum..... [T]he foundations
of the Republic [will not be] imperilled ... by declining to ... [enforce] the exclusionary rule . . . [in] grand jury proceedings." Id.
57. Id. at 348 (emphasis added).
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all excluding evidence. Indeed, the charge comes easily that the
exclusionist court is guilty of injudicious intermeddling with
what is solely the business of the executive-regulation of its
employees, the police-coupled with dereliction of the court's own
duty of keeping its doors open to all competent evidence. Indeed,
fragmentary premises make it easy for admissionists to characterize exclusion of unconstitutionally seized, competent evidence as a
gratuitous interruption of the natural flow of articles and information from the procurer to the fact finder. The court is pictured as neglecting its own job of facilitating that flow on the
speculation that it can diminish evil in a realm out of its ken.5 s
The seeds of the exclusionary rule's destruction are planted by
everyone, opponent or proponent, who adopts the fragmentary
model of a government and a prosecution.
The second line of attack on the deterrence rationale begins
with the observation that the exclusionary rule simply does not
deter. The deterrence rationale as an argument for the exclusionary rule depends upon a certain minor premise. Before
Mapp59 that premise was supplied by a vague hope that the rule
would deter, or by the assumption that it was the most promising
deterrent available. But after a decade of experience with Mapp,
the belief of knowledgeable observers, confirmed by the results
of studies, is that the rule does not deter, 60 or does not deter
sufficiently to compensate for its costly side effects. 61 With deterrence minimal 62 and adverse side effects apparently substan58. See, e.g., Burger, supra note 53; Plumb, Illegal Enforcement of

the Law, 24 CoRstrm L.Q. 337, 369-85 (1939)
Plumb]; Wigmore, supra note 16, at 479.

[hereinafter cited as

59. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
60. See, e.g., Oaks, supra note 43, at 672-736, and authorities cited

therein.
61. The use of the exclusionary rule imposes excessive costs on
the criminal justice system. It provides no recompense for the
innocent and it frees the guilty. It creates the occasion and incentive for large-scale lying by law enforcement officers. It di-

verts the focus of the criminal prosecution from the guilt or innocence of the defendant to a trial of the police.

Id. at 755. Other untoward consequences mentioned by Oaks are (1)

weakened substantive search and seizure rules, (2) intolerable delays in
the administration of justice, (3) greater reliance on plea bargaining, (4)
police immunization of criminals, (5) police imposition of extra-judicial
punishment, and (6) retarded development of alternative remedies. Id.

at 747-54. For a brief but provocative discussion of Oaks's findings, see
Amsterdam, supra note 28, at 475 n.593.
62. We shall assume without further argument that the exclusionary
rule is ineffectual as a deterrent, because our argument for the rule is
not related to deterrence. We are not indifferent to deterrence; we just
believe that it is not dispositive and that it has been overemphasized
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tial, it remains only to draw the conclusion that the rule is not
justified and must be repealed-a conclusion wished for by the
Chief Justice in Bivens,6 3 forsworn by Justice Powell in Calandra,
but predicted by Justice Brennan.

III. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF RIGHTS AND THE
TWOFOLD ORIGIN OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
Both the judicial integrity and the deterrence rationales
leave the exclusionary rule vulnerable to repeal. Although
spokesmen for the judicial integrity rationale avoid the shortcomings of the fragmentary conception of a prosecution, they
nevertheless tend to assume, as do the proponents of the deterrence rationale, that the defendant is not constitutionally entitled
to suppression of evidence unconstitutionally seized by the
government. They tend to assume that if the evidence is suppressed the defendant is merely the accidental beneficiary6 4 of an
exercise of the "supervisory power" 65 in his case; this assumption
is their undoing.
to the detriment of other urgent, indeed constitutional, considerations
which are properly dispositive.
63. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 420 (1971) (dissenting opinion).
64. One can also refer to the defendant as a "triggering mechanism"
or, with Chief Justice Burger, as a "private attorney general." The passage from which this latter characterization is taken testifies eloquently
to the weakness of the judicial integrity-supervisory power theory of the
exclusionary rule:
Since the Suppression Doctrine constitutes the defendant in a
criminal case as a sort of private attorney general to keep the
stream of justice pure, it is easier to understand the police reaction when the defendant succeeds in turning the tables and puts
the police department in the dock.
Burger, supra note 53, at 12. In note 171 and Part VJ infra,we consider
the differences in police and public attitudes toward the exclusionary rule
that could result from viewing the defendant as an individual demanding
that the government live up to the Constitution in its prosecution of him.
For additional references to the exclusionary rule understood on the basis
of a private attorney general model, see Oaks, supra note 43, at 671 n.25.
65. We refer to the "supervisory power" in the singular even though
the argument has correctly been made that there are two or three different judicial activities going on under this rubric. See Hill, The Bill of
Rights and the Supervisory Power, 69 CoLum. L. REv. 181, 193-94 (1969)
(hereinafter cited as Hill]. Provisionally, we shall mean by "supervisory
power" an authority the appellate courts have claimed for themselves
to review the conduct of lower courts in their own system when that
conduct is challenged by a litigant, or independently questioned by the
appellate court, on nonconstitutional grounds. The clearest extant discussion of the power is Note, The Supervisory Power of the Federal
Courts, 76 HARv. L. Rnv. 1656 (1963). The most profound treatment is
Hill, supra,.
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Justice Brandeis resorted to the supervisory power in his
Olmstead deliberations only after he had looked for, and failed
to find, a personal right to exclusion."6 Justice Brennan in
Calandra, on the other hand, seems to have assumed from the
beginning that the judicial integrity-supervisory power rationale
was his only serious option. He does not really seem to have
considered the possibility of a constitutional exclusionary right6 7
-and this omission occurs in spite of the fact that Justice Powell
had sharply drawn attention to the difference between the exclusionary rule understood as a "judicially created" supervisory
power phenomenon and the rule understood as a "personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.16 8 We intend, first, to
mark the importance of this difference for a proponent of the
exclusionary rule like Justice Brennan, who needs constitutional
reinforcement in order to overcome the "balancing" approach of
Justice Powell.69 Second, we desire to correct the impression
Justice Brennan leaves, intentionally or not, that all the judges
he calls "the framers of the rule" 70 conceptualized the problem
of improperly seized evidence the same way, or that the exclusionary rule has a single historical origin in the judicial integritysupervisory power rationale.
A. THE DIFFERENCE A RIGHT MAKES
We shall argue that there is a personal constitutional right
to exclusion-indeed that there are two such rights. 7 1 To show
what the point is in so arguing, we shall begin by addressing
the ideological partisan of the exclusionary rule, indicating to
him why his defense of the rule will be stronger when cast in
rights rather than in integrity-supervisory power language. But
we shall then go on to show that brief reflection on the superiority of the appeal to rights over the appeal to the court's discretion will suggest to the proponent of exclusion how he can and
66. See text accompanying notes 91-102 infra.
67. See note 14 supra.
68. 414 U.S. at 348.
69. Justice Powell uses the balancing metaphor, id., and in fact does
balance the deterrence benefit likely to accrue from enforcement of the
exclusionary rule in the grand jury against predictable harm to the grand
jury from interruptions caused by suppression hearings. Id. at 349-52.
But this balancing is not in service of constitutionaladjudication, because
Powell begins from the premise that no constitutional right is involved,
id. at 348; rather, it is "pragmatic"balancing by the Court in the exercise of its supervisory power. See note 171 infra.
70. 414 U.S. at 357.
71. For an exposition of the two rights thesis of this Article, see
text accompanying notes 138-39 infra.
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why he must transcend the level of mere partisanship, or why
he would not merely use the rights argument in the service of
partisanship, but would rather be a partisan of exclusion because
it is a right.
In a regime of rights consciousness, if not also in civil or
law-governed life as such,7 2 there is awareness that the appeal
to a right is different from, if not always and in every respect
stronger than, the appeal either to grace or to the general welfare. As Joel Feinberg has put it with respect to grace:
Rights are not mere gifts or favors, motivated by love or pity,
for which gratitude is the sole fitting response. A right is some72. By "regime of rights consciousness" we refer to the special
prominence rights-natural, moral, human, and constitutional-have had
in the thought and speech of Western man since Hobbes, or at any rate
since his step-grandchild, the French Revolution. Of Hobbes's political
doctrine, Leo Strauss wrote as follows:
Since the fundamental and absolute moral fact is a right and
not a duty, the function as well as the limits of civil society must
be defined in terms of man's natural right and not in terms of
his natural duty. The state has the function, not of producing
or promoting a virtuous life, but of safeguarding the natural
right of each. And the power of the state finds its absolute limit
in that natural right and in no other moral fact. If we may
call liberalism that political doctrine which regards as the fundamental political fact the rights, as distinguished from the duties,
of man and which identifies the function of the state with the
protection or the safeguarding of those rights, we must say that
the founder of liberalism was Hobbes.
L. STRAuss, NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY 181-82 (1953) (footnotes omitted). Writing of the same phenomenon, Simone Weil referred to "[tihis
bargaining spirit [which] was already implicit in the notion of rights
which the men of 1789 so unwisely made the keynote of their deliberate
challenge to the world." S. WEIL, SELECTED EssAys, 1934-43 at 18 (1962).
See also Salkever, Virtue, Obligationand Politics, 68 Am. POL. Sci. R v.

78 (1974).
Our reference to "civil or law-governed life as such" is meant to
suggest that assumptions about rights may necessarily underlie political
and legal discourse even when that discourse is inarticulate about them,
abstracts from them, or deemphasizes them in favor of duties. In commenting on the Greeks, H.L.A. Hart comes near to denying that the notion of a moral right is conceptually integral to the notion of a civil or
legal order. H.L.A. Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights?, in PoLI.ICA
PHILosoPHY 54 n.2 (A. Quinton ed. 1967). Gregory Vlastos takes issue
with him in Vlastos, Justice and Happiness in the Republic, in 2 PLATO:
A COLLECTION OF CRTICAL. EssAys 75 n.28 (G. Vlastos ed. 1971). Consider
alo Professor Dworkin's assertion:
[Government officials] must show that they understand what
rights are, and they must not cheat on the full implications of
the doctrine [of rights]. The government will not re-establish
respect for law without giving the law some claim to respect.
It cannot do that if it neglects the one feature that distinguishes
law from ordered brutality ...

.

If the government does not

take rights seriously, then it does not take law seriously either.
Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, in Is LAw DEAD? 168, 194 (E. Rostow
ed. 1971). See also 2 Samuel 12:1-6.
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thing a man can stand on, something that can be demanded or
insisted upon without embarrassment or shame.7 3
The relationship between the appeal to a right-let us now be
more specific and say a constitutional right-and an appeal to
the general welfare is more complicated. The right may have
been acknowledged or declared in the Constitution at least partly
because the framers believed that certain activity, for example
political speech, is transcendently conducive to the general welfare, or part and parcel with it. Under this hypothesis, there is a
utilitarian reason for giving an activity a privileged status, and
that reason is precisely to prevent subsequent political suppression of the activity from being rationalized by appeals to the general welfare. Many critics of the "balancing" approach to the
Bill of Rights have made this point, but none better than Justice
Jackson:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain
subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place
them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's
right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press,
freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights
may not be submitted
to vote; they depend on the outcome of
74
no elections.
Ultimately, however, the hypothesis that constitutional rights
stem exclusively from utilitarian considerations is dubious.7 r For
example, although freedom of expression may be regarded as a
safeguard of "those political processes which can ordinarily be
expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation"70 3 or
as generally indispensable to self-government,77 this is not the
73.

J. .FEINBERO, SOCIAL PHMIOSOPHY 58 (1973).

74. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638
(1943).
75. Consider the relevance to a discussion of constitutional rights
of Professor H.L.A. Hart's evaluation of Bentham's views on legal and
moral rights:
While disapproving of all talk of non-legal rights he alows...
that it sometimes has a meaning, viz. when it is simply an obscure way of asserting that there are good utilitarian reasons for
creating a legal right with its corresponding duty. But here it
is important to stress that though we may often insist that certain legal rights should be created simply because we believe
society in the aggregate will on the whole be better off if this
is done, this is not what is meant by the assertion that someone
has a moral right.
H.L.A. Hart, Bentham, 48 PROCEEDINGS OF THE BRITISH ACADmY 316
(1962).
76. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4
(1938).
77. See G. ANASTAPLO, THE CoNsTIrrU= oNAITsT: NOTES ON THE FIRST
AwINDNNT 115-20 (1971); A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM (1960).
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only reason for acknowledging a man's right to speak. Another
is that he thinks he has something worth saying. And in general
it can be said that the utilitarian reasons adduced for giving constitutional acknowledgment to various rights do not satisfactorily
account for the reactions when those same rights are violated.
When a property owner is denied fair market value in condemnation proceedings, or a Black Muslim is denied his mode of worship, or an accused is prevented from confronting his accuser or
is placed repeatedly in jeopardy, the observer wants to say that
wrongs have been done to the person entirely apart from the
78
general welfare.
78. There are two anti-personal rights arguments in the fourth
amendment literature that cannot be classified as attempts to assimilate
rights claims to utilitarian statements. One, which we shall discuss in
note 85 inffra, is that a person's right to privacy may be forfeited by criminal "abuse" of that privacy. The other is that, in the interest of securing
privacy and "persons, houses, papers, and effects" against their natural
enemy-the police-we should agree to treat the fourth amendment as
a regulation of the police rather than as a repository of individual rights.
Professor Amsterdam-the author of this latter proposal-can be said to
argue for it somewhat as follows.
The fourth amendment is what it does. But what it does, it does
through the exclusionary rule, and the exclusionary rule is administered
to deter or regulate the police. Although courts pay "lip service to the
view that the fourth amendment is a collection of portable little spheres
of interest in which you and I and the defendants plunge about like
swimmers in so many diving bells," Amsterdam, supra note 28, at 369,
in reality they are treating the amendment (through the rule) as "a general regulation of police behavior." Id. What courts should do is to
admit "that the regulation of police behavior is what the fourth amendment is all about," id., any judicial talk of personal rights of privacy
to the contrary notwithstanding. They should admit as much because
"it makes a difference whether regulation [of the police] is conceived
to be the primary thrust of the amendment or a mere by-product of the
amendment's protection of isolated enclaves of individual interest against
invasion by particular police actions." Id. at 371. And the difference
it makes, as Amsterdam shows with a variety of examples, is that privacy would be maximized if courts would treat the amendment as a police regulation, and would take their bearings from the norm of police
conduct most conducive to the privacy of the people at large ("regulatory
view," id. at 370) rather than from the rights of a given individual search
and seizure victim ("atomistic view," id.).
If, as we suggest, Amsterdam makes the amendment over in the
image of the exclusionary rule, it is the exclusionary rule understood
according to deterrence premises that is the image. To be sure, Amsterdam deprecates simpleminded deterrence notions. Id. at 431. But, if one
uses "deterrence theory" as we have used it in this Article-to signify
any theory that ascribes to the exclusionary rule the purpose of controlling the police rather than the purpose of avoiding judicial furtherance
of governmental wrongdoing-then it is clear that Amsterdam's "regulatory" theory is simply a systematized species of our deterrence genus.
It is also clear that Amsterdam shows how the deterrence theory of the
exclusionary rule has transformed, or will be allowed to transform, the
amendment itself.
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Now one can do as we have done and indicate why rights
are constitutionalized and allude to the way people react when
Amsterdam does not seem to want to transform the amendment into
a simple utilitarian proposition, because the good or freedom he sees it
maximizing-freedom from governmental intrusion-is not necessarily
coterminous with the general welfare, and because he seems to place a
right holder in the premises to resist surrender of fourth amendment
rights to the general welfare. But, paradoxically, the right holder is the
people at large, whose interest is usually thought to be closely related
to the general welfare. "[W]hy," asks Amsterdam, "when the fourth
amendment speaks of '[t]he right of the people,' is it thought to mean
the 'personal rights' of isolated individuals? Why does it not speak of
'the people' as in 'We the People' or-since I am driving at the point
that the amendment's purpose may be squarely to control the policeas in 'Power to the People'?" Id. at 367. One possible answer to this
question is that solicitude for personal rights has been ascribed to the
fourth amendment because it is hard to envision public bodies like constituent assemblies exercising the right of privacy. If "We the People,"
who performed that most public act of ordaining a Constitution, were,
in that constituent capacity, to be the holder of the right of privacy, they
would be a right holder who could never exercise the right.
If, however, the right holder is not "We the People," but-leaving
"Power to the People" out of consideration for a moment-"just everybody," i.e., all the privacy-experiencing individuals, then in what sense
if at all has Amsterdam removed the right from the individual? Is each
a proxy for all, or all for each? And in what capacity does a Webster
Bivens (see Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)) sue, if he still may sue, for violations
of (whose?) constitutional rights? (The one status that the Amsterdam
proposal does not alter is that of the movant for suppression, who is
already assumed by many judges and commentators to be a mere triggering mechanism or "private attorney general." See note 64 supra.)
Many of the characteristics of the Amsterdam proposal are traceable
to its being an extrapolation from two situations in which "the people,"
as in "Power to the People," clearly are set over against an occupying
army-revolutionary America and today's ghettos and barrios. Amsterdam, supra note 28, at 400. The obvious objections that might be lodged
against interpreting the fourth amendment on the basis of the occupation
model are, first, that even during wartime suspected Tories, fifth columnists, and police informers may arguably have rights against unjustified
search and seizure-although, to be sure, "the People" will not acknowledge those rights; and, second, that after the revolution the people may
become, for example, "The People of the State of New York," as in People v. Jones. And then, as is an extremely old story, the erstwhile collective right holder may wish to "waive" the rights it has been holdingin view of the radically new circumstances brought about by its becoming the government.
The idea of having a right violated is frequently associated with the
idea of suffering some kind of wrong, and we often think that having
a right is just that-a claim not to be wronged in a certain way. But,
if "the people" is the right holder, how is it wronged, and hence how
is its right violated, when the door of the suspected "pusher," spy, rapist,
or murderer is kicked down on mere suspicion-especially if the suspect
turns out in fact to be "an enemy of the people"? And if some mistakes
are made, the people as a whole will not be wronged; or at any rate
they will not be harmed-they will be benefited-by a practice of hunch
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these rights are violated, and then prepare to apply these general
conclusions about rights to the particular claim in issue, i.e., the
alleged personal constitutional exclusionary right. But, this circuitous approach is not necessary, because the forcefulness of the
personal exclusionary right argument has been shown more directly, by an act as it were. In Edward Barrett's well-regarded
critique of the exclusionary rule,7 9 he eloquently attests to the
power of a personal right argument by the lengths he goes to
demonstrate the invalidity of that argument.
There are, Barrett says, three conceivable arguments for the
exclusionary rule-deterrence, judicial integrity, and "the defendant['s] . . . right to exclusion."3 0 He is able to dispose of the
first two with relative ease. The deterrence argument is bad
because exclusion does not deter.3 1 The judicial integrity rationale, as Barrett finds it in the literature, can be made to seem
derivative from or dependent on utilitarian, general welfare arguments, and can therefore be made to seem defeasible in face
of stronger arguments for more urgent utilities. As he asks in
a passage which bears repetition:
Suppose a policeman by an illegal search has obtained evidence
which establishes the defendant as a peddler of narcotics to juveniles. Where lies the duty of the judge? Can we assume
from any general social point of view that.., the duty of the
judge is to reject the evidence and free the defendant?8 2
The personal exclusionary right argument, on the other
hand, puts Barrett to considerably more trouble. Consider, he
83
says, two celebrated bookmaking cases:
The police acted illegally in entering the defendants' homes.
The defendants acted illegally in engaging in bookmaking in
and harrassment, up to the point where the police become the greater
threat to the security of the people than are the "criminal classes." But
long before that point is reached, we will have moved from a rights to
a utilitarian orientation.
In short, one should hesitate to embrace the Amsterdam regulatory
proposal. It is difficult to see why we should look forward to a time
when, to borrow Professor Dellinger's words, "the fourth amendment is
[no longer to be] read ... as conferring ... a personal right to be free
of unwarranted searches and seizures, and . . . [when] the justice that

is due [under the amendment] is [no longer] justice to individuals ...
[but is] merely justice to formless groupings of the citizenry ...

."

Del-

linger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARv.
L. REv. 1532, 1553 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Dellinger].
79. Barrett, supra note 50.
80. Id. at 579.
81. Id. at 582-88.
82. Id. at 582.
83. Id. at 579-81. The cases referred to are Irvine v. California, 347
U.S. 128 (1954), and People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
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their homes. ...
[I]f one were to look only to the rights of the
defendants, why would it not be reasonable to take the position
that by engaging in bookmaking within their houses they had
waived their constitutional right to privacy and could in no
event complain of the police entries... ?84

The breathtaking possibilities implicit in this suggestion show
'how far one intelligent admissionist felt he had to go to undermine any appearance of an exclusionary right-or what a
healthy respect he has for the forcefulness of a rights argument.
In his determination to discredit the exclusionary right he annihilates the coordinate right to be free from nonprobable-cause
searches.8 5
84. Barrett, supra note 50, at 581.
85. The passage quoted is one of the most remarkable utterances
by a responsible commentator in all of the exclusionary rule literature
and accordingly should be exhibited more fully:
This concern with the rights of the defendant, it is submitted,
will not withstand closer analysis. The constitutional provisions
do not guarantee a right to commit crime within the four walls
of one's abode secure from police intrusion. Rather, the import
of the constitutional provisions is that the police shall not engage
in indiscriminate searches where probable cause has not been
clearly demonstrated. Hence they expressly recognize that pursuant to a search warrant properly obtained and sufficiently precise in its definition of the scope of the search, the police may
search a person's dwelling, and even if he has not committed
a crime and no evidence is found he cannot complain of violation
of his privacy. Where the police have reasonable grounds for
believing that an individual's right to be secure in his person,
house, papers, and effects is being abused for the purpose of
committing a crime, they may search him or his premises by
following the proper procedure.
Consider, for example, the situations involved in the Irvine
and Cahan cases. The defendants in those cases were using the
privacy of their homes for the purpose of violating the laws
against bookmaking. The police, instead of following the prescribed procedures and getting search warrants, made surreptitious entries and installed dictographs for the purpose of overhearing conversations. The police acted illegally in entering the
defendants' homes. The defendants acted illegally in engaging
in bookmaking in their homes. Why should they have any personal right to be freed from the consequences of their own illegal
acts because of illegal police intrusions upon a privacy which
they were abusing? In fact, if one were to look only to the
rights of the defendants, why would it not be reasonable to take
the position that by engaging in bookmaking within their houses
they had waived their constitutional right to privacy and could
in no event complain of the police entries--reserving, of course,
a civil action for damages to recover for any unnecessary damages to property or violence to the person?
Id. at 580-81. It is uncertain whether Barrett confines this waiver potency only to crimes committed in private or-a different question-why
he limits the waiver to the right of privacy. There may be some poetic
justice in such a limitation, but are there good logical, moral, or legal
reasons for coordinating the forfeiture so rigorously with the crime? If
one can so readily lose his right to be free from promiscuous police invasions because of what those invasions reveal he has done in private, what
besides arbitrary prejudice is to prevent the principle of waiver from

1974]

EXCLUSIONARY

RULE

In effect, Barrett acknowledges that recognition of a right
is usually tantamount to settlement of the moral question of
having an effect also, for example, upon his right to silence, or his right
not to be placed twice in jeopardy, or, for that matter, his right to due
process of law?
Barrett has followed through consistently on the forfeiture theme by
denying any civil recovery for the unprovoked invasion itself: the privacy abusers "could in no event complain of the police entries." But
he does not explain why one who has abused his privacy retains his right
against property damage or violence to his person. As Wigmore explained, in reply to Justice Holmes's characterization of the Olmstead
wiretapping crime as "dirty business,"
[blut so is likely to be all apprehension of malefactors. Kicking
a man in the stomach is "dirty business," normally viewed. But
if a gunman assails you, and you know enough of the French
art of "savatage" to kick him in the stomach and thus save your
life, is that "dirty business" for you?
Wigmore, Constitutional Law-Fourth Amendment-Telephone WireTapping as a Violation, 23 Nw. U.L. REv. 377, 378 (1928). With adoption
of the doctrine of forfeiture (which is presumably antithetical to what
Packer called "the doctrine of legal guilt," PACKER, supra note 48, at
166), the burden of justification shifts: whereas the practitioners of unconstitutional police methods had been on the defensive, now the proponents of due process are; for they are no longer able to show the point
of constitutionalism or law-governed response to crime (there being no
such point)-nor able to supply grounds for not identifying suspects as
potential enemies of society subject to disqualification from the lawgoverned practice of punishment and vulnerable to mere "acts of hostil202-09 (Oakshott ed. 1947). For a
ity." See T. HOBBES, LxmATHI
specification of one condition necessary to punishment, see Griffiths,
Ideology in Criminal Procedure or A Third "Model" of the Criminal
Process, 79 YAIx L.J. 359, 387 n.99 (1970). For remarks on enmity and
acts of hostility within American due process of law, see id. at 384-86.
Consider, in particular, the following observation on exclusionary rules:
[A]mong the standard arguments for the exclusionary rules attached to the Fourth and Fifth Amendments is the necessity to
find effective means of protecting the innocent-one sometimes
wonders how much remains of the idea that guilty defendants,
too, are entitled to have the integrity of their persons and homes
protected.
Id. at 384-85 (footnotes omitted). See also note 55 supra. But see Note,
Search and Seizure in the Supreme Court: Shadows on the Fourth
Amendment, 28 U. Cm:. L. REv. 664, 673 n.49 (1961) ("Arguably, neither
the exclusionary rule nor the fourth amendment which it was designed
to enforce has as its purpose the protection of any but the innocent.")
Upon encountering Barrett's forfeiture doctrine, one might be
tempted to say that one of the more perverse effects of the exclusionary
rule is the dangerous arguments it provokes. But perhaps these arguments should be viewed as fundamental rather than dangerous: there
is no denying that the controversy about the exclusionary rule gets down
to fundamentals. The critic of the rule says the criminal must not go
free because the constable blundered. The defender, on the other hand,
says a constitutional government simply does not violate fundamental
constitutional rights while enforcing the law. And Barrett asks, with
reference to the defendant's erstwhile right to privacy, What right?
Or take another fundamental category, the relationship between
means and ends. Justice Brandeis had tried to bring things to a head
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what should be done where the right is validly claimed. But
this is to acknowledge that, if a person considering the exclusionary rule controversy is persuaded that there is an exclusionary
right, and if he experiences the ordinary moral response to a claim
of right, then he will no longer view the rule merely as a measure
about which reasonable men may differ, or which he can elect
to either favor or disfavor for merely utilitarian reasons. If the
proponent of exclusion-or for that matter the erstwhile opponent-recognizes a right to exclusion, and if he shares the
general understanding of what that recognition entails, he will
thereby see that utilitarian reasons for the rule are redundant
and that utilitarian reasons againstthe rule are ineffective unless
they are of a very special order of urgency. If there is a right
to exclusion, the least one can say is that the burden of persuasion 'has been shifted to those who would repeal the rule, 6 and
that the "balancing process" candidly employed by Justice
Powell8 7 is simply inappropriate.
But, in Calandra,Justice Brennan is not thinking that there
might be an exclusionary right; 88 he is not thinking about the
by insisting, with the admission of illegally obtained evidence in mind,
that

[t]o declare that in the administration of the criminal law the
end justifies the means-to declare that the Government may
commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private
criminal-would bring terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this Court should resolutely set its face.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1927). Interestingly
enough, one of the prominent critics of the exclusionary rule honestly
believed that he could consistently call for admission and at the same
time echo Brandeis's sentiment. According to William Plumb:
The fact that evidence of crime was found by a search unlawful
in its inception does not purge the search of its illegality. This
much must be admitted. For we cannot accept the ]hilosophy
that the end justifies the means, that the law-violating officer
is to be excused if his offense reveals another.
Plumb, supra note 58, at 377 (emphasis added, footnotes omitted). But

Plumb can have it both ways and be an admissionist who denies that

the end justifies the means only by fragmenting the governmental relationship and letting the officer take all the blame. Barrett, on the other
hand, at least in the passage under consideration, does not fall back on
the fragmentary model-he gets down to fundamentals by choosing one
of the mutually exclusive propositions. For him, finding evidence of
crime does purge the search of its illegality because the fact that a crime
had been committed has made it impossible for there to be an illegal
search (leaving aside the matter of excessive force). When Barrett suggests that the crime constitutes a waiver of the constitutional right to
privacy, he is excusing the officer and he is saying that "a search unlawful in its inception" becomes legal because "evidence of crime was found
by" it.
86. See text accompanying note 339 infra.
87. 414 U.S. at 348.

88. See note 14 supra.
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way rights work; he is therefore not prepared to counter Justice
Powell's balancing process-not prepared to react as he would
if,for example, the same kind of reasoning were commended to
him in a first amendment setting. Because of both an historical
error and a conceptual mistake, Brennan assumes the truth' of
what Powell asserts, i.e., that there is no personal right to the
exclusion of unconstitutionally seized evidence.

B. AN HISTORICAL ERROR
Brennan accuses Powell of forgetting "the historical objective and purpose of the rule."8 9 It turns out, however, that there
is not just one, but there are three historical understandings of
the rule-the two judicial integrity-supervisory power approaches of Olmstead, and the fourth amendment personal right
thesis of Weeks. Although Brennan quotes from the Weeks opinion, he ignores its personal exclusionary right holding,90 leaving
the impression that it is just another judicial integrity case,
thereby helping to perpetuate the all but total present oblivion
of the Weeks personal right alternative, just when defenders of
the rule need to be sharply reminded of it.
Our own interest in the Weeks case does not stem, however,
from a desire to supply an argument for beleaguered partisans
of the rule. Our thinking is more ambitious than that. We want
to revitalize understanding of the Weeks opinion because we
think it contains both a correct interpretation of the fourth
amendment and the best extant suggestion of the conceptual
linkage between seizure and use of evidence. What ultimately
needs to be done, and what we shall do in Part IV of this Article,
is to show -how Justice Day anticipated the one-government approach of the Olmstead dissents, and joined it with a personal
right to support a unitary interpretation of the fourth amendment. But we will be in no position to appreciate the genius
of the Weeks combination so long as we are unaware that there
are separate elements to be combined. So in the remainder of
this Part we shall simply and briefly distinguish between the
integrity doctrine of the Olmstead dissents, and the personal
right aspect of Weeks. For that purpose we must recall the different backgrounds of the opinions in those two cases.
Writing for a unanimous Court in Weeks v. United States,9 1
89. 414 U.s. at 356.
90. Id. at 357-58.
91. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
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an indubitable fourth amendment case, Justice Day recognized
a personal fourth amendment right to exclusion. Although he
expressed a serious concern for judicial integrity, 92 the ultimate
point and the dominant moral thrust of his opinion was precisely
the constitutional exclusionary right.9 3 By contrast, the portions
of the Olmstead dissents from which Justice Brennan quotes in
Calandraand with which we are dealing here could not, in the
view of their authors, be predicated on a constithtional exclusionary right, and therefore had to be predicated on judicial integrity or some other supervisory power rationale standing alone.
Brandeis and Holmes perceived such a necessity because they
were on the losing side of a controversy over whether the fourth
amendment applied at all to wiretapping.94 As they understood
the effect of their defeat on the coverage point, it precluded them
from making constitutional arguments for exclusion because the
Olmstead majority had held that there was no constitutional violation in the procurement.9 5
Justice Brandeis devoted a section of his dissent to disputing
the majority's denial of fourth amendment coverage to wiretapping, and a part of that section dealt with the theory under which
he would have excluded the evidence had the coverage issue been
decided his way.9 6 Brandeis invoked the doctrine of Boyd v.
United States,97 under which the fifth amendment becomes, as
92. Id. at 391-92, 394.
93. [T]here was involved in the order refusing the application

[for suppression and return of the letters] a denial of the constitutional rights of the accused . . . . [I]n holding [the letters]
and permitting their use upon the trial, we think prejudicial error was committed.
Id. at 398.
94. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928).
95. But see note 277 infrTa.
96. 277 U.S. at 477-79.
97. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). Justice Brandeis was not the last postWeeks Justice to appeal beyond Weeks to Boyd. At least three Justices
writing opinions on the exclusionary rule within the last fifteen years
have apparently believed the Weeks doctrine is either beneath mention
as a personal rights rationale for exclusion, or that it is in need of moral
support from the Boyd doctrine. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents
of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 412-13 (1971) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 646-47, 657 (1961) (Clark, J.);
id. at 661-63 (Black, J., concurring). Continued vitality of the Boyd doctrine is thus an impediment to clear thinking about the Weeks constitutional exclusionary rights thesis.
An 1863 Act, "the first [of its kind] . . . in this country . . . or in
England," 116 U.S. at 622, "authorized the search and seizure of a man's
private papers, or the compulsory production of them, for the purpose
of using them in evidence against him in a criminal case, or in a proceeding to enforce the forfeiture of his property." Id. at 622-23. Apparently
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it were, the fourth's exclusionary rule. Thus he declined to follow Weeks and find exclusionary potency in the unaided fourth
amendment. But he then went on to argue that the evidence
this Act and its 1867 reenactment were unpopular, for in 1874 Congress
repealed the search and seizure provisions, retaining only the subpoenalike compulsory process, augmented by the provision that, should the defendant "fail or refuse to produce [the papers demanded] . . .the allegations stated in the.., motion shall be taken as confessed, . . ." Id. at

620, quoting Act of June 22, 1874, ch. 391, § 5, 18 Stat. 187. The Boyds
were served under this statute in a forfeiture proceeding.
Concurring with the holding against the Government, Justice Miller
urged a simple self-incrimination rationale for reversing the lower court's
employment of this unconstitutional compulsion. 116 U.S. at 638-41.
But, writing for the Court, Justice Bradley did not accept that simple,
logical, and correct solution. Instead, he insisted on bringing the fourth
amendment into the affair, see, e.g., id. at 621-22, 624-25, despite the absence, as Miller and countless commentators have pointed out, of either
a search or a seizure. One repercussion of this almost inscrutable deed
is especially noteworthy: Bradley does a great and revolutionary thing
by getting courts to think about the exclusion of seized evidence; but
in the very same motion he ties the fourth amendment so closely to the
fifth, id. at 632-35, that, with the notable exception of Weeks and its
progeny, judges have refrained from asking the fourth amendment to
perform exclusionary labors single-handedly. In Boyd, Bradley seemed
to be bringing the fourth to the aid of the already sufficient fifth, but
the effect of what he did was to make later judges think the fifth had
to be brought to the aid of the fourth. And one upshot of that prejudice
is that present day opponents of the exclusionary rule think they have
dispatched the constitutional personal rights basis for the exclusionary
rule when they have discredited the Boyd fourth-fifth combination.
Bradley both established and undermined the exclusionary rule in the
same opinion.
Justice Black, one of the five-man majority in Mapp, justified his
abandonment of Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), on his discovery,
or new appreciation, of the Boyd fourth-fifth doctrine. Mapp v. Ohio,
supra, at 661-63. Justice Clark, writing for the plurality in Mapp, also
relied on the Boyd doctrine, along with the deterrence and judicial integrity rationales and the Weeks fourth amendment doctrine. Id. at 64647, 657. See also Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 30 (1963) (Clark, J.)
("In Mapp v. Ohio ... we followed Boyd v. United States . .. which
held that the Fourth Amendment, implemented by the self-incrimination
clause of the Fifth, forbids the Federal Government to convict a man
of crime by using testimony or papers obtained from him by unreasonable searches and seizures as defined in the Fourth Amendment. We
specifically held in Mapp that this constitutional prohibition is enforceable against the States through the Fourteenth Amendment." (footnotes
omitted)) But see Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); Rosenfeld, The Fourth and Fifth Amendments-Dimensions of an "Intimate
Relationship," 13 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 857 (1966). The credit Black and
Clark extended to the Boyd doctrine provided Chief Justice Burger with
an opportunity to discredit the personal rights approach to the exclusionary rule without ever having to discuss the Weeks fourth amendment
analysis. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 414-15 (1971). But see id. at 412-13, where he mentions but misrepresents Weeks. Burger says there are three rationales
for the rule: deterrence, id. at 413; the "sporting contest" theory, which
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obtained by the Prohibition officers should have been excluded
as a matter of judicial integrity, "[i]ndependently of the constiis what he calls the judicial integrity theses of the Brandeis and Holmes
Olmstead dissents, id. at 414; and finally:
The exclusionary rule has also been justified on the theory
that the relationship between the Self-Incrimination Clause of
the Fifth Amendment and the Fourth Amendment requires the
supression of evidence seized in violation of the latter. (citing
opinions from Boyd, Wolf, and Mapp]

Even ignoring, however, the decisions of this Court that have
held that the Fifth Amendment applies only to "testimonial" disclosures ....

it seems clear that the Self-Incrimination Clause

does not protect a person from the seizure of evidence that is
incriminating. It protects a person only from being the conduit
by which the police acquire evidence. Mr. Justice Holmes once
put it succinctly, "A party is privileged from producing the evidence, but not from its production." Johnson v. United States,
228 U.S. 457. 458 (1913).
Id. at 414-15. We agree with everything the Chief Justice says about
Boyd, but we deplore the fact that he has been given an excuse by Black
and Clark to even mention Boyd, to say nothing of deriving satisfaction
from discrediting its doctrine.
Although Bradley's preoccupation with the evidentiary aspect of
searches and seizures is a healthy counterpoise to the privacy preoccupation of much latter-day fourth amendment discussion, his evidentiary
emphasis is clearly, even outrageously, excessive. (Indeed, Bradley's
doctrine is a perfect caricature of the evidentiary transaction interpretation of the fourth amendment we offer in Part IV infra.) Not only is
Bradley's opinion the source of the mere evidence rule, see Gouled v.
United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921), which has now been discarded, see
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), but, because of its evidentiary
preoccupation, it is shockingly casual about the invasion of privacy that
is part and parcel with search and seizure. For example, trying to assimilate the subroena characteristics of the 1874 Act to a search and
seizure, Justice Bradley says:
It is true that certain aggravating incidents of actual search and
seizure, such as forcible entry into a man's house and searching
amongst his papers, are wanting, and to this extent the proceecding under the act of 1874 is a mitigation of that which was authorized by the former acts; but it accomplishes the substantial
object of those acts in forcing from a party evidence against himself. It is our opinion, therefore, that a compulsory production
of a man's private papers to establish a criminal charge against
him, or to forfeit his property, is within the scope of the Fourth
Amendment to the Constitution, in all cases in which a search
and seizure would be; because it is a material ingredient, and
effects the sole object and purpose of search and seizure.
116 U.S. at 622. One can say, indeed, that the meaning Bradley attaches
to "search and seizure" in the fourth amendment is exactly coterminous
with the meaning he gives to "unreasonablesearch and seizure," id., because the hallmark he ascribes to each is the evidentiary "object and
purpose," which is for him per se unreasonable. The search is a search
for the same reason that it is unreasonable, and so "search" loses its
generic quality and "unreasonable" ceases to be a term of distinction.
Although we have been critical of the Bradley opinion, perhaps there
are grounds for Justice Brandeis's assessment that Boyd is a case that
"will be remembered as long as civil liberty lives in the United States."
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928). And perhaps Justice
Brennan has explained why:
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tutional question," because the evidence had been obtained in violation of state law.9 8 And this was roughly where Justice Holmes joined him:
While I do not deny it, I am not prepared to say that the penumbra of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments covers the defendant ....

But I think, as Mr. Justice Brandeis says, that,

apart from the Constitution, the government ought not to use
9
evidence obtained ...

by a criminal act. 9

[T]he Court in Boyd v. United States . .. and in subsequent
cases has commented upon the intimate relationship between the
privilege against unlawful searches and seizures and that against
self-incrimination. This has been said to be erroneous history;
if it was, it was even less than a harmless error; it was part
of the process through which the Fourth Amendment, by means
of the exclusionary rule, has become more than a dead letter
in the federal courts.
Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 255 (1960) (dissenting opinion)
(footnotes omitted).
98. Independently of the constitutional question, I am of the
opinion that the judgment should be reversed. By the laws of
Washington, wire-tapping is a crime....
To prove its case, the
government was obliged to lay bare the crimes committed by
its officers on its behalf. A federal court should not permit such
a prosecution to continue.
277 U.S. at 479-80 (footnotes omitted). Even Professor Hill, who is critical of the general pronouncements about judicial integrity-supervisory
power door-closing in the Olmstead dissents, seems to agree that the result the dissenters call for is correct-because of the statutory violation
by the officers:
It was the criminal conduct, rather than distaste for wiretapping,
which was the basis of the "unclean hands" contention of Justice
Brandeis. The latter did indeed have strong words of condemnation for wiretapping, but this was solely in connection with
the separate constitutional issue. As for Justice Holmes, he saw
the Government's position as one of "pay[ing] its officers for
[getting] evidence by crime," and then asking the courts in effect
to act as accessories. It was this that he called "dirty business,"
rather than, as commonly assumed, wiretapping as such.
....

In general.., the effect of a willful violation of state

law by federal law enforcement officers would seem to be a
proper subject for determination by the federal judiciary.
Hill, supra note 65, at 202.
99. 277 U.S. at 469-70. Justice Holmes was much closer to Weeks
than was Justice Brandeis. Not only does he question the wisdom of
Brandeis's reliance on Boyd, see note 97 supra, and the "penumbra of
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments," but he also gives Weeks credit for
overthrowing the key slogan of the fragmentary model:
I am aware of the often repeated statement that in a criminal
proceeding the Court will not take notice of the manner in which
papers offered in evidence have been obtained. But that somewhat rudimentary mode of disposing of the question has been
overthrown by Weeks v. United States. ...
277 U.S. at 470-71. Holmes's fidelity to Weeks is also manifest in his
opinion for the Court in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251
U.S. 385 (1920), the core of which is simply a restatement of what he
takes to be the Weeks principle, namely, that "[t]he essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that ...
evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court ....

392. See notes 111, 150, and 167 infra.

."

Id. at
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The judicial integrity argument of Justice Brandeis, being
nonconstitutional, is also-or thereby-not a personal right argument. As Justice Brandeis says, the "clean hands" principle will
be invoked "despite the wish to the contrary of all parties to
the litigation.... The court protects itself."'10 0 This and the other
100. 277 U.S. at 485. This passage and its context have drawn fire
from commentators, some of it justified, some not. For example, Justice
Brandeis has been taken to task for invoking a private law principleequitable at that-in a criminal law context. It has been said that he
errs here because the government as prosecutor, unlike the complainant
in equity, does not stand to gain personally by its unfairness or abuse
of process. Note, The Judge-Made Supervisory Power of the Federal
Courts, 53 GEo. L.J. 1050, 1070-7.1 (1965). Brandeis has also been criticized because the "criminal courts, exist for the protection of society, and
they fail this purpose, this duty, if they release a prisoner in the face
of evidence of his guilt because another has failed the same duty."
Plumb, supra note 58, at 378. In short, the clean-hands doctrine demands
irresponsible self-indulgence from criminal courts.
But merely to quote Brandeis on the point is to show that he did
not invoke the clean-hands doctrine naively. Brandeis had asked
whether the Supreme Court would, "by sustaining the judgment below,
sanction such conduct on the part of the Executive [as was revealed in
the Olmstead record]," 277 U.S. at 483. His own response was that
[t]he governing principle has long been settled. It is that a
court will not redress a wrong when he who invokes its aid has
unclean hands. The maxim of unclean hands comes from courts
of equity. But the principle prevails also in courts of law. Its
common application is in civil actions between private parties.
Where the Government is the actor, the reasons for applying it
are even more persuasive. Where the remedies invoked are
those of the criminal law, the reasons are compelling.
Id. at 483-84 (footnotes omitted). At all times cognizant of the difference between civil and criminal actions, Justice Brandeis was contending
that the case for insisting on prosecutorial "clean hands" or fairness is
more powerful than the counterpart case for purity of the private plaintiff-probably on two grounds. In Brandeis's words, "[o]ur government
is the potent, the omnipresent, teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches
the whole people by its example." Id. at 485. In addition, there is something about the "remedies... of the criminal law" that makes the "reasons .

.

. [for scrupulousness and fairness] compelling." If he had been

of Holmes's mind about punishment, Brandeis would have insisted on
a candid recognition that the criminal defendant and the state are in an
openly adversary relationship because the state as plaintiff openly proposes to "profit" or "gain" at the expense of the defendant in a way
that the official theory of civil litigation would deny to the private plaintiff, who is, after all, supposed only to keep or make himself whole. In
a letter Holmes had said:
If I were having a philosophical talk with a man I was going
to have hanged (or electrocuted) I should say, "I don't doubt
that your act was inevitable for you but to make it more avoidable by others we propose to sacrifice you to the common good.
You may regard yourself as a soldier dying for your country if
you like. But the law must keep its promises." I fear that the
touch of sentiment that I notice in your political writing will
be revolted at this, but personally I feel neither doubt nor scruple.
1 HoLrs-LAsKi Lmrzns 806 (M. Howe ed. 1953), quoted in J. KAPLAN,
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differences we have noted or shall note between the Weeks opinion and the Olmstead dissents are not taken into account by
Justice Brennan, who writes as if Justices Day, Brandeis, and
(1973). The
inappropriateness of Brandeis's invocation of the clean-hands doctrine is
not proved, then, by pointing, as do the Note writer and Plumb, to the
fact that Olmstead was a criminal prosecution. For that is just a way
of asking, not answering, what inference is to be made from the fact
that it was a criminal rather than a civil case.
A more cogent objection to the clean-hands, judicial integrity exclusionary rationale is lodged by Professor Hill. It is that the courts do
CRImINAL JUsTicE: INTRODUCTORY CASES AND MaATERiAus 16

not have the authority to "close their doors" to, or thwart, prosecutions
merely because of "Official Conduct Not Violative of Constitutional or
Statutory Provisions, But Wrongful From a Judicial Perspective." Hill,
supra note 65, at 199. Hill is arguing against a kind of governmental
fragmentation that can result when the court goes beyond a proper
unitary-model refusal to consummate unconstitutional or illegal governmental courses of conduct, and in addition makes itself unavailable for
the trial of certain cases because it finds reprehensible the manner in
which evidence has been obtained. See text accompanying note 44 supra
and notes 115 and 288 infra. To be sure, Hill approves of the result in
Olmstead, because the federal officers there were violating state statutes,
Hill, supra note 65, at 202, 215; see note 98, supra; but he repudiates employment of the Olmstead "unclean hands" and "dirty business" rationale
as was proposed by the dissents in On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S.
747 (1952) (a "wired informer" case), and in Sorrells v. United States,
287 U.S. 435 (1932), and Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958)
(entrapment cases). Hill, supra note 65, at 199-200, 210-12. Hill finds
this kind of "the court protects itself' door-closing objectionable not
merely because it thwarts the executive in the lawful exercise of its prosecutorial office, but also because it does so without "asserting judicial
competence to establish standards to which the executive branch must
conform." Id. at 204. "It is disingenuous to assert that no infringement
upon executive prerogatives is involved when the courts do no more than
withhold the process that is invoked by the executive in a criminal prosecution .... In general, enforcement of the criminal law is a responsibility of the executive branch, and judicial door closing intimately and directly affects the discharge of that responsibility." Id. at 203. But Hill
is amenable to closing the door on an executive who violates a constitution or statute: "[U] nder our system of separation of powers it may not
be within the province of the judicial branch, aside from the construction
of pertinent constitutionalor statutory provisions, to pass... judgments
[of propriety] on the executive branch, or to impede executive programs
on the basis of such judgments." Id. (emphalis added).
Hill's article is, among other things, a corrective to the BrandeisianFrankfurterian "jurisprudence of avoidance": "the view of judicial authority here set forth limits the possibilities of avoiding the constitutional
issue." Id. at 213. "In the absence of an independent judicial prerogative [the presence of which Hill denies], the courts must look to statutory
or constitutional sources for rules of decision." Id. at 212. This means
that practices like entrapment or the use of wired informers can be judicially challenged only as9 "denials of due process." Id. "The use of
an appropriate adjective can introduce a constitutional issue into almost
any case." Id.
If we understand Hill correctly, he is proposing something like the
translation we shall argue for in Part VII of this Article, namely trans-
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Holmes, whom he labels "the framers of the rule,"''1 cut their
opinions from the same doctrinal -cloth. Writing of these same
three Justices, "the judges chiefly responsible for ... [the rule's]
formulation," Justice Brennan says "their concern as guardians
of the Bill of Rights was to fashion an enforcement tool to give
content and meaning to the Fourth Amendment's guarantees."' 0 2
This is meant to describe a thesis-the original thesis-to be defended against Justice Powell's innovation. The difficulty is that
Justice Brennan cannot be accurately describing the original thesis because there was no single original thesis. As it turns out,
neither does his language accurately describe the position of
either Day or Holmes or Brandeis taken separately.
For Justice Day, as we shall see, the rule was not "an enforcement tool," but was itself a "Fourth Amendment guarantee." Or, to put it another way, the rule does not "give content
and meaning to the Fourth Amendment guarantees," as Brennan
says; it is part of that meaning. And, as for Justices Brandeis
and Holmes, we have already noted that in the pertinent parts
of their Olmstead dissents they were not even discussing the
fourth amendment because they had conceded for purposes of
the argument that the wiretaps did not violate the amendment.
Accordingly, they were arguing for exclusion under the supervisory power. In short, Day's is a constitutional right holding,
whereas Brandeis and Holmes made a supervisory power argument. And Brennan's inattention to this difference is detrimental to his argument because, losing sight of the difference, he
never sees the right.
lation of all concern for judicial integrity into due process languagewith the corollary that if the challenged executive conduct does not fail
the due process test, the courts must live with it. To the objection that
compulsory constitutionalization of issues places a "great strain" on the
courts in "hard cases," Hill has at least two replies: first, that in any
case the nonconstitutional supervisory power does not extend to the
states, id. at 213; and, second, that deciding cases on constitutional
grounds need not be an intolerable strain, because, as he argues at length
in his article, "[p]articularly in cases involving what may be called the
procedural safeguards of the Bill of Rights, it should be recognized that
alternative methods of implementation may be constitutionally acceptable." Id. This latter notion, which is shared by Kaplan, supra note
55, at 1030, is the only one of Hill's major contentions with which we
disagree. It means, as Hill interprets it, that the exclusionary rule in
search and seizure cases is both constitutional and yet negotiable,
whereas we believe the rule is constitutional and not negotiable-rather,
not negotiable because constitutional. See note 109 infra.
101. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 357-58 (1974).
102. Id. at 356.
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IV. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT EXCLUSIONARY RIGHT
If Justice Brennan fails to articulate a fourth amendment
exclusionary right, he at any rate says relatively little that would
be incompatible with one. Justice Powell, on the other hand,
not only denies that exclusion is "a personal constitutional right
of the party aggrieved,"' 0 3 but he also provides an interpretation
of the fourth amendment which makes such a denial inevitable.
In this Part, we shall contrast Powell's interpretation to Justice
Day's construction of the amendment in Weeks, a construction
which compels the claim that there is a constitutional right to
exclusion.
A. JUSTICE POWELL'S "INVASION" INTERPRETATION
The idea of a fourth amendment exclusionary right is implausible if not preposterous in light of a fragmentary interpretation of the amendment. 0 4 The fragmentary interpretation,
which can also be called the "invasion" theory of the amendment,
was accepted by the Court at least as early as Wolf v. Colorado,0 5
and it is totally in command of Justice Powell's Calandra opinion. According to this construction, the executive is the sole addressee of the fourth amendment: courts are addressed only as
warrant-issuing magistrates. The executive is the only branch
of government to which the amendment speaks because it is the
only agency which is capable of violating the imperative of the
amendment by unreasonably invading privacy or unreasonably
violating the security of "persons, houses, papers, and effects."
Such invasions occur "out in the field" where courts do not go,
and where they therefore have no responsibility. Without responsibility for the search and seizure, the court cannot have a
duty to exclude improperly obtained evidence from the defendant's trial. And where there is no duty, there is no corresponding
right.
Justice Powell's clearest statement of the invasion theory of
the fourth amendment occurs in a section of his Calandraopinion
where he is answering the claim of Calandra's counsel that "each
question asked of the Respondent before the grand jury, which
question was only asked because of a past violation of the Fourth
Amendment, [amounts to] a new, immediate violation of the
Fourth Amendment."1 0 6 By "new... violation" counsel appar103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 348.
See Part I supra.
338 U.S. 25 (1949).
414 U.S. at 353 n.9.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:251

ently meant a fresh inroad on Calandra's privacy, for he spoke
of "an additional intrusion." But, as Justice Powell observes
by way of clarification, since privacy-invading grand jury questions of a witness are not as such unconstitutional, counsel's argument is coherent only if he means
not merely that the grand jury's questions invade his [client's]
privacy but that, because those questions are based on illegally
obtained evidenc% they somehow 7constitute distinct violations
of his Fourth Amendment rights.10
Needless to say, Powell rejects the contention as he clarifies it.
His reason for thinking that a use of unconstitutionally obtained
evidence cannot be a distinct violation of a fourth amendment
right is of special moment to us because we propose to argue
precisely the contrary.
Justice Powell's answer to Calandra's counsel is that counsel
has confused categories by suggesting that there is a right to
exclusion when he should have realzed that fourth amendment
rights relate only to the search and seizure, leaving subsequent
events in the realm of "remedies":
Questions based on illegally obtained evidence are only a derivative use of the product of a past unlawful search and seizure.
They work no new Fourth Amendment wrong. Whether such
derivative use of illegally obtained evidence by a grand jury
should be proscribed presents a question, not of rights, but of
remedies. 08
By saying it is a question of remedies, he means it is a question
of judicial discretion in the use of the Court's supervisory
power. 19 As we have observed, the rationale of Calandrais that,
107. Id. at 353-54.
108. Id. at 354. Justice Powell's repeated reference to "derivative
use" might tempt one to believe he is implying that whereas derivative
use, such as that before the grand jury in Calandra,is not constitutionally
prohibited, direct (evidentiary) use would be. But that is not what he
is implying-he is not suggesting that if he were faced with nonCalandrafacts involving a more direct use of evidence in a grand jury
proceeding, or at a trial, he would there recognize an exclusionary right.
He makes short work of the direct/derivative distinction: "The same
considerations of logic and policy apply to both the fruits of an unlawful
search and seizure and derivative use of that evidence, and we do not
distinguish between them." Id. at 354-55.
109. On the supervisory power generally, see note 65 supra. Here
we want to draw attention to the fact that the constitutional right/supervisory power dichotomy which informs our criticism of Justice Powell's
Calandraopinion throughout this Article is repudiated by much of the
scholarly literature. The authors of this literature resist the notion that
a particular rule or result must issue from either the Constitution or the
supervisory power. They want to say instead that the supervisory power
can be used in the service of the Constitution--or at any rate of "constitutional values"-and that when it is so used it gains legitimacy from
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whatever may be said about the deterrent effect of exclusion at
trial, not enough can be said for its deterrent effect in the grand
jury to "outweigh" the predictable "damage to ... [the grand
jury] institution," and that therefore a grand jury exclusionary
rule would be bad "policy," bad remedial law.110
Justice Powell asserts that the use of evidence "work [s] no
new Fourth Amendment wrong," because
[t]he purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to prevent unreasonable governmental intrusions into the privacy of one's person,
house, papers, or effects. The wrong condemned is the unjustified governmental invasion of these areas of an individual's
life. That wrong ...
is fully accomplished by the original
search without probablecause."'
the Constitution without, however, giving rise to rigid constitutional
rules. With respect to the exclusionary rule in particular, they want to
say just what Justice Powell says-that it "is a judicially created remedy
designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its
deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party
aggrieved." 414 U.S. at 348.
Professors Kaplan and Hill, representatives of the school of thought
to which we refer, reject the dichotomy from which we are working by
calling the exclusionary rule "quasi-constitutional"-appropriate because
"the Constitution demands something that works-presumably at a reasonable social cost," Kaplan, supra note 55, at 1030, but replaceable
when it appears that another "remedial or prophylactic" device "does
the job better." Id. See Hill, supra note 65, at 182-87; Katz, The Jurisprudence of Remedies: ConstitutionalLegality and the Law of Torts in
Bell v. Hood, 117 U. PA. L. Rv. 1, 64-66 (1968). But see id. at 38-39
& n.208. We are not persuaded that the exclusionary rule belongs in
the class of "temporary expedients" with, for example, the "safeguards"
of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45, 490 (1966), which are exemplary "quasi-constitutional" rules for both Kaplan and Hill. I
supra
note 65, at 185-86; Kaplan, supra note 55, at 1030. An alternative stated
by Hill helps us briefly to articulate our conclusion: whereas we deny
that "the essential purpose of the rule is to advance implementation generally by deterrence of police violations," we affirm that the exclusionary
rule is "so integral an aspect of a constitutional right as not to permit
of substitutes"-the Constitution "requir[ing] that persons be immune
from prosecution on the basis of illegally-seized evidence ...
[and] the
exclusionary rule [being] ... constitutionally mandated in a way that
hardly permits of substitutes." Hill, supra note 65, at 184-85. The best
scholarly articulations of the thesis that the exclusionary rule is integral
to the Constitution are Dellinger, supra note 78, at 1559-63; Schwartz,
Retroactivity, Reliability, and Due Process: A Reply to Professor Mishkin, 33 U. CnL L. REv. 719, 747-52 (1966); and Allen, The Wolf Case:
Search and Seizure, Federalism,and the Civil Liberties, 45 Nw. U.L. Rv.
1, 20 (1950).
110. 414 U.S. at 354. See text accompanying notes 1-6 supra.
111. 414 U.S. at 354 (emphasis added). Accord, Plumb, supra note
58, at 376. See also note 118 infra. Professor Amsterdam cites this
Calandrapassage and its context in his sequel to the unitary model passage we quoted in note 28 supra. The sequel reads as follows:
The admission of unconstitutionally seized evidence is therefore not, as the critics of the exclusionary rule assume, merely
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This is no more than an attempt to read the fragmentary model
into the fourth amendment, the barely suppressed argument being that, because the executive and not the court or grand jury
something that happens after "a violation" of the fourth amendment has occurred, and when it is too late to prevent, impossible
to repair, and senseless to punish the government for that violation. [citing Calandra] It is the linchpin of a functioning system of criminal law administration that produces incentives to
violate the fourth amendment. Attention is distracted from that
system, and the exclusionary rule is talked about as though it
were an instrument for "deterring" discrete and specific episodes
of unconstitutional police behavior, because of the generally prevailing atomistic conception of the fourth amendment that I
questioned in my first lecture. The atomistic conception is, I
think, too narrow.
Amsterdam, supra note 28, at 432 (footnotes omitted). We refer to Amsterdam's contrast between the "atomistic" and the "regulatory" views of
the fourth amendment in note 78 supra. In that note we observe that,
far from being opposed to the deterrence rationale for the exclusionary
rule, the regulatory view of the amendment is a radicalization of that
rationale. If theories of the fourth amendment be categorized according
to whether, on the one hand, they ascribe to the courts a constitutional
exclusionary obligation, or, on the other, they merely expect courts to
employ exclusion to induce the police to meet their constitutional obligations, the regulatory view belongs in the latter "remedial" or "instrumental"--or what from the beginning we have called the supervisory
power-"deterrence"--category.
But in the passage just quoted, Amsterdam seems to be repudiating
precisely the deterrence or instrumental theory. To complicate matters,
he casts out the deterrence theory of the rule as part of what he calls
the "atomistic" understanding-the understanding that attributes solicitude for personal rights to the fourth amendment. In other words, he
associates the deterrence theory of the rule with what appears to be exactly the understanding of the amendment that we are opposing to the
deterrence theory. Furthermore, the atomistic view as it is presented
in this passage sounds very much like what we have labelled the "fragmentary" theory of a government, a prosecution, and the fourth amendment. In sum, it looks as if Amsterdam is denying the possibility of
that combination of unitary and personal-rights thinking on which this
Article stands or falls. At the very least, there must be some sorting
out of ideas just to establish what the differences are between Amsterdam's position and our own.
The "atomistic" view of the amendment criticized by Amsterdam
shares a decisive premise with the fragmentary, "invasion" theory of the
amendment we are faulting: each limits an individual's fourth amendment rights to freedom from the original invasion. The "atomistic" view
is held by those, like Justice Powell, who not only "atomize" "the people" into individuals with personal rights (we ourselves do that) but
who also pursue the fragmentary strategy of denying the existence of
a single governmental course of conduct-from procurement to use of
evidence-against which persons have a right. See text accompanying
notes 112-22 infra. There is, however, another personal rights thesisone that builds on rather than destroys the unitary view. It insists that
the individual has a personal right to expect the whole governmentcourts emphatically included-to avoid involvement in unreasonable
searches and seizures. We shall discuss one version of this unitary personal rights position here in Part IV as the "Weeks evidentiary transac-
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is the invader, and because the "invasion" is the sole fourth
amendment violation, the court or grand jury is not morally or
constitutionally implicated and can therefore in good conscience
make use of the evidence itself.
tion" interpretation of the fourth amendment. In anticipation of that discussion we shall merely note that Justice Holmes, the most vivid spokesman for the kind of unitary thinking Amsterdam recommends in the passages quoted in this note and in note 28 supra, was a faithful adherent
of the Weeks evidentiary transaction personal exclusionary right thesis.
For example, he made it the core of his opinion for the Court in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 358 (1920). When one abstracts from the derivative use aspects of that case, and focuses on
Holmes's restatement of the Weeks paradigmatic principle, it reads as
follows: "The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that ... evidence so acquired shall not be
used before the Court .... ." Id. at 392. And, so far as we know, it
never occurred to Justice Holmes to question, in a constitutional case
like Silverthorne (as contrasted with a nonconstitutional case like Olinstead, see text accompanying notes 94-102 supra), what it did occur to
Justice Day to affirm in Weeks, namely, that refusal to suppress is "a
denial of the constitutional rights of the accused." Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914). (On the Silverthorne opinion, see note
167 infra).
The real puzzle that Amsterdam creates in the passage under consideration is how he can share Justice Holmes's unitary vision so
thoroughly-seeing admission of unconstitutionally seized evidence as
the "linchpin of a functioning system of criminal law administration that
produces incentives to violate the fourth amendment"-and yet fail to
move with Holmes to the Weeks personal exclusionary right position,
or at any rate to a notion of exclusion as an irreducible constitutional
requirement. We think Amsterdam's general strategy of transforming
the fourth amendment into something other than a personal rights provision is only partially responsible for his failure to follow Holmes. One
more cause of his failure is that he reads Weeks, not as it is read by
Holmes, but, for example, as it is read by Justices Black and Harlan,
see notes 126 and 164 infra, and by the latest pure fragmentary modeldeterrence theorist, Justice Powell. According to Powell,
[tjhe exclusionary rule was adopted to effectuate the Fourth
Amendment right of all citizens "to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures ...." Under this rule, evidence obtained in violation
of the Fourth Amendment cannot be used in a criminal proceeding against the victim of the illegal search and seizure. Weeks
v. United States ....
[T]he rule's prime purpose is to deter future unlawful police
conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth
Amendment against unreasonable search and seizures ....
In
sum, the rule is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent
effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party
aggrieved.
Calandra v. United States, 414 U.S. 338, 347-48 (1974). Compare this
passage with the following characterization of the rule by Amsterdam:
T he primary instrument for enforcing the fourth amendment
has long been the exclusionary rule-a judicially fashioned doctrine that excludes the products of unreasonable searches and
seizures from admission into evidence against those whose rights
have been violated.
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If we correctly understand Justice Powell's thesis, it is that
what we shall be calling the "evidentiary transaction" 1 2 does
not exist for moral and constitutional purposes, and that, therefore, searches and seizures are properly viewed in isolation from
the evidentiary use of their products. Although Justice Powell
would no doubt acknowledge that, as a matter of nontechnical
fact, there is a governmental "event" that can be called an "evidentiary transaction," the notion is not a concept of art for him;
he denies it standing in contemplation of law. This is one way
of explaining why Justice Powell does not think a court (or
grand jury) has a constitutional duty to refrain from using improperly obtained evidence or the defendant a constitutional
right to its exclusion. The conceptual unities for which such a
duty and right would make sense do not commend themselves
to Justice Powell. For purposes of deciding what should be done
with unconstitutionally obtained evidence, the entities perceived
by the unitary model theorists do not exist. There is not "one
government," or "a prosecution," and neither is there an "evidentiary transaction." On the contrary, Justice Powell fragments the government as much as possible, breaks up a prosecution into a series of discrete events, and, what is of immediate
interest, denies that search, seizure, and use can be a single transaction. Indeed, in a revealing slip of the pen he even says that
Amsterdam, supra note 28, at 360, citing Weeks and Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961). The only thing that is present in Powell's formulation
and missing from Amsterdam's is a reference to "deterrence effect."
Everything else is the same-the emphasis on "judicial creation" that
is so alien to the Weeks opinion and to the constitutional exclusionary
opinions of Justice Holmes, and the notion that admission itself cannot
be a violation of one's fourth amendment rights. And Amsterdam does
not leave his voluntaristic, supervisory power view of the exclusionary
rule only partially articulate. He insists that
there is no necessary relationship between the violation of an
individual's fourth amendment rights and exclusion of evidence.
The exclusionary rule is simply a tool to be employed in whatever manner is necessary to achieve the amendment's regulatory
objective by reducing undesirable incentives to unconstitutional
searches and seizures.
Amsterdam, supra note 28, at 437. That is how far Amsterdam is from
Holmes's unitary, personal rights, constitutional view that "[t] he essence
of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way
is that.., evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court...."
As much as Amsterdam may sometimes sound like a unitary theorist,
and as much as he may deprecate naive versions of the deterrence thesis,
see id. at 431, in the end he is a deterrence theorist working from the
fragmentary model of judicial responsibility: the model that denies that
courts have a constitutional obligation to exclude unconstitutionally
seized evidence entirely apart from the deterrence-or "regulatory"-effect of that exclusion.
112. For similar phrasing, see note 118 infra.
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the "wrong... is fully accomplished" merely by the search. It
is as if he prefers not to think of the seizure, and therefore ndt
of the primary object of most seizures-evidence. This abstraction is quite understandable in view of the threat posed for the
fragmentary model by the concept of evidence and its embodiment in the notion of an evidentiary transaction.

B. JUSTICE DAY'S EVIDENTIARY EmPHASIs
If Justice Powell tries to read the fragmentary model into
the fourth amendment, we think Justice Day actually finds the
unitary model there. He finds in the amendment a unitary conception of judicial responsibility, and, what is virtually the same
thing in helpfully different language, he finds in the amendment
what we are calling the "evidentiary transaction" approach to
the problem of improperly obtained evidence. It is this approach
that should be compared with Justice Powell's fragmenting
fourth amendment jurisprudence.
One gets a sense of the unitary tendency of the Weeks opinion from these words:
The effect of the Fourth Amendment is to put the courts of the
United States and Federal officials, in the exercise of their power
and authority, under limitations and restraints as to the exercise
of such power and authority, and to forever secure the people
• .. against all unreasonable searches and seizures under the
guise of law. This protection reaches all alike, whether accused
of, crime or not, and the duty of giving to it force and effect is
obligatory upon all intrusted
under our Federal system with the
113
enforcement of the laws.
Justice Day's interpretation does not need to be augmented by
the later unitary model thinking of Holmes and Brandeis nearly
as much as their argument needs to be augmented by his personal
right approach. Justice Day finds the unitary model implicit in
the fourth amendment. There is no fragmentation of governmental responsibility, nor any implication that the fourth amendment is addressed only to the executive. -On the contrary, Justice
Day thinks first of the effect of the amendment on the courts,
and then of its restraint on the executive, or, in words we borrow
from Chief Justice Marshall, Justice Day views the fourth
amendment as "language of the constitution . . . addressed
especially [though not exclusively] to the courts."" 4 And when
Day refers to judicial responsibility under the amendment, he
is by no means thinking only of the responsibility for warrants.
113. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391-92 (1914).
114. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 179 (1803).
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He speaks more grandly of "[t] he efforts of the courts and their
officials to bring the guilty to punishment . . . [and] of those
great principles . . . in the fundamental law of the land" that

limit these efforts. 115
115. 232 U.S. at 393. We quote this passage for exegetical purposes,

not to subscribe unreservedly to it, for it points, intentionally or not, in
the direction of a form of unity to which we object; it suggests a conception of unity brought about by judicial dominance and preemption by
courts of the prosecutorial initiative. We think Justice Day has here
gone beyond his own considered unitary position-from the unity that
results when courts express their responsibility for the conduct of the

whole government by reviewing executive action, to a kind of unity re-

sulting when courts themselves assume an active posture toward crime.
In any case, we disavow the impression left by the phrase "the courts
and their officials."
Protest against judicial usurpation of the executive law enforcement
prerogative is perhaps as necessary as Professor Hill's protest against
judicial frustration of legitimate law enforcement activity. See note 100
supra. But neither is more important than recognition of the basic position shared, despite all their other differences, by Justices Day, Holmes,
Brandeis, and Brennan, i.e., that the courts must thwart constitutionally
or statutorily invalid executive conduct when that conduct requires judicial cooperation for its consummation. (For a discussion of the difference between thwarting constitutionally and statutorily illegitimate conduct, and judicial "door-closing" to the fruits of executive conduct the
only fault of which lies in the transgression of judicial notions of propriety, see note 100 supra.) This is the position attacked by the fragmentary model opponents of the exclusionary rule.
Indeed-and this is a truly interesting turn in the argument-fragmentary theorists have been known to argue that the reason the courts
may not thwart illegitimate executive activity is that the courts themselves have a supervening responsibility to see that crime is punished.
Professor Plumb was one such theorist, the effect of whose argument
was to deny the existence of the unitary model for purposes of due process, but to affirm the existence of the unitary model for purposes of crime
control. According to Plumb, the courts' responsibility to punish crime
supersedes any responsibility they may have to help the government remain faithful to constitutional limitations. Plumb, supra note 58, at 37678.
The difference between the one-government theory of Holmes and
Brandeis and the one-government result of Plumb is that whereas
Holmes and Brandeis insist that the government be consciously conceived of as one for purposes of due process, Plumb permits the government more or less mindlessly to be one for purposes of crime control.
The fragmentary theory makes it unnecessary for the courts to notice,
much less to have scruples about the means employed by the executive.
The result is that all parts of the government, fragmented and not responsible for the propriety of means employed by sister branches, nevertheless join together in quest of a common end. It is a marvelous prescription for a frictionless association-an association whose governing
policies are a laissez-faire eschewal of mutual censorship among the
members, and an agreed-upon common end-to protect "organized society and its law-abiding members" from a common external enemy, "the
criminal classes." Id. at 376, quoting with approval from Address by
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As for Justice Day's interpretation of the fourth amendment
so as to find a special-we do not say exclusive-concern in the
amendment for unreasonable evidentiary searches, he seems in
this one respect to have followed Justice Bradley's opinion for
the Court in Boyd v. United States.116 At any rate, he accepts
Bradley's history of the amendment, which he paraphrases to the
effect that general warrants and writs of assistance had sanctioned "invasions of the home and privacy of the citizens and
the seizure of their private papers in support of charges, real
or imaginary, made against them," and that these were the kinds
of "unreasonable searches and seizures" against which the people
117
sought to protect themselves through the fourth amendment.
Given Justice Day's acceptance of this account of the amendment's origin, and given that as a judge he would surely know
that the great majority of searches of which courts take cognizance, either at the warrant or at the trial stage, are evidentiary,
the "invasion" interpretation of the amendment later urged by
Justice Powell would not readily have crossed his mind as an
alternative to the evidentiary search interpretation. We doubt
that it occurred to him that the main subject of the amendment could be privacy in general, isolated from "the efforts of
the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment."
Once a predominant fourth amendment concern for evidentiary searches and seizures is assumed, Justice Day's exclusionary
result follows with relative ease, as we shall now show by articulating the kind of thinking on which we believe Justice Day's
opinion depends. We do not attribute to Day all the reasoning
we set forth here. We only claim that, while the reasoning is
our own, it has been prompted by our reading of the Weeks opinion, is consistent with it, and is perhaps demanded by it. We
Hon. Samuel Seabury, American Law Institute Annual Dinner, May 7,
1932, in 18 A.B.A.J. 371 (1932).
We believe there is a constitutional world of difference between
Plumb's insistence that the court assume responsibility for punishment
of criminals even when the evidence necessary to their conviction is procured unconstitutionally, Plumb, suvra note 58, at 376-78, and Hill's insistence that the court accept all relevant and reliable evidence obtained
constitutionally and legally. Plumb is making an illicit unity out of
fragmentary model pieces, whereas Hill is trying to prevent the fragmentation of government that results when unitary model judicial responsibility goes beyond its proper constitutional or statutory concern and is
transformed into mere fastidiousness, which then comes between the
court and its duty to try the cases brought to it by the prosecutor. See
notes 44 and 100 suvra.
116. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). See note 97 supra.
117. 232 U.S. at 390 (emphasis added).
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begin by summarizing this reasoning and the conclusions to
which it leads.
The unitary, "evidentiary transaction" theory implicit in
Justice Day's opinion insists upon a fourth amendment exclusionary duty and right because it assumes a conceptual and moral
connection between the trial court and the evidence-seizing police. This connection exists because every search for or seizure
of evidence points beyond itself to use at trial. Search, seizure,
and use are all part of one "evidentiary transaction," and every
such transaction presupposes a court as well as a policeman. Because the court is integral to the evidentiary transaction, it cannot insulate itself from responsibility for any part of that transaction, and specifically not from responsibility for the manner in
which evidence is obtained." 8 The only way the court can avoid
118. One of the most articulate formulations of this thought appears
in People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 445, 282 P.2d 905, 912 (1955):
When, as in the present case, the very purpose of an illegal
search and seizure is to get evidence to introduce at a trial, the
success of the lawless venture depends entirely on the court's
lending its aid by allowing the evidence to be introduced. It
is no answer to say that a distinction should be drawn between
the government acting as law enforcer and the gatherer of evidence and the government acting as judge.
The clearest of all formulations is probably this by William Plumb:
[When] the purpose of the search [is] to obtain evidence, it is
pure sophistry to declare, as courts frequently have done, that
the search and the subsequent use of the evidence are distinct
transactions.
Plumb, supra note 58, at 374-75. Yet Plumb, who is one of the most
assiduous admissionists, goes on in effect to ascribe precisely this fragmentary sophistry to the fourth amendment:
But, distinct transaction or no, there is much room to question
whether [the fourth amendment] was ever intended to impose
this additional sanction [of exclusion]. The provision operates
upon legislatures to bar them forever from making unreasonable
searches and seizures lawful, upon executives to bar them from
enforcing such laws, and upon the courts to bind them to punish
such searches and seizures whether made with or without legislative sanction. But the Constitution lays down no rule of evidence ....

When the invasion of the home has been effected,

the violation of the Constitution is complete. It is neither the
possession of property nor the use of evidence, but the sanctity
of homes, that is the concern of the Constitutional guaranty.
Id. at 375 (emphasis added); accord, United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S.
338, 354 (1974) (Powell, J.), quoted in text accompanying note 111 supra.
One of the remarkable things about the early critics of exclusion was
the clarity with which they could see the constitutional warrant or obligation to initiate the affirmative action of punishing the officers-warranted or obligated by the Constitution independently of what the legislature may or may not have enacted-and the equal clarity with which
they saw that the negative "act" of exclusion is not required by the Constitution. Thus Wigmore assumed that
[t]he natural way to do justice here would be to enforce the
splendid and healthy principle of the Fourth Amendment directly, i.e., by sending for the high-handed, over-zealous marshal
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consummating an unconstitutional course of conduct in which,
wittingly or unwittingly, it has been involved from the beginning, is to abort the transaction by excluding the evidence. To
admit the evidence is for the court to implicate itself in the unconstitutional police misconduct and to violate the Constitution.
Contrary to what Justice Powell says, the executive "invasion" cannot be the only wrong condemned by the amendment,
because the amendment condemns an entire transaction, only
part of which is the invasion-the rest being a judicial act. Given
the concept of evidence and the notion of an evidentiary transaction, and given the assumption that the evidentiary transaction
is a special concern of the amendment, and given the further
assumption that the amendment is coherent, the use of evidence
in the evidentiary transaction falls under the amendment's proscription along with the invasion, and therefore the courts are,
like the executive, under a direct and immediate fourth amendment duty. So, again contrary to Justice Powell, the "accomplishment" of the "original search" does not exhaust the category of constitutional wrongs that can occur in the course of the
whole unconstitutional transaction. The completion of the
search and seizure does not remove the episode from the cognizance of the amendment. On the contrary, the invasion activates
the amendment's exclusionary potency.
As Justice Day describes Weeks:
The case ... involves the right of the court in a criminal
prosecution to retain for the purposes of evidence the letters and
correspondence of the accused, seized in his house in his absence
who had searched without a warrant, imposing a thirty-day imprisonment for his contempt of the Constitution, and then proceeding to affirm the sentence of the convicted criminal.
Wigmore, supra note 16, at 484.
Present day commentators take the more sensible view that the relative difficulty of justification is the reverse of what Wigmore and Plumb
supposed. For example, Professor Hill says that
[c]onceptually, there is no difficulty about the proposition that
if judicial power is to be exercized upon person or property, constitutional limitations must be observed, including rules determining the consequences of a violation of constitutional right.
The constitutional character of such defensive remedies is well
recognized ....
It is when the remedies are offensive or affirmative in character that conceptual difficulties arise.
To what extent is the Constitution self-executing in regard
to affirmative remedies?
Hill, Constitutional Remedies, 69 CoLum. L. REv. 1109, 1111-12 (1969).
By "affirmative" remedies, Hill has in mind primarily money damages.
Presumably his question is even more acute when the "remedy" is punishment.
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without his authority, by a United States Marshal
holding no
warrant for.., the search of his premises." 9
[Tihe question presented involves the determination of the
duty of the court with reference to the motion made by the defendant for the return of certain letters... taken from his room
by the United States Marshal, who... visited the room of the
additional testidefendant for the declared purpose of obtaining120
mony to support the charge against the accused.
Justice Day speaks of "a criminal prosecution" rather than
merely a trial, and he refuses to regard the marshal as a remote
personage whose misconduct comes under the heading of "someone else's business." The court and the marshal are not viewed
as moral strangers, but as parts of the same government and
parties to the same governmental course of conduct. And, indeed, neither a criminal court nor a law enforcement officer
makes sense in isolation from the other. A criminal court is not
an intelligible institution without the expectation that it will receive evidence from which to synthesize verdicts and judgments.
By the same token, a policeman-e.g., the marshal in Weeksmay be out in the field, but his being out there in a law enforcement, as opposed to some administrative, capacity is only intelligible on the expectation that he will come in to court.
That is not merely a contingent expectation: it is rooted in
Justice Day's understanding of the fourth amendment, an understanding which, on this point, is surely not unique to Day. As
he says, the marshal is limited by the fourth amendment only
when he is "acting under color of his office"; 12 1 the fourth
amendment "secure[s] the people . . . against all unreasonable
searches and seizures under guise of law.' 22 But one can understand what that office is, or what the marshal does when he
makes searches and seizures in lawful guise, only by reference
to a court. This is so because the marshal's duty is, as Justice3
12
Day says, "to bring . . . proof to the aid of the government.'
But bringing proof or evidence is unintelligible if there is not
a court there to accept-or reject-it. And we can therefore say
that concern about the judicial use of the fruit of fourth amendment violations is built into the amendment if the amendment is
thematically addressed to the evidentiary transaction.
The exclusionary thrust of the amendment is not just an impersonal proscription of the use of unreasonably seized evidence;
119. 232 U.S. at 393.
120. Id. at 389.
121.

Id.

122. Id. at 392 (emphasis added).
123. Id. at 397.
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the amendment recognizes an exclusionary right in the defendant, a right that is conceptually and morally part and parcel with
the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. To
put it as intransigently, and correctly, as we know how, the basic
right is to be free from the entire transaction; the right to exclusion and the right to be free from the original invasion are
coordinate components of that embracing right. Notice that in
his statement of the question in Weeks, Justice Day is not asking
whether the lower court might in the exercise of its discretion
invoke the supervisory power and exclude the evidence; he is
instead asking what is the "duty of the court [under the fourth
amendment] with reference to ... letters... taken from [the
defendant's] room by the United States Marshal . . . for the

declared purpose of obtaining additional testimony to support the
charge against the accused"; he is asking whether a "court in
a criminal prosecution" has "the right ...

to retain for the pur-

poses of evidence the letters and correspondence of the accused . .",12
Justice Day's phrasing of the question assumes
what Justice Powell's denies, namely, that it makes sense only
to speak of the defendant's rights and the court's rights and
duties and not of mere optional "remedies."
Having ruled that "the letters in question were taken from
the house of the accused by an official of the United States acting
under color of his office in direct violation of the constitutional
rights of the defendant,"' 2 5 Justice Day concludes that "there
was involved in the order refusing the application [for their return] a denial of the constitutional rights of the accused....
In holding [the letters] and permitting their use upon the trial,
we think prejudicial error was committed.' 28 This language is
tolerably unambiguous. It makes it clear that the Weeks Court
recognized two violations, one by the marshal and one by the
court, neither of which was regarded as "more" or "less" unconstitutional than the other. And presumably these words
leave no doubt that the reason the court does not have the right
to admit the evidence is that the defendant has a fourth amendment right to its suppression.
124. See text accompanying notes 119-20 supra.
125. Id. at 398.

126. Id. Despite this language, Justice Black once insisted "that the
federal exclusionary rule is not a command of the Fourth Amendment
but is a judicially created rule of evidence which Congress might negate."
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 39-40 (1949) (concurring opinion). But
see Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 645-59 (1946) (the same Justice
on the constitutional status of the rule after Mapp).
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Justice Day affirms what Justice Powell denies, i.e., that the
admission of unconstitutionally seized evidence is a violation of
99a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.1 127 Our
intent is not to bludgeon Justice Powell with the venerable authority of Justice Day, but first to show that Powell's proposition
has not always seemed self-evident, and second to exhibit the
kind of thinking that underlies the claim of right Justice Day
makes. This thinking is informed by unitary model assumptions,
by the assumption that the fourth amendment has a particular
but not exclusive concern for evidentiary searches, and by the
necessary consequences of the concept of evidence and the notion of an evidentiary transaction. This thinking, which is the
fourth amendment exclusionary theory we are urging, can be recapitulated as follows: Judicial use is conceptually inseparable
from evidentiary seizure because evidentiary seizures under color
of law make no sense without an expectation of judicial usemake no more sense than an evidence-gathering law enforcement
officer isolated from a court, or a criminal court cut off from
evidence-gathering law enforcement officers. The concept of
evidence-the conceptual setting of any constitutional guarantee
pertaining to evidence-compels attention to the whole transaction, to use as well as acquisition. Or, in other words, fragmentation of the transaction is as arbitrary as fragmentation of
the government. The fourth amendment fragments neither the
transaction nor the government. Its meaning is that when any
part of the government participates in an evidentiary transaction
which involves an unreasonable search and seizure it commits
a constitutional wrong. And for any part of the government to
commit a wrong denominated as such by the fourth amendment
is not just to do wrong in the abstract, but to violate a person's
constitutional right. In particular, the court which admits unreasonably seized evidence participates in an unconstitutional
evidentiary transaction and violates the defendant's fourth
amendment exclusionary right.
C.

A

CAVEAT ON THE EVIDENTIARY EMPHASIS

-- Our discussion of the "'evidentiary transaction" may mislead
readers into thinking we are urging a fourth amendment theory
by which only evidentiary searches qualify for fourth amendment protection, 128 or a theory by which administrative searches
127. 414 U.S. at 348.
128. See, e.g., Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971); Abel v. United
States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960); Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959). For
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could be legitimized under less stringent formulas of "reasonableness."' 20 But we are urging neither. To clarify our meaning,
we must distinguish two obviously different concerns, the responses to which can both be affected, in different ways, by the
perceived presence or absence of an evidentiary search of an evidentiary transaction.
It is one thing to ask whether a particular search is fourth
amendment-related activity, and if so, whether it is "reasonable"
within the fourth amendment meaning of that term, and to let
the evidentiary or the administrative intention of the search determine the answer to those questions. We are not doing that.
We are instead assuming that the search or seizure is unconstitutional, and asking what the court ought to do in response to that
assumed unconstitutionality. In particular, we are asking how
the existence of an evidentiary transaction or an evidentiary
search-they are not the same thing-should be allowed to affect
the answer to the question of admissibility.
According to the evidentiary transaction interpretation, the
correct answer to the question of admissibility is implied in the
answer to the question of reasonableness-admission is unconstitutional when the taking is unconstitutional, whether or not the
search is evidentiary or administrative. The reason the evidentiary transaction theory can treat this implication as universal
is that in every case in which evidence is offered in court there
is an evidentiary transaction-again, whether or not the search
is evidentiary or administrative. This is so because an evidentiary decision is eventually made by the executive although there
may have been no evidentiary design at the time of the search
or even the seizure. A member of the executive, whether policeman or prosecutor, must make that evidentiary decision if the
question of admissibility is to be posed at all. Even if both the
search and seizure themselves are purely administrative and
without evidentiary intent, the offer at trial as evidence of things
seized is sufficient indication that at some point in the prosecution a representative of the executive has decided to use those
articles as evidence. According to the evidentiary interpretation
there is more to account for in a case involving introduction of
discussion of another possible caricature of our position, see note 97

supra.
129. See Frank v.- Maryland, 359-U.S. 360, 383 (1959) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting). See also See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); Greenberg, The Balance of Interests
Theory and the Fourth Amendment: A Selective Analysis of Supreme
Court Action Since Camara and See, 61 CAin_. L. Rwv, 1011 (1973).
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evidence obtained from an administrative search than, on the one
hand, a merely administrative act undertaken with no forethought to evidentiary usage, and, on the other, a judicial use
of information. These two events do not exist as unrelated fragments in the universe but are rather part of an intelligible transaction because bound together by a third event-an executive
evidentiary decision, which itself is made with a court in mind
and which indeed would be unintelligible without a court in
mind.
But the fact that an evidentiary transaction must be perceived and a proper inference drawn from that perception must
not be allowed to obscure the fact that there are still two questions here-the constitutionality of the intrusion itself and the
constitutionality of the use of unconstitutionally seized items.
And it will not be surprising to learn that those who do not adopt
the evidentiary transaction interpretation allow the answers to
these two questions to be affected differently by the presence
or absence of evidentiary intent in the search. For example, the
admissibility question was raised for Justice Frankfurter in Wolf
v. Colorado,30 a fourteenth amendment case in which the fourth
amendment was discussed. There he refused to exclude the
fruits of a search, giving no weight to the undisputed evidentiary
purpose of the search.' 3 ' But in Frank v. Maryland,'13 2 also a
fourteenth amendment case in which the fourth amendment was
discussed, the constitutionality of a search itself was questioned.
Justice Frankfurter argued that the nonevidentiary intention of
that administrative sanitation search made it subject to a less
rigorous set of standards-if to any constitutional standards at
all.

33

And, although we think he was grievously mistaken in

both cases, we would not accuse him of inconsistency; he was
assigning different weight to the evidentiary intention in different contexts and in response to different questions.
In Weeks, Justice Day was not confronted by the Frank question about the propriety of the search and seizure. The Weeks
search, having been unwarranted, was taken to be unconstitutional; Day was therefore faced only with the Wolf question
about the use of the evidence. But it should not be denied that,
even as he addresses the admission question, Justice Day leaves
the impression that for him the unwarranted or otherwise unac130. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
131. Id. at 27-28, 33.
132. 359 U.S. 360 (1959).

133, I4, at 365-67,
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ceptable search with an evidentiary intention is the "core" or
paradigmatic invasion proscribed by the fourth amendment
(much as abridgment of political speech is regarded by many
as the paradigmatic first amendment violation). This is partly
because he had no occasion in Weeks to advert to the phenomenon of the administrative search, and thus seems to have just
assumed that the fourth amendment is primarily concerned with
evidentiary searches. But, if one does not choose to interpret
Justice Day by reference to his inadvertences or his unconsidered
assumptions, one may also plausibly suggest that he insisted on
the centrality of the evidentiary search in the fourth amendment
scheme of things, simply because he was unwilling to ignore the
intention of searches and thereby become preoccupied with the
manner of search. In this connection, three things can be said
in Justice Day's defense.
The first is that there is nothing in Day's evidence-oriented
perspective that requires him to sanction administrative searches
merely because they do not have an evidentiary intention. That
is, his apparent focus on the ends of searches does not commit
him to a position of indifference concerning reasonableness of
the means, nor to letting the objective of the search determine
its reasonableness. There is no indication that Justice Day would
have approved those later Supreme Court opinions that took his
emphasis upon-or concern with-the object or intention of
searches as a license to make the fourth amendment "fluctuate
with the 'intent' of the invading officers."' 34 We think Justice
Day would consider that development as unfortunate as the opposite error of forgetting the evidentiary objective of the vast
preponderance of searches with which courts have any connection.
Second, Day's special concern with the evidentiary objective
is not part of a fifth amendment tenderness for the accused.
On the contrary, Day pointedly eschews the fourth-fifth Boyd approach to exclusion; 13 5 he insists that the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures "reaches aU alike, whether accused of crime or not."' 36 But, third, the fact is that evidentiary
134. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 255 (1960) (Brennan, J., dissenting). But see Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 383 (1959) (Douglas,
J., dissenting).
135. "The defendant contends that ... [the instant] appropriation
of his private correspondence was in violation of rights secured to him
by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution of the United
States. We shall deal with the Fourth Amendment .... " 232 U.S. at
389; see id. at 391. See also note 97 supra.
136. 232 U.S. at 392.
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searches are necessarily crime-related in some way, and so there
is a sense in which Justice Day's focus on evidentiary searches
is an ascription to the fourth amendment of a special concern
for the criminal accused. We think Justice Day indeed believed
that judicial participation in the prosecution-to-court evidentiary
transaction, which occurs only in the criminal case, makes the
criminal case of special fourth amendment importance. The
claim to superiority that can be made for Justice Day's evidentiary perspective over the contemporary preoccupation with the
extent of the invasion lies precisely in the fact that Day takes
cognizance of that whole transaction as a transaction and therefore deliberately exposes the court, as a direct addressee of the
fourth amendment, to concerns about the constitutionality of its
own participation in the transaction-concerns to which the in•
vasion analysis is by definition impervious.
Evidentiary use is the end for which evidentiary search and
seizure is the means. Five things need to be said of the evidentiary transaction as an end-means relationship: (1) Like any
other means, evidentiary search and seizure is unintelligible
without reference to its end. But (2) like most ends, evidentiary
use is only a necessary, not a sufficient, condition to the moral
or constitutional acceptability of the means to it-in this case
the acceptability of any particular search and seizure. And (3)
participation in the end implicates a court in the means and
therefore places on it a duty of eschewing evidence obtained by
unconstitutional means or makes it responsible for those means
when it admits their products. But (4) denial of the evidentiary
transaction and fragmentation of the end-means relationship obscures the court's responsibility for the means. Therefore (5)
(the point we wish to stress) awareness of the transaction and
of the relationship, and self-consciousness about the character of
evidentiary use as an end, are needed to vitalize judicial concern
about the means as means rather than as unrelated events involving another branch of government. By keeping the endthe court's own use of the evidence-in focus, the evidentiary
interpretation turns the attention of the court back on the means
by which the evidence has been obtained. That attention produces a severe reckoning with a constitutional duty-a duty with
which courts informed, by the invasion theory of the fourth
amendment do not have to contend because they do not recognize
it. Only the end-oriented evidentiary emphasis with its systematic attention to the destination of evidence prompts a court to
ask not only whether the evidence has been obtained by unconsti-
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tutional means, but also what constitutional responsibility the
guardian of that destination has. In other words, Justice Day's
evidentiary emphasis is superior to the invasion emphasis because it takes the question of the court's constitutional responsibility seriously, makes it register on the judicial sensibility, and
keeps that part of the government with the greatest control over
137
the end from ignoring the means.
137. It might be suggested that this is tendentiousness, or even outright question-begging. For, although we proceed as if we are concerned
to interpret the fourth amendment objectively, and as if we believe the
question of proper interpretation must therefore be settled prior to and
independently of the exclusion controversy, in fact the interpretation we
prefer, implying exclusion as it does, lacks the independence from the
question at issue-to exclude or not to exclude-necessary to give logical
support to the exclusionary conclusion we favor. Our response to this
criticism might not absolve us of the charge, because it begins not with
a denial of tendentiousness, but with an assertion that, given the present
text of the fourth amendment, one is driven to formulate a conception
of the values and the prohibitions expressed in it. But this conception
is part and parcel with the meaning one ascribes to the amendment. The
upshot is that a certain amount of apparent question-begging is inevitable in a controversy that touches as deeply on the fundamentals of intragovernmental relations as does the exclusionary controversy. This will
be so, as we observed in Part I, see text accompanying notes 32-34 supra,
at least until someone finds a point of view in political theory from which
to discuss these matters.
We doubt that a significant interpretation of the fourth amendment
can be articulated without compelling implications for the treatment of
unconstitutionally obtained evidence. At any rate, no extant interpretation of the fourth amendment avoids clear exclusionary or admissionist
implications. Surely the wish for a nontendentious interpretation is not
fulfilled by the "invasion" interpretation of the amendment. That interpretation implies the nronexistence of a fourth amendment exclusionary
imperative just as clearly as the evidentiary emphasis implies its existence.
The more important question, however, is not whether there is a
theory that is "neutral" toward the exclusionary controversy, but whether
the quest for such an interpretation might be a mistake. Consider what
a truly neutral theory of the amendment would be like. Either it would
be neutral because so abstract as to give no guidance at all, or it would
be neutral because occupying a position not taken by the two present
theories. And consider what this position might be. The evidentiary
transaction theory imposes an exclusionary duty on the courts; the invasion theory denies such a duty, and it permits either exclusion or admission, as the courts, in the exercise of the supervisory power, elect. A
"neutral" theory is left to occupy a position of uncertainty. But opacity
or ambiguity is only neutrality by default. And we ordinarily choose
constitutional interpretations not because they becloud, but because they
explain, issues.
It turns out, then, that the only procedure, short of an elaborate political-theoretical analysis, from which we are likely to learn anything, is
a candid confrontation between the two admittedly nonneutral interpretations of the fourth amendment. Each theory has to be its own defense.
One reason we are writing this Article is that we think the evidentiary
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V. "REMEDIES" AND OTHER RESPONSES TO
VIOLATIONS OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
We think that there is a fourth amendment exclusionary
imperative and that we have accurately described it in Part IV.
We need hardly say, however, that ours is an unconventional way
of accounting for the search and seizure exclusionary rule. The
evidentiary transaction interpretation is obviously not the only
possible construction of the amendment, and it may not even be
the only acceptable one. It differs from the constructions
placed on the amendment by both Calandraopinions, to each of
which we would now without pause systematically compare it
were we confident enough of our understanding of those interpretations to do so. Although Justice Powell's invasion interpretation and deterrence rationale are easily comprehended, Justice Brennan's understanding of the amendment and his justification for the rule are not; there is even reason to wonder if his
position is coherent. What this discussion needs, therefore, is a
study of Justice Brennan's thesis-and that is largely the objective of the rest of our Article.
This study will show that Justice Brennan at least points
in the direction of a coherent position, and that, were he to go
where he points, he would argue that the defendant has an exclusionary right. The exclusionary right we find implicit in Brennan's Calandradissent-the second exclusionary right of which
we have spoken 13 8-is different from and additional to, but not
incompatible with, the fourth amendment evidentiary transaction exclusionary right we found implicit in the Weeks opinion.
The distinctiveness of the Brennan alternative will prove to be
that, unlike Justice Day's evidentiary transaction interpretation,
it does not construe the fourth amendment as one of those parts
of the Constitution "addressed," as Chief Justice Marshall said
of another part, "especially to the courts"; 13 9 it rather construes
the fourth amendment as primarily addressed to the executiveand finds the courts under a duty to review executive conduct
in light of the amendment. This duty of judicial review is, we
shall argue, the correlative of the defendant's due process right
theory'is the more defensible of the two. We think it a more adequate
construction of the amendment because the amendment is a limitation
on government; because, as such, it should be interpreted so as to make
maximum moral sense of the entire government which it limits; and because the evidentiary interpretation, being the unitary theory in the
fourth amendment setting, does that.
138. See text accompanying notes 15 and 71 supra.
139. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 179 (1803).
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to have the law of the land applied in his case: he has a right
to have the court sitting in his case consult the Constitution when
executive conduct related to his case is challenged under
any of its parts. And when search and seizure conduct is successfully challenged as unreasonable, he has a due process right to
exclusion of the disputed evidence, because exclusion is the only
concrete expression which adverse judicial review of unreasonable search and seizure can take.
Adequately articulated, Justice Brennan's theory exists on
an altogether different-and superior-constitutional plane from
that occupied by the Powell invasion-deterrence thesis. There
is, however, no easy access to the Brennan thesis as thus articulated because the way to it is strewn with the verbal debris from
that permanent terminological disaster known as the exclusionary rule controversy. The first step toward clarity will be a brief
juxtaposition of the simple Day and Powell alternatives and the
more complicated Brennan thesis. Gaining an appreciation for
the comparative complexity of Justice Brennan's reasoning, we
can then exhibit at length the refinements necessary to its full
comprehension. When so refined and fully comprehended, we
believe it stands as the constitutional equal of the Weeks evidentiary transaction interpretation. The constitutional equality
of the Weeks thesis and the potential Brennan thesis consists in
the fact that they both pay heed to the moral concerns characteristic of unitary model thinking: Weeks through the evidentiary
transaction construction of the fourth amendment, and Brennan
through judicial review and due process of law.
A. JusTIcEs DAY, POWELL, AND BRENNAN ON GIVING
"FORCE AND EFFECT" TO THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

We may take as a bench mark Justice Day's placement of
all officialdom under the duty of "giving to [the fourth amendment] force and effect.' 40 According to our interpretation in
Part IV, this simply means that no official-judicial, executive,
or legislative-may sponsor or participate in unreasonable
searches or seizures, and that in particular courts may not engage in evidentiary transactions involving unreasonable searches
or seizures. But Justice Powell can use remarkably similar language to ascribe a deterrence rationale to the exclusionary rule.
He says, for example, that "the rule's prime purpose is to deter
future unlawful police conduct and thereby effectuate the guar140.

Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914).
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antees of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable search
and seizures.' 141 He writes as though he has not seriously
considered the possibility that a court could give force and effect to, or "effectuate," the amendment simply by refusing
to admit unconstitutionally seized evidence. He thus begins by
ignoring what we regard as a significant kind of force and effect.
The alternative upon which he seems to insist is this: either one
has the dramatic and palpable effect of actually deterring the
police from invading privacy, or one has no effect at all. What
we, following Justice Day, regard as a giving of force and effect
by the courts-through their own direct and simple obedience
to the rule-Justice Powell does not regard as genuine "effectuation." But of course he would not take seriously such judicial
obedience as real effectuation, because to do so would be incongruous with his whole perspective on the fourth amendment.
That perspective-the fragmenting police "invasion" theorydoes not recognize the evidentiary transaction and it therefore
assumes that trial courts (as opposed to warrant-issuing magistrates) are under no fourth amendment obligation.
We can recapitulate Justice Powell's understanding as follows, although he has not said it this way: The executive is the
sole addressee of the fourth amendment because the executive,
and not the judiciary, is the potential invader of privacy. Being
the sole addressee of the amendment, the executive is the only
body in a position to give force and effect to the amendment
in the way that only an addressee can-by its own simple obedience to it. Courts cannot give force and effect to the fourth
amendment merely by obeying it because the amendment is not
addressed to them and no amount of obedience by a nonaddressee
can "effectuate" a law. Judicial "effectuation" of the fourth
amendment is not obedience on the part of the courts to some
illusory exclusionary imperative, but is rather their use of the
exclusionary rule or some "device" to influence others to conform to the sole authentic imperative of the amendment-its proscription of executive "invasion."
It is easier to identify fourth amendment duties, or lack
thereof, in Day's and Powell's interpretations than in Brennan's.
For Day, both the police and the courts are under a direct obligation to avoid the unreasonable or unwarranted evidentiary transaction. According to Powell only the police and not the courts
are obligated by the amendment. In Powell's interpretation, po141.

414 U.S. at 347.
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lice disregard for the fourth amendment is an occasion for the
optional exercise by the courts of the supervisory power. In Justice Brennan's view the amendment of course imposes an obligation on the police. What cannot be so casually determined is
the source and content of whatever fourth amendment obligation
he believes the courts are under. Justice Brennan ascribes to
the courts what seems to be a very great fourth amendment responsibility; he virtually asks them to create a living amendment.
And yet he does not make immediately clear whether the courts
must fill this role, and if so why. Despite his expressed distaste
for Powell's deterrence rationale, he does not unambiguously
rule out the possibility that he, like Powell, is working from
supervisory power premises.
Justice Brennan says, "The exclusionary rule is needed to
make the Fourth Amendment something real; a guarantee that
does not carry with it the exclusion of evidence obtained by its
violation is a chimera."' 142 Elsewhere he alludes to official mis-

conduct that "threatened to make the Amendment a dead letter."'143 He then says, however, that the curtailment of this latter evil is not the "ultimate objective" of the exclusionary rule.
Rather, the framers wanted "to fashion an enforcement tool to
give content and meaning to the Fourth Amendment's guarantees"; 144 and, because they could not "direct or control the conduct of law enforcement officers, the enforcement tool had necessarily to be one capable of administration by judges.' 1 4" Deter-

rence of the police, in any case, "was at best only a hoped-for
effect of the exclusionary rule, not its ultimate objective,"' 14 6 and
"enforcement" by the "tool" was meant to be brought to bear
solely on the courts themselves, by the courts themselves, to
achieve the "twin goals" of avoiding "taint" and of "assuring the
people... that the government would not profit from its lawless
47
behavior."
Although the profile of fourth amendment judicial responsibility, and of the exclusionary rule, emerging from these passages
is blurry, we think that there is nevertheless something important to be learned from Justice Brennan's Calandra dissent
and that time will be well spent uncovering his meaning. One
plausible interpretation of his analysis is that exclusion of evi142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 361.
at 356.
at 357.
at 356.
at 357.
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dence is simply classical judicial review applied to executive conduct. We think that possibility is provocative in its simplicity
and eligible for exploration. But we are not yet equipped or
positioned to make that exploration, or to see what is implicit
in Justice Brennan's other concern, i.e., judicial integrity, because
we are still handicapped by the willful carelessness of the exclusionary rule discussion as it is conducted by courts and commentators. Fortunately, this malaise does not require a sophisticated
"remedy." It will be enough to dwell briefly on embarrassingly
ordinary distinctions-distinctions that are commonplace elsewhere in the law but all too frequently ignored in the exclusionary rule debate.

B. A VARIETY OF RESPONSES TO A VARIETY OF Evms
The literature of the exclusionary rule is replete with references to exclusion as one of several "alternative remedies" for
the problem of illegally seized evidence. 148 The meaning of the
expression is that a government has a choice of prosecuting the
offending officer, facilitating tort actions by victims, excluding
the evidence, or combining all or some in a "remedial mix."' 4 9
148. See, e.g., Hill, supra note 65, at 182; Oaks, supra note 43, at 675.
149. Hill, supra note 65, at 185 n.17. In addition, the courts may experinent with varying doses of exclusion, as Professor Kaplan indicates
they are already doing: for example, exclusion is diminished by standing
requirements, Kaplan, supra note 55, at 1030, or, to take another of the
several examples Kaplan cites, judges are more likely to find a search
and seizure constitutional in the case of grave crimes than in routine
cases. Id. at 1036-37. Kaplan urges courts to continue to be flexible,
but also to be more thoughtful and systematic. Specifically, he recommends repeal of the exclusionary rule for certain "serious cases," id. at
1046, and conditioning admission of evidence gathered by police departments on their record of fidelity to the fourth amendment-courts should
"hold the exclusionary rule inapplicable to cases where the police department in question has taken seriously its responsibility to adhere to
the fourth amendment." Id. at 1050.
Kaplan's "prior offense" plan is somewhat like the modification of
the exclusionary rule recently urged by Professor Amsterdam, at least
in the respect that under both plans police conduct would be regulated
by bringing the exclusionary rule to bear as a lever against police departments. The difference is that whereas Kaplan would in effect place departments on and off probation depending on their compliance with the
amendment as it is presently interpreted, Amsterdam interprets it anew
to require that legislatures or police departments promulgate rules to
govern search and seizure conduct. Amsterdam, supra note 28, at 41617. Amsterdam proposes that the Supreme Court tell the police, before
any searches are initiated or arrests are made, that there is a step toward
reasonableness which police departments can and must take: they must
begin trying to govern themselves; they must strive to achieve "reasonableness" in one of its root meanings, i.e., as "nonarbitrary," id. at 41718, or "rule-governed." Products of searches and seizures unreasonable
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The locus classicus of this thesis is Justice Frankfurter's Wolf
opinion, where one finds such phrases as "the ways of enforcing
* . . [the]
basic right," "the means by which the right should
be made effective," and "what remedies ... should be af-

forded."'u 0

Justice Powell is writing in the Wolf tradition when

in this sense-the products of unregulated police departments-would be
excluded. Id. at 429-33.
150. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949). Justice Murphy's
trenchant dissent in that case is also based on the notion of "alternative
remedies," even as he denies that there is in fact any alternative to exclusion:
Imagination and zeal may invent a dozen methods to give
content to the commands of the Fourth Amendment....
[But] alternatives are deceptive. Their very statement conveys the impression that one possibility is as effective as the
next. In this case their statement is blinding. For there is but
one alternative to the rule of exclusion. That is no sanction at
all.
Id. at 41. Only Justice Rutledge rejects the very idea that there could
be an alternative to exclusion:
Congress and this Court are, in my judgement, powerless to permit the admission in federal courts of evidence seized in defiance
of the Fourth Amendment [and] so I think state legislators and
judges-if subject to the Amendment as I believe them to bemay not lend their offices to the adminssion in state courts of
evidence thus seized.
Id. at 48. On the position taken by Justices Black and Douglas in Wolf,
see text accompanying notes 168-71 infra.
The difference between Justices Murphy and Rutledge is virtually
identical to the difference between Professor Amsterdam and Justice
Holmes. We have noted a "unitary" similarity between Amsterdam and
Holmes in their shared concern for the actual communication going out
from admissionist courts to the police as a result of the practice of admitting illegally obtained evidence. See note 28 supra. But there is a difference in what ultimately counts for the two men. For Amsterdam it
is the kind of deterrence device or strategy that can be implemented,
whereas for Holmes it is the constitutional duplicity of admissionismwhat Professor Dellinger calls "the law speak[ing] with two voices."
Dellinger, supranote 78, at 1563.
According to Amsterdam, the Constitution commands
that the administration of the system of criminal justice be so
ordered as not to produce incentives toward unreasonable search
and seizure which it is not fully capable of restraining. Unless
and until a far better system of restraints is devised and put
into effective operation than we now have or can soon anticipate,
the exclusionary sanction is the only way to honor that command.
Amsterdam, supra note 28, at 433. It may be extremely unlikely that
any system of restraints could meet this stringent criterion, but, should
it happen, the court is no longer bound to exclusion. For Holmes, on
the other hand, "the essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of
evidence in a certain way is that ... evidence so acquired shall not be
used before the Court.. .." Silverthorne v. United States, 251 U.S. 385,

392 (1920). And this is so because, for Holmes, "no distinction can be
taken between the Government as prosecutor [or police] and the Government as judge." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928).
In short, for Holmes the requirement of exclusion is entailed by his gen-
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he says of the exclusionary rule that, "as with any remedial
device, the application of the rule has been restricted to those
areas where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served."'151
Two unwarranted assumptions are built into this manner of
speaking: first that the obvious imprecision of the term "remedy," as habitually used in the illegal evidence context, is harmless; and second that, when properly understood, exclusion, criminal prosecution, and civil liability are all subsumable in the same
way under the notion of remedy, either strictly or loosely socalled. We shall recall the two germane senses of "remedy," indicate the hazards in ignoring the difference between them, and
show that the exclusionary rule fits under neither the technical
notion nor the "problem solving" notion of remedy.
Leaving the evidentiary transaction interpretation aside,
there are at most five actual or potential evils requiring cure,
prevention, or avoidance in the matter of unconstitutionally obtained evidence. They are: (1) invasion as injury, (2) a pattern
of police misconduct, (3) the fourth amendment's being rendered
"meaningless," (4) the government's "affirmatively sanctioning"
unconstitutional searches and seizures, and (5) a "taint" on judicial integrity. Each of these five problems presumably elicits
a response appropriate to it. As we catalogue these responses,
we shall see that remedy, technically understood as primarily
backward-looking, is appropriate only for the first (invasion).
"Remedy" in the forward-looking sense of problem solving is,
on the other hand, appropriate only for the second (police misconduct).
The third (meaninglessness), fourth (affirmative
sanction), and fifth (taint) require neither a past-oriented traditional remedy for something the executive has done or specifically threatened against the individual, nor a future-oriented preventive measure for what the executive may do to members of
the public at large. They call for the court itself to avoid an
evil in the present.
1. Invasion as Injury
This is the evil in connection with which the term "remedy,"
strictly so-called, is historically and technically at home, and in
connection with which the courts, law and equity, fulfill paradiguinely unitary conception of governmental responsibility, and is hence a

'moral certainty," whereas for Amsterdam the longevity of the requirement is contingent on the inefficacy of present alternative remedies.
151. 414 U.S. at 348.
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matic judicial, as opposed to legislative, functions. Whether the
cause of action arises at common law or under a statute or the
Constitution, and whether the suit can result in money damages
or in some other legal or equitable remedy, the idea is to help
make or keep the plaintiff-victim whole-to help him recover
from or ward off a specific invasion. Any legislative-like "policy" for recognizing a particular cause of action will be expressed
hesitantly, and the court will prefer the assumption that its ostensible job is also its real job, i.e., to respond to the particular
plaintiffs claim for redress. "The province of the Court is,
solely, to decide on the rights of individuals ....,u52
While it permits some latitude for the fashioning of the most
appropriate remedy, the "province of the Court" thus understood
is nevertheless not a broadly discretionary roving commission.
A court with a "rights-remedies" attitude toward its office will
feel justified neither in taking action merely because "something
needs doing" nor in declining redress on the assumption that
some other agency might possibly be doing something in the
premises. 1 53 In the words of Chief Justice Marshall:
[W2here a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights
depend upon the performance of that duty, it seems . . .clear
that the individual who considers himself injured, has a right to
resort to the laws of his country for a remedy.1 54

Underlying this utterance there may be an unrealistic premise,
namely, that the traditional law of remedies is capable of vindicating every right, or that "'rights' and 'remedies' [are] in a 1:1
152. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803) (Marshall, C.J.).
153. The posture of the rights-oriented court is well described by
Professor Dellinger when, in defense of the holding in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971),
he explains in effect why the Court ought not to wait for Congress to
provide relief for victims of unreasonable searches and seizures (as the
Chief Justice and Justice Black, dissenting in that case, would have preferred):
[Ilf the fourth amendment is read (as it should be) as confernng upon Webster Bivens a personal right to be free of unwarranted searches and seizures, and if the justice that is due is justice to individuals and not merely justice to formless groupings
of the citizenry, then it is nevertheless wrong to turn Bivens
away. Whether or not any larger social gain will result from
the decision in Bivens in terms of the deterrence of unlawful
official behavior, the decision has the virtue of establishing that
the nation's courts are open-to claims that an individual's federal
constitutional rights have been violated under the authority of
the federal government and are ready to find a remedy that will
at least provide compensation for the individual wrong that has
been done.
Dellinger, supra note 78, at 1553-54.
154. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 166 (1803).
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correlation."' 155 It does seem clear, however, that if traditional
remedies are available, the court is in no sense an officious intermeddler to invoke them and would be in dereliction of office
if it declined. Justice Harlan puts the matter concisely when
he says:
[A] court of law vested with jurisdiction over the subject matter
make prinof a suit has the power--and therefore the duty-to
cipled choices among traditional judicial remedies. 156
But, going on without pause to indicate the problematical character of our next subject, he observes:
Whether special prophylactic measures-which at least arguably the exclusionary rule exemplifies ... are supportable on
grounds other than a court's competence to select among tradito make good the wrong done... is a
tional judicial remedies
157
separate question.

It is to this separate question that we now turn, observing as
we do that we are moving from remedies strictly understood to
remedies as "special prophylactic measures" and to the question
of the supportability of the exclusionary rule on grounds other
than a court's traditional remedial competence. We should note
that there is presumably also a question of the supportability
of the rule on the ground of that competence itself, because, as
must be remembered, exclusion does not "make good the wrong
done."'158 Finally, we note that Justice Harlan is commendably
cautious in qualifying his characterization of the exclusionary
rule as "arguably" a "special prophylactic measure," because that
is precisely one of the questions in issue. We, for example, want
to say it is neither a traditional remedy nor a preventive measure,
but a different thing altogether-a recognition of the defendant's
due process right to the exercise of judicial review.
2. "Special Prophylactic Measures" for Police Misconduct
One cannot helpfully discuss deterrent, supervisory measures
in the illegal evidence context without being prepared to compare
155. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 401 n.3 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
156. Id. at 408 n.8.
157. Id.
158. Id. The fact that the exclusionary rule helps only the guilty
is of course frequently cited as still another perverse characteristic of
the rule. And yet critics properly scorn any attempt to justify exclusion
as compensation for unreasonable search and seizure. See Oaks, supra
note 43, at 671 n.25. But if exclusion is not compensation, then the undeniable "help" that accrues to the guilty by virtue of suppression ought
to be regarded merely as an unavoidable consequence of giving the defendant his fourth amendment or due process rights. One would have
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these measures both with traditional remedies and with judicial
review. But comparison cannot be made unless it is appreciated that there are different things to compare-hence the value
of Justice Harlan's intimation that we should be more terminologically precise. Everyone knows, but not everyone remembers
to say, for example, that the exclusionary rule is not a remedy,
except (and even then only "arguably") in the nonjudicial sense
appropriate to handymen, troubleshooters, legislators, and other
"problem solvers" whose job it is to "remedy situations" or otherwise "fix up" things that have broken down, gotten out of hand,
or gone awry. Judicial contact with this legislative function normally occurs on occasions of statutory interpretation, when the
court needs to know "[w]hat remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the commonwealth.""3 0 Exceptionally, however, courts are expected or expect themselves to act like legislatures, because they have or
claim to have supervisory power. 160 And in this legislative
capacity they do not treat the movant, e.g., the victim of an illegal
seizure, primarily as a right holder with a claim on the remedy
or with a right to judicial review of the executive conduct in
his case, but merely as a triggering mechanism to put supervisory
measures in motion. 6 ' This is the case in suppression hearings
to say that Chief Justice Traynor slipped into error when, in People v.

Cahan, 44 CaL 2d 434, 447, 282 P.2d 905, 913 (1955), he spoke of "a particular criminal ... [being] redressed for a past violation of his rights by
excluding the evidence against him."
159. Heydon's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 637 (K.B. 1584), quoted in L.
FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 83 (1964).

160. Professor Hill might take issue with our characterization of ju-

dicial legislation as an "exceptional' function. At least he would object

to this characterization if under "judicial legislation" we were to include
judicially developed limitations on government, and if "exceptional"
were meant to connote anything like "recent innovation." For, under
the heading "Judicial Activism in the Tradition of the English Common

Law," Hill, supra note 65, at 207, he observes that "the Bill of Rights

is in large part the constitutional expression of liberties won by the people of England in the course of centuries of struggle against the royal
prerogative." He acknowledges that "the role of the English judiciary
in shaping this development was a complex one," but he thinks it
plausible to say that "at stages of English history, the common law
judges assumed the task of expanding the liberties of the subject . . 21

and he speaks of "lawmaking in the tradition of English judicial ac-

tivism." Id. at 207-08. See also Grant, Our Common Law Constitution,
40 BOSTON U.L. REV. 1 (1960). But by "exceptionally" we mean "nonparadigmatically" rather than "nontraditionally." Even in the England
of the formative rulemaking period of the common law, the concept of
judicial legislation, if it was articulated at all, must have been recognized
as parasitic on the notion of legislative legislation.
161. See note 64 supra.
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under the deterrence theory, where the movant is thought to
be sans personal right to suppression, and in the largely hypothetical criminal prosecution of the police, where the victim is
the complaining witness.
The distinction between remedies strictly and loosely socalled is not an idle semantic observation. It can have consequences. With only a little hyperbole, we can say that the fate
of the exclusionary rule could be determined by reference to
that distinction. For, whereas the court is authorized, indeed
duty-bound, "to make [and implement] principled choices"
among traditional remedies, there is some doubt-Justice Harlan
saw it as "a ... question" anyway' 2-- about a court's authority
to improvise legislative-type "remedies" for diseases of the commonwealth. If one shares this doubt, and also believes that the
exclusionary rule is such a remedy-an exercise of the supervisory power directed at remedying a pattern of police misconduct-one may well doubt the legitimacy of the rule in any forum. But reference to that kind of generalized doubt is not
necessary to account for Justice Harlan's blithe and peremptory
call in Coolidge v. New Hampshire 63 for repeal of the exclusionary rule in the state courts. One sees how vulnerable the Mapp
rule is to repeal, and why Harlan could be peremptory with it,
when one recalls, with the help of Harlan's dissent in that case,
that the Supreme Court's supervisory writ does not run to the
states:
Essential to the majority's argument against Wolf is the proposition that the rule of Weeks v. United States ... derives not
from the "supervisory power" of this Court over the federal judicial system, but from constitutional requirements. This is so
because no one, I suppose, would suggest that this Court0 possesses any general supervisory power over the state courts.' 4
162. See text accompanying note 157 supra.
163. 403 U.S. 443 (1971). Concurring in Coolidge, Justice Harlan
voiced his feeling "that the law of search and seizure is due for an overhauling," id. at 490, and without pause he then said he "would begin
this process of re-evaluation by over-ruling Mapp v. Ohio ... and Ker
v. California . . . [which] made the federal 'exclusionary rule' applicable
to the States . . . [and] forced the States to follow all the ins and outs
of this Court's Fourth Amendment decisions, handed down in federal
cases." Id.
164. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 678 (1961) (emphasis added). See
also Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 50 n.1 (1949): "Of course this Court
does not have the corrective power over State courts that it has over
the lower federal courts." But see Lee v. Florida, 392 U.S. 378 (1969),
which may negate Harlan's disclaimer. See also note 277 infra.
At first, Justice Harlan is willing "to assume, for present purposes,
that the Weeks rule 'is of constitutional origin.'" 367 U.S. at 678.
Shortly, however, his "considerable doubt as to the soundness of this
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To meet Justice Harlan's strictures, then, and to legitimize
enforcement of the exclusionary rule against the states, one
must either deny that the exclusionary rule has a deterrence
purpose, or deny that, having such a purpose, it is a mere product of the supervisory power. Justice Clark, author of the plurality opinion in Mapp, sensed the difficulty and chose the latter
alternative, i.e., to affirm the deterrence purpose and yet to deny
the supervisory power source. He says that the exclusionary
rule is "a clear, specific, and constitutionally required-even if
judicially implied-deterrent safeguard without insistence upon
which the Fourth Amendment would have been 'reduced to a
form of words.' ,,'c5 This passage is incorrigibly ambiguous,
mixing in about equal portions vague constitutional references,
deterrence rationale, and empirical generalization. Justice Clark
does not make clear whether the exclusionary rule is constitutionally required as such or is required only because it is a deterrent. Nor does he make clear whether, if it is constitutionally
required as a deterrent, it is required because of its deterrent
intention, or because it actually works as a deterrent. If the ex-

clusionary rule is constitutionally mandated as, but only as, an
actual deterrent, Justice Clark does not vouchsafe the constitutional theory that would make a requirement of the fourth
amendment depend on this kind of contingency. But Clark's
position is not dubious merely because of his tortured prose.
Rather, that prose perfectly reflects the difficulty of his undertaking, or the undertaking of any person who attempts to harbor
simultaneously a constitutional and a deterrence view of the exclusionary rule."0 6
foundational proposition" surfaces when he says that, as far as he is concerned, "it is entirely clear that the Weeks exclusionary rule is but a
remedy which, by penalizing past official misconduct, is aimed at deterring such conduct in the future." Id. at 680. Future-oriented deterrence
remedies would seem to issue from, and only from, the supervisory
power.
165. Id. at 648.
166. As Professor Hill says, "Justice Clark's [Mapp] opinion is not
easily parsed." Hill, supra note 65, at 183 n.14. One simply cannot tell
from the quoted passage whether Clark is in agreement with Kaplan,
who says that all that is demanded from the Constitution is "something
that works," Kaplan, supra note 55, at 1030, and that if and when a more
effective deterrent is found "it should replace the current exclusionary
rule," id., or whether Clark deems the exclusionary rule "to be so integral
an aspect of a constitutional right as not to permit of substitutes ...

Hill, supranote 65, at 185.
It might be thought that Justice Clark is saying something like what
Professor Hill says about the status of what he calls "matters of implemental detail":
Even when, in the apparent absence of alternatives, a procedural
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3. JudicialReview as Avoidance of Fourth Amendment
"Meaninglessness"-TheDue ProcessExclusionaryRight
When words like "meaninglessness" and "ineffectuality" are
used by proponents of the exclusionary rule they are meant to
suggest that the rule must be promulgated or maintained to
avoid rendering the fourth amendment fatuous or futile. What
is left indefinite, always by the words themselves and sometimes
by the context, is what the necessary and sufficient conditions
of meaningfulness and effectuality are. If one hears it said
without elucidation that the exclusionary rule gives "force and
effect" or "content and meaning," one does not know whether
exclusion is thought to be a supplier of effect and meaning immediately itself, or only mediately by its effect on the police.
And, when taken out of context, the same is true of Justice
Holmes's characterization of the hazard as "reduc[ing] the
Fourth Amendment to a form of words."' 6 7 It cannot be said
rule is held to be constitutionally required, it may cease to be
so if suitable alternatives are developed, or if other measures
have eliminated or brought under control the evil at which it

is aimed. In short, constitutional holdings in some matters of

implemental detail may not be immutable.
Id. at 181. But even if the passage from Clark's opinion were susceptible
of construction along the lines of the Hill thesis, the Mapp opinion would
not be free from logomachy, because, as Hill notes, Justice Clark seems
also to have adopted the thesis "that there is a constitutional right not
to be convicted on the basis of illegally-seized evidence." Id. at 183.
167. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392
(1920). Of course, one must hasten to add that the Silverthorne opinion
as a whole leaves absolutely no doubt about Holmes's meaning. That
opinion is informed by the unitary model of a government and a prosecution-indeed, by the Weeks evidentiary transaction interpretation of

the fourth amendment-and there is, accordingly, no mention in it of deterrence of executive misconduct.

The Silverthorne business records were seized without warrant, and
photographs and copies were made of them. The district court ordered
the originals returned, but impounded the copies. Subpoenas to produce
the originals were then served, "and on the refusal of [Silverthorne] to
produce them the Court made an order that the subpoenas should be
complied with, although it had found that all the papers had been seized
in violation of the parties' constitutional rights. The refusal to obey this
order is the contempt alleged." Id. at 391. "The Government now, while
in form repudiating and condemning the illegal seizure, seeks to maintain
its right to avail itself of the knowledge obtained by that means which
otherwise it would not have had." Id. This is what Justice Holmes says
about the Government's theory of the case:

The proposition could not be presented more nakedly. It

is that although of course its seizure was an outrage which the
Government now regrets, it may study the papers before it returns them, copy them, and then may use the knowledge that
it has gained to call upon the owners in a more regular form
to produce them; that the protection of the Constitution covers
the physical possession but not any advantages that the Govern-
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whether the amendment becomes mere verbiage because courts
do not discourage the police from unreasonable searches and
seizures, or because the courts encourage the police to make unreasonable searches and seizures, or simply because the courts
are taken to signify their indifference to the amendment when
they admit illegally seized evidence.
Sometimes a Justice will indicate what he wants to happen,
but will not succeed in explaining exactly why his wish should
be the command of others. For example, the Justice may try
to embrace simultaneously the notion that there is in the premises a genuine imperative binding on the Court, and the notion
that the exclusionary rule is a product of the supervisory power.
The chief difficulty with this approach is that the only imperative existing in supervisory power situations is not imposed upon
the Supreme Court, but is rather the result of that Court's fiat
in the exercise of the supervisory power. The other difficulty
is that in state cases the Supreme Court may not have supervisory jurisdiction.
Justice Douglas's dissent in Wolf168 is an illustration of these
difficulties. He associates himself with Justice Black's supervisory power understanding of the source of the exclusionary rule;
and yet, in opposition to Black, he would exclude the Wolf evidence. But his statement of opposition to admission is not cast
as if it were part of a mere disagreement about how a discretionary power should be exercised. It is written with a determination that seems to assume that the Supreme Court is under
some kind of moral or constitutional imperative existing independently of its own fiat. In his Wolf concurrence, Justice Black
goes out of his way to speak for the supervisory power conception when he says that "the federal exclusionary rule is not a
command of the Fourth Amendment but is a judicially created
ment can gain over the object of its pursuit by doing the for-

bidden act. Weeks v. United States ... to be sure, had established that laying the papers directly before the grand jury was
unwarranted, but it is taken to mean only that two steps are

required instead of one. In our opinion such is not the law. It

reduces the Fourth Amendment to a form of words .... The

essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in
a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not
be used before the Court but that it shall not be used at all.
Of course this does not mean that the facts thus obtained become
sacred and inaccessible. If knowledge of them is gained from
an independent source they may be proved like any others, but

the knowledge gained by the Government's wrong cannot be
used by it in the way proposed.

Id. at 391-92.
168. 338 U.S. at 40.
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rule of evidence which Congress might negate."'169 For Black
any question of extending the rule to the states is settled by
that assumption. By contrast, the assumption of judicial creation settles nothing for Justice Douglas because he cannot rid
himself of the notion that the fourth amendment places the
Court under some kind of duty. He insists that "evidence
obtained [by unreasonable search and seizure] must be excluded
...
since in the absence of that rule of evidence the Amendment
would have no effective sanction."'110 But Justice Douglas is
more successful in expressing his concern and his exclusionary
wish than in explaining why the Court must give the amendment a sanction-why, if the amendment is addressed to the executive, and if therefore the Court can only make evidentiary
rulings in the premises, the Court has the responsibility to rescue the amendment from nullification by the executive. Douglas's "must" is presumably not intended to be merely 'hortatory,
and yet he does not explain how the exclusionary rule can at
once be the product of a constitutional imperative, binding on
the Court, and yet also be a nonconstitutional, congressionally
negatable "rule of evidence." The answer is surely that the
"must" is not genuine, but is instead an exhortation not binding
on the states, nor on Congress, nor on the Supreme Court it171
self.
169. Id. at 39-40.
170. Id. at 40.
171. The more or less articulate assumption of Justice Douglas (and
of Professor Kaplan, see note 55 supra and note 276 infra) is that the
Court may, or must, adopt a policy toward the fourth amendment. We
assume, of course, that the amendment has a "policy" in the sense of
"purpose" or "rationale"-a policy in light of which the courts interpret
the amendment to determine the constitutional rules of search and seizure. Our qualms are not about the notion of the amendment having a
policy, but about the courts or the Supreme Court being free or not free
to adopt policies toward or in the implementation of the amendment. In
particular, we think it may be important to discover the relationship between judicial freedom or obligation with respect to policy formulation
and the obligation of police to obey the fourth amendment or to respect
Supreme Court policy toward it.
Consider the difficulties one encounters in trying to understand the
hypothesis of a constitutional compulsion to adopt a policy supportive
of the amendment. Either the Court thinks it clearly must adopt a certain policy, in which case it will not be "adopting" a policy but will rather be interpreting and following the rules of the amendment; or it will
not know what policy it should adopt, in which case it will indeed be
"adopting"-perhaps even "originating"--but, by the terms of the example, it will not know whether it has complied with the constitutional
imperative, supposing there is one. This latter problem is one of the
difficulties with Professor Kaplan's formulation of the matter-the other
difficulty being how and in what form that which he calls the constitu-
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Although Justice Douglas tries to move away from the totally discretionary, "creative," "improvisational" understanding
tional "demand" impinges on the police:
[T]he exclusionary rule is merely one arbitrary point on a continuum between deterrence of illegal police activity and conviction of guilty persons. As a stopping point, it can be justified
solely on the ground that it achieves a better balance between
these twin goals than would other points. If another stopping
point does the job better, it should replace the current exclusionary rule ....
In other words, the rule is not written into the Constitution.
Rather, the Constitution demands something that works-presumably at a reasonable social cost. The content of the particular remedial or prophylactic rule is thus a pragmatic decision
rather than a constitutional fiat.
Kaplan, supra note 55, at 1030. If we read this correctly, Kaplan is not
treating the fourth amendment as a rule or set of rules that has a policy,
i.e., a purpose or rationale, but as itself being a kind of policy statement.
What we seem to be given is a "first order" policy statement, in response
to which the Court must come up with "second order" "policies" or "particular remedial or prophylactic rule [s]." But it is difficult if not impossible, in such a scheme, to find an obligation. It is uncertain whether
a constitutional provision, understood as a policy statement, can also be
understood as imposing an obligation, or whether it is merely hortatory.
Furthermore, in the case of Kaplan's formulation, there is not only a
question about the origin and the force of the phrase "the Constitution
demands," but also about the addressees. We are not told how one infers
such a demand from the Constitution, nor whether it has the force of
obligation, nor, if so, on whom it is obligatory. We do not know why
the Court is bound to do what is "demanded" of it, nor why, if the measures taken by the Court are merely in response to a policy statement,
they bind the police to compliance with them.
We shall assume that the Court will know when it has tried hard
enough to find the remedial mix that works. Perhaps there is nothing
more mysterious about an "arbitrary point on a continuum," which is
supposed to be "something that works-presumably at a reasonable
social cost," than there is about any balancing metaphor. But if that
language and that metaphor are not mysterious, they nevertheless fail
to specify how vigorous the Court must be in meeting the constitutional
"demand," and what efforts and sacrifices it is entitled to ask of society,
and especially of the police, before it can satisfy itself and those to whom
it is accountable that it has something that "works" well enough and
yet without unreasonable "social cost." Supposing this question can be
passed over as it relates to the Court's own constitutional duty, we do
not think it can be passed over in dealing with police obligations under
the fourth amendment. We can understand the police having obligations
under the fourth amendment, viewed as a rule or set of rules, but we
have trouble understanding police obligations under the amendment understood as a policy statement.
Perhaps, however, we have been laboring under a misapprehension
insofar as we have even thought of a police obligation. Perhaps the police are merely to be deterred and/or manipulated in pursuance of the
policy. If this is so, as on reflection it seems to be, we can then shift
our concerns radically from conceptual enigma to doubt about the soundness of a compliance strategy that abstracts from obligation. The statements, "You police must refrain from violating privacy because we courts
have a policy of deterring you from violating privacy," or "Refrain, be
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of the exclusionary rule articulated by Justice Black, he simply
finds no solid conceptual ground to move to. By contrast, it
seems to us, Justice Brennan in Calandrahas at least a divination of where that ground does not lie, as is shown by his reluctance to look for support in the deterrence rationale: deterrence
of the police "was at best only a hoped for effect of the exclusionary rule, not its ultimate objective."' 7 2 To be sure, when
Brennan tries to say positively what the objective is, he lapses
into vague references to meaningfulness, as when he says that
the rule properly understood is "an enforcement tool to give content and meaning to the Fourth Amendment's guarantees."" 3
This is not only vague, but it also suggests that Justice Brennan
is working from a voluntaristic, supervisory conception of the
rule after all.
There are, however, other passages in Brennan's Calandra
dissent in which one can hear something of a constitutional ring,
as if the practice of classical judicial review were being invoked.
For example, Justice Brennan states that "the vital function of
the [exclusionary] rule [is] to insure that the judiciary avoid
even the slightest appearance of sanctioning illegal government
conduct.' 7 4 This passage can be interpreted three ways: First,
it can be taken as a judicial integrity, "the court protects itself"
utterance; we shall discuss it and like passages under that interpretation in Part VII. But, second, if "sanctioning" were taken
as a synonym for "validating," one could plausibly follow up on
Brennan's language by insisting that the exclusionary rule is not
cause we have settled at one 'arbitrary point on a continuum' "-these
statements are not good rhetoric, to say nothing of good constitutionalism. (Some help on the strategy question will be found in Oaks, supra
note 43, at 705-06, 711, 724-25. ("A legal sanction is most likely to be
an effective deterrent when it is reinforced by a sense of moral obligation
or an appeal to conscience." Id. at 724.)
It will be apparent that we do not think anything is gained, and that
much is lost, by treating the amendment as a policy rather than as a
rule. (On the notion of "policy," and what one can call the voluntaristic
qualities it has by contrast with both "rule" and "principle," see Dworkin, JudicialDiscretion, 60 J. Pmtosopva 624, 631 (1963); and The Model
of Rules, 35 U. Cm. L. REv. 14, 23 (1967).)
We do not deny that this conclusion is- supportive of the argument
we shall be making in the remainder of this Article. That argument is
that exclusion is one indispensable expression of the defendant's constitutional right to have the fourth amendment, understood as a "rule of recognition" and therefore as part of "the law of the land," applied in his
case-the right he has to judicial review where the government has violated constitutional laws in its prosecution of him.
172. 414 U.S. at 356.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 360.
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a separate "rule" at all, but is simply another name for judicial
review-a name, moreover, which is misleading if it suggests
that judicial review of executive search and seizure conduct is
at all different from judicial review of legislative conduct. To
the extent that "sanctioning" is synonymous with "validation"
in Justice Brennan's Calandra opinion, he is giving the fourth
amendment "meaning," or saving it from "meaninglessness," in
the same way the judicial review doctrine of Marbury v. Madison' 75 purports tx give meaning and force and effect to the
whole Constitution, i.e., by not giving judicial force and effect
to governmental conduct that violates the Constitution.1 6 But,
if this is what Justice Brennan has in mind, he has taken us
away from the notion of remedy, whether strictly or loosely understood-away from both the traditional remedial canon and
the supervisory power-into the realm of constitutionalism and
judicial review. Exclusion qua judicial review is neither compensation for harm done by another branch of government, nor
deterrence of harm threatened, nor judicial self-protection. It
is rather the court's method of avoiding a wrong it might do
to the defendant by ignoring, in his case, what we shall be calling a constitutional "rule of recognition." Exclusion as judicial
review is the court's affirmation of the defendant's personal due
process right to have this rule of recognition-the fourth amendment-observed in his case. The judicial review approach to unconstitutionally seized evidence is a repudiation of the fragment175. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
176. If an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution,
is void, does it, notwithstanding its invalidity, bind the courts,
and oblige them to give it effect? Or, in other words, though
it be not law, does it constitute a rule as operative as if it was
a law? This would be to overthrow in fact what was established
theory; and would seem, at first view, an absurdity too gross
to be insisted on. It shall, however, receive a more attentive
consideration.
It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule
to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that
rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of each.
So, if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the
law and the constitution apply to a particular case, so that the
court must either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the constitution, disregarding the law; the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case: this is of the very essence of
the judicial duty.
If then the courts are to regard the constitution; and the constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature; the
constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to
which they both apply.
Id. at 177-78.
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ary model, an uncloistering of the court, an acknowledgment by
the court that it must attend to fourth amendment matterseven if that amendment is primarily addressed to the executive-because the court is part of the government that has allegedly violated the fourth amendment, and because it is being
asked to validate that violation by using its product to jeopardize
a person's life, liberty, or property. If the court cannot ignore
the manner in which the evidence has been obtained (and we
shall presently argue that it cannot), then it is faced with the
alternatives of excluding the evidence and thereby rendering the
fourth amendment meaningful as a "rule of recognition," or
making it meaningless by admission. That is, it is faced with
the alternative of respecting or violating the defendant's "due
process" right to have the "law" of the fourth amendment observed in the government's prosecution of him.
In Part VI we shall discuss the judicial review account of
the exclusionary rule, and the possibility that Justice Brennan
has it in mind when he refers'to the avoidance of "sanctioning
illegal conduct." In the meantime, however, we want to turn
to a third possible meaning of this phrase and to a hazard closely
related to, if not indistinguishable from, fourth amendment
"meaninglessness." We are going to ask if there is a difference
between "meaninglessness" by omission and something called
"affirmative sanction."
4. "Authoritative Disavowal" of "Affirmative Sanction"
We have discussed the senses in which the term "remedy"
can be used in connection with the problem of illegally seized
evidence.177 Then, by taking up the problem of fourth amendment "meaninglessness," we were led out of the realm of remedy
into that of judicial review. 178 But admission may be more than
failure to review; in order to understand what takes place in
an admissionist jurisdiction, the emphasis may have to be placed
on the act of admission rather than on the failure to review. If
that shift in emphasis is made, it may be concluded that the
court as part of the government has itself created a problem
which cries for solution by some "remedy" in the looser sense
of "repairing a situation" that is morally awry. Admissionist
courts have been accused not merely of rendering the fourth
amendment and similar protections "meaningless" by passive
177. See text accompanying note 151 supra.
178. See text accompanying notes 175-76 supra.
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"condonation," but also of affirmatively commissioning illegal
conduct. It is with that allegation in mind that we now turn,
first, to Justice Frankfurter, who did not believe that admission
constituted affirmative sanction, and to Justice Holmes, who believed that it did.
Writing for the Court in Wolf, Justice Frankfurter felt "no
hesitation in saying that were a State affirmatively to sanction
...

[unreasonable] police incursion into privacy" it would be act-

ing unconstitutionally, 179 the implication being that there is nothing "affirmative" about admission. During the Olmstead litigation the Department of Justice had expressed its disapproval
of the criminal wiretapping done there.i 0 To this Justice
Holmes responded that he could "attach no importance to protestations of disapproval if . . . [the government] knowingly ac-

cepts and pays and announces that in the future it will pay for
the fruits."'" Now, for Holmes, "no distinction can be taken
between the Government as prosecutor and the Government as
judge."'1 2 This presumably means that judicial expostulation
against unconstitutional police activity is no more credible than
executive "disapproval" if it is accompanied by admission. This
is so at least if acceptance of the evidence is tantamount to an
"announcement" that the court wants the fruits and will accept
them in the future. In short, Holmes is saying that admissionist
courts do exactly what Justice Frankfurter said in Wolf "would
run counter to the guaranty of the [Constitution]" namely, they
"affirmatively ... sanction ... [unreasonable] police incursion
into privacy .... ." Or, to put it another way, Justice Holmes

sees no difference between rendering the fourth amendment
"meaningless"---'a form of words"--and affirmatively sanctioning executive conduct violative of the amendment.
179. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949). Aside from the question whether admission should be taken to constitute affirmative sanction, there is the separate question of what kind of governmental conduct

Justice Frankfurter thought would amount to the forbidden sanction.

Dissenting in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 211 (1961), he said that if
victims of fourth amendment violations were denied redress in state
courts "on the ground that the official character of the [policemen]
clothed them with civil immunity," .this would be affirmative sanction
of the violation. See Hill, Constitutional Remedies, 69 COLUm. L. REV.

1109, 1151 (1969).

180, "According to the Government's brief.

..

'[tjhe Prohibition Unit

of the Treasury disclaims [wiretapping] and the Department of Justice

has frowned on it.'" Ohnstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 483 n.15
(1928). The Government was thus repeating a pattern of behavior previously noted by Holmes in his Silverthorne opinion. See note 167 supra.
181. 277 U.S. at 470.
182. Id.
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One wonders whether Justice Holmes would have been mollified if the government had also sought to have the wiretapping
agents prosecuted by the state of Washington. It is doubtful
that Holmes would have "attached importance" to that-or that
such action would have spoken loudly enough to constitute for
him a convincing disavowal of the wiretapping, given the Government's simultaneous use of the wiretapping evidence and its
readiness to use more of the same. If we are not mistaken, the
implication of Holmes's statement is that any form of disapproval, no matter how strenuous, is vitiated and neutralized by
introduction and admission into evidence. 183 For presumably
the more deserving of punishment the conduct of the officers
is, the less comprehensible will be the court's admission of their
work product. To say the least, doubts exist as to whether punishment can redress the moral imbalance created by admission
of illegally obtained evidence; and if as to punishment, then
more so as to civil awards.
These doubts exist because, however innocuously judges
would like to have admission interpreted, it will be taken as a
revelation of the court's fundamental attitude toward the rule
of law. The evidentiary decision is taken to be so revealing because it is so exclusively and intimately within the court's control-so fundamental to the court's own business of deciding
how it will synthesize its own peculiar product. By admitting
the evidence, the court says that so far as it, a court of law, is
concerned in the conduct of its own business, the manner in
which evidence is obtained will not be allowed to make any difference. 184
Wigmore, Holmes's great antagonist in the early days of the
exclusionary controversy, acted as if he thought he had made
an adequate defense of admission by saying that when a court
lets evidence in "the illegality is by no means condoned; it is
merely ignored."' 8 5 This is a significant disclaimer, and we shall
comment on it in proportion to its importance. It is important
not merely for what is said, or for who says it, but also for the
moral impulse it bespeaks. The archetypal admissionist, like
many of his successors,18 6 felt the need to absolve the admission183. See our consideration of Justice Holmes in note 150 supra.
184. The admissionist court signals what is of greatest consequence
to it when it adopts a principle according to which it presumably must
admit illegally obtained evidence in the prosecution of officers for illegally obtaining evidence, and so on ad infinitum.

185. Wigmore, supra note 16, at 479.
186. See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 356 n.11 (1974)
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ist court of complicity in executive misconduct. Indeed, the
question has never been whether courts are constitutionally at
liberty to condone unconstitutional searches and seizures, but
whether, by admitting the evidence, they do condone a violation
of the fourth amendment. And it is noteworthy that the question has been similarly circumscribed in the debate over judicial
review of legislation. Indeed, we think it would be useful to
recur momentarily from the exclusionary controversy to the
older debate and to the jurist in whose vineyard Wigmore can
be said to have labored.
In the debate provoked by Marbury v. Madison, the fragmentary model was used to deny judicial condonation of unconstitutional legislation, much as, we are arguing, that same model
has been used by Wigmore and others to deny condonation of
executive misconduct. Justice Gibson's dissenting opinion in
Eakin v. Raub 8 7 is generally cited as the classic response to Marbury. On the point of interest here, Gibson briskly answered
his own question-whether "the judges do a positive act in violation of the constitution, when they give effect to an unconstitutional law"--by responding "[n]ot if the law has been passed
according to the forms established in the constitution."1 88 He
went on to find "the fallacy of the question" in its
supposing that the judiciary adopts the acts of the legislature as
its own; whereas the enactment of a law and the interpretation
of it are not concurrent acts, and as the judiciary is not required
to concur in the enactment, neither is it in the breach of the
constitution which may be the consequence of the enactment.
The fault is imputable to the legislature, and on it the responsibility exclusively rests. 189
(Powell, J.) (" 'Illegal conduct' is hardly sanctioned,

...

by declining

to make an unprecedented extension of the exclusionary rule to grand
jury proceedings .... "); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed.
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 414 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
("Nor is it easy to understand how a court can be thought to endorse
a violation of the Fourth Amendment by allowing illegally seized evidence to be introduced against a defendant if an effective remedy is provided against the government."); People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 453,
282 P.2d 905, 916 (1955) (Spence, J., dissenting) ("The expression of...
[the admissionist] view does not signify that I condone any illegal search
or seizure by any enforcement officer. . . .");Barrett, supra note 50 ("It
should be noted that the exclusion of the evidence usually results in the
defendant's completely escaping punishment for his act, while the admission of the evidence does not constitute a judicial approval of the officer's
conduct, and that [the] officer is still, at least in theory, subject to some
form of civil or criminal liability."). But see note 85 supra, on the question of whether the officer is civilly liable according to Barrett's theory.
187. 12 S. &R. *330, *344 (Pa. 1825).
188. Id. at *354.
189. Id.
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We think the intent of these words is similar to that of Wigmore's noncondonation remark, and that they could be used as
well to justify use of evidence as to justify enforcement of a statute. And, because almost all present-day admissionists are loyal
to Marbury, it is perhaps healthy to draw attention to Wigmore's
kinship with Gibson, precisely so contemporary admissionists will
be prompted to reexamine the doctrinal consistency of their admissionism on the one hand and their loyalty to judicial review
on the other.
Justice Gibson does not imply that a constitution is a merely
subjective charter, nor deny that it provides the criteria by
which a legislative enactment can be shown to be unconstitutional. But, having granted objective status to constitutions, he
denies that courts "do a positive act in violation of the constitution," or that the "judiciary adopts the acts of the legislature
as its own" when it "give [s] effect to an unconstitutional law."
Because the judges do not "concur" in the passage of the act,
Justice Gibson does not believe they can be held to have concurred in the violence the act does to a constitution. And the
reason the enforcing judges do not concur and are therefore without "fault" or "responsibility" is that "the enactment of a law
and the interpretation of it are not concurrent acts." Now, the
fact of timing to which Gibson points is indubitable. The doubtful premise is his assumption that moral "concurrence" is contingent on temporal "concurring." The question at its narrowest
is the vitality in our public law of the notion of "ratification."
At its broadest, the question is a confrontation between the unitary and fragmentary models, with Marshall stressing unitary
"transactions" or "courses of conduct" and Gibson fragmenting
the government along the temporal lines that can be drawn between various acts.
It might be complained, however, that this digression has
not advanced the inquiry, because the paragraph from Gibson's
opinion is a feeble specimen of fragmentary thinking, and that
Wigmore, for example, does not rely for his disclaimer on the
mere absence of temporal concurrency. We must try to establish
what Wigmore means by saying that "illegality is by no means
condoned; it is merely ignored."' 90
190. Wigmore, supra note 16, at 479. See text accompanying note
185 supra. But see Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178
(1803):

Those... who controvert the principle that the constitution is
to be considered, in court, as a paramount law, are reduced to
the necessity of maintaining that courts must close their eyes
on the constitution, and see only the law.

19741

EXCLUSIONARY

RULE

We assume that the relationship between the clauses is conceptually intimate and that Wigmore is saying that illegality is
not condoned precisely because it is ignored. Now, this interpretation can in turn be construed in either one of two ways,
depending on how "ignored" is understood-depending, that is,
on whether one emphasizes the current or the obsolete sense of
that word.
"To ignore" currently means, "to refuse to take notice of...
to disregard intentionally . . . [to] shut 'one's eyes to.' "191

This

is surely the sense Wigmore has primarily in mind. Indeed, in
his gloss on the proposition under discussion, he includes a
dictum from an English case to the effect that "the Court [could
not] take notice in what manner [the evidence] was obtained."'19 2
But, this sense does not serve Wigmore because it begs the main
question, which is whether the court is at liberty not to take
notice of, or is free to shut its eyes to, the manner of obtaining
evidence.
In order to avoid question-begging, one must resort to the
archaic sense, "not to know, to be ignorant of."'1 93 If Wigmore

is saying anything responsive to the condonation problem, he
must be saying that in some respect the court is ignorant of the
officers' misconduct. Wigmore must be trying to undermine the
condonation innuendo by finding the court somehow aloof from
the illegality. And, even though courts are logically incapable
of "ignoring" that of which they are honestly not aware-conscious inadvertance presupposing prior advertance-ignoring
nevertheless may, and perhaps must, have as its objective the
simulation of genuine ignorance. To put it another way, just
as the current sense of "to ignore" is parasitic on the obsolete
sense, so also must Wigmore's reference to ignoring be ultimately concerned with ignorance and knowledge, because guilty
knowledge is precisely what leads to the charge of condonation.
The implication of Wigmore's precept would seem to be that
if the ignoring does not succeed there will be condonation, or
that if there is knowledge there is condonation. So, presumably,
the court cannot morally afford to know how the evidence was
obtained. Nor, presumably, can it feign ignorance, for, one
would assume, if the problem for which a solution is sought is
This doctrine would subvert the very foundation of all written constitutions.

191.

5 OXFORD ENGLISH DIcTioNARY 33 (1933).

192. Wigmore, supra note 16, at 479 n.1, citing Jordan v. Lewis, 93
Eng. Rep. 1072 (K.B. 1740).
193. 5 OxFoRD ENGLISH DicioNARY 33 (1933).
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a moral problem, bad faith would be contrary to purpose.
And yet ignoring, even as it is parasitic on the concept of ignorance, at the same time presupposes both knowledge and willfulness. At any rate, under Wigmore's account the court's ignorance is contrived; the court does not know because it will not
allow itself to be told.
As might be expected, Wigmore does not even try to pursue
the "ignorance" tack; his final recommendations are that the
court should send for "the high-handed, overzealous marshal
who had searched without a warrant, imposing a thirty-day imprisonment for his contempt of the Constitution and then
[the court should proceed] to affirm the sentence of the convicted criminal."' 94 But the court cannot fairly sentence the
marshal without hearing what he has done. So, in the very act
of doing justice, the court would lose its cover of willful ignorance, and, by Wigmore's hypothesis, condone that which, also by
his hypothesis, it cannot in justice afford to condone. Either the
court keeps up the sham of ignorance, and therefore acts in bad
faith, or it listens to what the defendant is trying to tell it; if
it persists even then in admitting the evidence, it condones the
"means through which . . . [the government] has been enabled

95
to obtain the evidence."'
The court will be chargeable with condonation unless it can
find a way to disavow the "high-handed" conduct of the officer.
Wigmore may have thought he had found a disavowal mechanism in punishment. To be sure, he never in so many words
claims to cancel admission by punishment; he only says that "the
natural way to do justice here would be [on the one hand] to
enforce the splendid and healthy principle of the Fourth Amendment directly, i.e., by... imposing a thirty-day imprisonment"
on the officer, and, on the other, to admit the evidence and convict and sentence the defendant. 196 But, if we have correctly
understood the implications of Wigmore's whole argument, punishment of the officer, and that by the admitting court, is not
merely what good judicial administration would suggest, but is
what any admissionist court must do. The admissionist court
must itself try to avoid condoning the officer's invasion-it cannot morally afford to gamble on the contingency that some other
agency might vindicate the moral and constitutional integrity of
the court. Yet the only instrument of disclaimer the admission-

194. Wigmore, supranote 16, at 484.
195. Id. at 479.
196. Id. at 484.
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ist court has kept at its disposal is punishment. So the court
must punish, if that will do any good, i.e., if punishment is a
sufficiently eloquent disclaimer. This brings us back to the
question of what can be accomplished by punishment as a disavowal mechanism when it is coupled with admission.
Punishment is sometimes the only way a government can
put moral distance between itself and the acts of its agents.
This kind of exigency has instructively been called an occasion
for the "expressive function" of punishment' 97-an occasion for
the use of punishment as "authoritative disavowal ' 198 of improper or embarrassing agent conduct. Something like this is
probably what Wigmore had in mind, or what he should have
had in mind. But the problem with punishment is that, whereas
it is sometimes a necessary condition to the regaining of a moral
equilibrium, and sometimes a necessary and sufficient condition,
it is sometimes neither necessary nor sufficient. The case of improperly obtained evidence would seem to be one where even
if punishment is necessary it is certainly not sufficient to accomplish disavowal in the face of the court's willingness to use the
evidence. A court can refrain from taking the initiative to facilitate criminal or damage actions against invading officers and yet
maintain the credibility of its stated opposition to those invasions, if it excludes the evidence. But the reverse may not
be true. 99 At the very least, one has to admit that there is a
197. In order to distinguish between governmental impositions that
might truly be called "part of the price of doing business" (which he
calls "penalties") and those which have to be called punishment, Joel
Feinberg argues that punishments have an identifying characteristic that
differentiates them from mere penalties:
That characteristic, or specific difference... is a certain expressive function: punishment is a conventional device for the expression of attitudes of resentment and indignation, and of judgments of disapproval and reprobation, on the part either of the
punishing authority himself or of those "in whose name" the
punishment is inflicted. Punishment, in short, has a symbolic
significance largely missing from other kinds of penalties.
J. FEINBEEG, DOING AND DESERVING 98 (1970).
198. Id. at 101. Feinberg explains this phenomenon as follows:
Consider the standard international practice of demanding that
a nation whose agent has unlawfully violated the complaining
nation's rights should punish the offending agent.... Punishing [say, a transgressive pilot] is an emphatic, dramatic, and
well-understood way of condemning and thereby disavowing his
act. It tells the world that the pilot had no right to do what
he did, that he was on his own in doing it, that his government
does not condone that sort of thing.... In quite parallel ways
punishment enables employers to disavow the acts of their employees (though not civil liability for those acts), and fathers
the destructive acts of their sons.
Id. at 101-02.
199. We surely do not wish to convey the impression that we are
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question whether credibility on the point can be maintained if
the court facilitates criminal or tort actions and yet welcomes
the improperly obtained evidence. Is there any way other than
exclusion to avoid condonation? Punishment (or a damage
award) would seem to be an additional desideratum. But more
should not be asked of it than it can give.
5. Exclusion as Protectionof Judicial Integrity

We have discussed four responses to four respective perceived problems: (1) personal remedies for unconstitutional invasions, (2) preventive measures for patterns of police misconduct, (3) exclusion qua judicial review to avoid "meaninglessness" of the fourth amendment as a rule of recognition, and (4)
exclusion and punishment as possible alternative responses to the
allegedly separate phenomenon of "affirmative sanction." Finally,
we are adding exclusion as a way judges keep themselves "untainted." We think, however, that almost everything that needs
saying about judicial integrity can and should be said in our discussion of the constitutional right of the defendant to have the
government act legally throughout its prosecution of him. That
discussion, which we shall present in Parts VI and VII, will show
hostile to the tort (or the penal) response to unconstitutional search and

seizure. We simply think, with Justice Brennan, the author of the
Court's opinion in Bivens and of the dissent in Calandra,that damages

are awarded and motions to suppress granted for entirely different reasons, and are hence not fungible "alternative remedies." Professor Dellinger's statement of the matter cannot be improved on:

[I]n his Bivens dissent, the Chief Justice denied that fourth
amendment violations would be endorsed by permitting the introduction of illegally seized evidence as long as an effective
damage remedy against the government was provided. But
availability of an alternative compensatory remedy only reduces
and does not eliminate the legitimizing effect of the official use
in court of evidence seized in violation of the fourth amendment.
In essence, by disallowing in all cases the use of the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence gathered in violation of the
fourth amendment, the Chief Justice's proposal would permit the
government to buy itself out of having to comply with constitutional commands. To abolish the exclusionary rule and replace
it with an action for damages against the governmental treasury
is to have the law speak with two voices.
Dellinger, supra note 78, at 1562-63.
On the entirely separate question of the genuine "availability of an
alternative compensatory remedy," see Professor Amsterdam's assessment of Chief Justice Burger's plan for quasi-judicial compensation tribunals in Amsterdam, supra note 28, at 429-30.
For a forthright attempt to deal with some of the difficulties courts
and legislatures would encounter in an attempt to fashion a viable compensatory remedy for fourth amendment violations, see Levin, An Alternative to the Exclusionary Rule for Fourth Amendment Violations, 58
JuDicATuRE 75 (1974).
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how and why most extant judicial integrity arguments, those of
Justices Brandeis and Brennan included, are truncated when left
in isolation and make sense only when consciously recognized as
partial statements of the more comprehensive argument for
a personal right to legality and due process.
VI. EXCLUSION AS JUDICIAL REVIEW
Having canvassed the evils possibly attendant on unreasonable searches and seizures, and having briefly viewed the exclusionary rule as a response to some of those evils, we are now
in a position to say with some precision and confidence what
functions the rule does not perform when it is understood as
Justice Brennan understands it. He does not view it as a
"remedy" in either sense of the term; 20 0 nor does he see "affirmative sanction" as a separate evil requiring a different response
from that appropriate for "meaninglessness. ' 20 1 Thus, according
to Justice Brennan, the exclusionary rule must be either an exercise of judicial review 20 2 or a supervisory power protection of
judicial integrity. In this Part we shall discuss the judicial review hypothesis, in the next that of judicial integrity.
We previously singled out Justice Brennan's statement that
"the vital function of the [exclusionary] rule [is] to insure that
the judiciary avoids even the slightest appearance of sanctioning
illegal government conduct."20 3 Although this declaration was
intended by Brennan as an expression of the judicial integrity
rationale, we have suggested that it might also be subject to a
judicial review interpretation. It could be recast, for example,
to read "the vital function of the exclusionary rule is to ensure
that the judiciary avoids validating unconstitutional conduct."
We shall now briefly exhibit the indications in the Calandradissent that Justice Brennan might accept this judicial review
emendation. 20

4

We think there are at least two now familiar

passages that might be employed to support the hypothesis that
there is an inchoate judicial review thesis in that dissent: first,
the claim that the exclusionary rule "give[s] content and meaning to the Fourth Amendment's guarantees" 20 5 and, second, the
statement that
200. See text accompanying notes 152-66 supra.
201. See text accompanying notes 177-99 supra.
202. See text accompanying notes 167-76 supra.
203. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 360 (1974), discussed
in text accompanying notes 174-76 supra.
204. See also text accompanying notes 249-52 infra.
205. 414 U.S. at 356.
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[t]he exclusionary rule is needed to make the Fourth Amendment something real; a guarantee that does not carry with it the
exclusion of evidence obtained by its violation is a chimera. 20 6

It is plausible to suggest that Justice Brennan believes that
the fourth amendment binds the courts because it is part of the
Constitution and because, by virtue of the reasoning and holding

of Marbury v. Madison,20 7 the courts are obligated to review
governmental conduct alleged to be at variance with any part
of the Constitution invoked in litigation. One can indeed say
that the intent of Marbury is precisely to prevent the Constitution from becoming "a chimera"--an eventuality that Chief Justice Marshall seemed to have in mind when characterizing as a

"solemn mockery" the anti-review theory that a "constitution
forms no rule for [a judge's] government." 208
It could perhaps also be said that according to Brennan the
judiciary's obligation to review searches and seizures is especially acute because they affect personal rights. At any rate we
know he places great stock in Madison's anticipation that
[i]f they [the rights] are incorporated into the Constitution,
independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a
peculiar manner the guardians of those rights; they will be an
impenetrable bulwark against
every assumption of power in the
Legislative or Executive.209
Indeed, it is Justice Brennan's opinion that
[t]he exclusionary rule gave life to Madison's prediction that
"independent tribunals of justice ...

will be naturally led to

resist every encroachment upon rights expressly
stipulated for
210
in the Constitution by the declaration of rights."

But, if Justice Brennan thinks the exclusionary rule is a
specimen of judicial review-an especially eligible specimen-it
is notorious that some of his brethren, otherwise committed to
judicial review, ignore or deny its pertinence to searches and
seizures. Justice Harlan, for example, wrote an extended critique of the exclusionary rule in Mapp,21 1 in which he barely

nodded at the possibility that the rule could be considered an
exercise of judicial review. 212 For him, the exclusion of evidence
and the doctrine of Marbury v. Madison are simply not in the
same realm of discourse. Justice Harlan assumes that the only
way exclusion could even conceivably come under the constitu206. Id. at 361.
207. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).

208. Id. at 180.
209. 414 U.S. at 356-57, quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 439 (1789).
210. Id. at 366, quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 439 (1789).

211. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 672-86 (1961) (dissenting opinion).
212. See id. at 678.
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tional umbrella would be as a defendant's claim immediately on
the court, as a "fair trial"-or what he calls "procedural"--right.
According to Harlan, exclusion must be either a fair trial right
or a mere supervisory power-deterrence remedy. Denying the
former, he affirms the latter. At no point does he consider the
possibility that exclusion could be the court's response to its own
duty to review the constitutionality of the executive's search and
seizure.
A. THE FOURTH Amr!ENDMENT AS A CONSTITUTIONAL STEPCHILD
In his Mapp plurality opinion, Justice Clark remonstrated
with the Wolf Court-much as Brennan remonstrates with the
Calandra Court-for making the fourth amendment a constitutional stepchild 213 by withholding judicial review from governmental acts challenged under it. "[W]e are aware of no restraint," Justice Clark said,
similar to that rejected today [i.e., similar to the ultimate antiexclusionary holding of Wolf], conditioning the enforcement of

any other basic constitutional right. The right to privacy, no
less important than any other right carefully and particularly
reserved to the people, would [if Wolf remained the law] stand
in marked contrast to all other rights declared as "basic to a free
society." ... This Court has not hesitated to enforce as strictly
against the States as it does against the Federal Government the
rights of free speech and of a free press, the rights to notice and
to a fair, public trial, including, as it does, the right not to be
convicted by use of a coerced confession, however
logically
relevant it be, and without regard to its reliability. 214

We shall discuss two of these heretofore more favored constitutional rights, pursuant to Justice Clark's implicit suggestion that
the treatment they have received provides analogies by which
to justify the exclusionary rule in search and seizure cases as
a constitutional requirement. In the course of this discussion we
shall be concerned with one of Justice Harlan's arguments in re-'
joinder to Clark's opinion.
1. The Confessions Analogy

There are at least three ways to respond to the proposition
that unconstitutionally seized evidence is for constitutional purposes an analogue of coerced but reliable confessions. Two of
these approaches assume or assert the analogy, and the third,
whose spokesman in Mapp is Justice Harlan, denies it. With
213. The phrase is Professor Amsterdam's. Amsterdam, supra note
28, at 363.
214. 367 U.S. at 656 (footnotes omitted).
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Dean Wigmore, one assumes that any argument from analogy
would obviously call for admission of both confessions and seized
evidence because both are reliable evidence. 215 Wigmore's fragmentary model position is simple and consistent: both the
Weeks rule and any confessions rules not having to do with reliability are "extrinsic policy" proposals whose "policies" are
simply not eligible, and which therefore obviously do not override the commanding common-law principle that all reliable and
relevant evidence must be admitted. 216 With Justice Clark, on
the other hand, one asserts the analogy with a view to supporting exclusion. "[N] othing," he says, "could be more certain than
that when a coerced confession is involved, 'the relevant rules
of evidence' are overridden ....
Why should not the same rule
apply to . .. unconstitutional seizure of goods, papers, effects,
21 7
documents, etc.?
There are two reasons why the analogy as an analogy does
not support Justice Clark's plea for exclusion of unconstitutionally seized evidence. But, as we shall see, precisely these reasons
for failure of the confessions/search and seizure analogy bring to
215. One can indeed say that, for Wigmore, analogizing is redundant
because it is obvious on the face of each "analogue" that it should be
admitted. See 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 856 (1940) and 8 id. § 2184.
With respect to coerced confessions, Wigmore adhered to what he
called the doctrine of "Confirmation by Subsequent Facts":
That theory is that where, in consequence of a confession otherWise inadmissible, search is made and facts are discovered which
confirm it in material points, the possible influence which
through caution had been attributed to the improper inducement
is seen to have been nil, and the confession may be accepted
without hesitation.
3 id. § 856. See also id. § 857. (And consider id. § 856 n.1: "A subsequent confirmation by the accused's own acknowledgment of the correctness of the confession should also relieve from any inquiry into the influence of the inducement, or into the voluntariness in general of the
confession. ..

.")

216. The fragmentary model is built into the very phrase "extrinsic
policy"-the barely suppressed premise underlying the expression being
that policies which interfere with truth-seeking are extrinsic to a court's
concerns because truth-seeking exhausts a court's proper concern.
Hence, Wigmore's enormous impatience with exclusionary rules and
hence also the threshold of resistance that "extrinsic policies" had to
overcome to be accepted by him:
[The rules of extrinsic policy] forbid the admission of various
sorts of evidence because some consideration extrinsic to the investigation of truth is regarded as more important and overpowering.
The rules of this

...

class .

.

. obstruct .

.

. [rather than]

facilitate the search for truth.... It follows that no limitation
of the present nature ought to be recognized unless it is clearly
demanded by some specific important extrinsic policy.
8 id. § 2175.
217. 367 U.S. at 656.
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the sharpest possible light the judicial review rationale for ex-

clusion of unconstitutionally seized evidence. The first reason
for the failure of the analogy, as Clark attempts to draw it,
stems from his gratuitous subsumption of the confessions rule
under the "fair trial" rubric. The second reason stems from the
doubt Justice Harlan creates as to whether a coerced confession
is a subject for judicial review-a doubt as to whether in the
coerced confessions case as such there is actually presented any
conduct by another branch of government requiring validation or
invalidation by the judiciary.
a.

The "Fair Trial" Mistake

Unlike both Wigmore and Clark, Justice Harlan denies the
analogy. It "is not a true one"; 218 "I think the coerced confession analogy works strongly against what the Court does today."2 10 He believes the analogy is faulty because, whereas the
confessions rule has to do "with something which is regarded
as going to the heart of our concepts of fairness in judicial procedure" 220 is in short a "procedural right" 2 21-the search and
seizure exclusionary rule has nothing to do with a fair trial and
is indeed "an incidental means [by which a court may pursue]
other ends than the correct resolution of the controversies before
it.

'

222

In particular, the exclusionary rule in search and seizure

cases is "but a remedy which, by penalizing past official misconduct, is aimed at deterring such conduct in the future. ' 22 3 To
be sure, these are bare assertions, which, as assertions, beg the
question. For the issue is precisely whether the exclusionary
rule in search and seizure is a mere deterrence remedy, and
therefore not "something ... going to the heart ... of fairness
in judicial procedure." 224 But, even as mere assertions, Harlan's
218. Id. at 683.
219. Id. at 685.
220. Id. at 684.
221. Id. at 685.
222. Id. at 683.
223. Id. at 680.
224. Justice Harlan uses some legerdemain to render the exclusion
of reliable confessions into a fair trial provision. At the beginning of
his argument, when he is still focusing solely on seized evidence, his proT
nouncements have a distinctly Wigmorian cast:
I do not see how it can be said that a trial becomes unfair simply because a State determines that evidence may be considered
y the trier of fact, regardless of how it was obtained, if it is
relevant to the one issue with which the trial is concerned, the
guilt or innocence of the accused.
Id. at 683. At this point in the argument it does not appear that the
accusatorial emphasis in the system would be a fundamental or fair trial
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characterizations help us get our bearings by indicating that he
adheres to the now familiar fragmentary propositions that there
consideration. At the most, one might see it as one of the negotiable
"specifics of trial procedure, which in every mature legal system will
vary greatly in detail ... ." Id. But, as Harlan begins to deal with
the confessions analogy in earnest and therefore to account for the confessions rule, he departs from his initial Wigmorian exclusive preoccupation with relevance and reliability and concludes by making the accusatorial emphasis the key fair trial indicator. Indeed, he has to make this
departure because it would be impossible to rationalize the exclusion of
reliable, coerced confessions on Wigmorian premises. Upon reading Harlan's argument, one is prompted to think how much simpler his job
would have been had it been open for him to follow Wigmore's lead and
admit both illegally obtained evidence and confessions. But in Mapp
Harlan was faced with the fact that the Court had already departed from
the Wigmore position and introduced values other than reliability into
its decisions about confessions. See generally Developments in the
Law-Confessions, 79 HARv. L. REV. 935, 954-84 (1966) [hereinafter cited
as Developments]. Had Harlan not been confronted with this confessions fait accompli, one could see him making his Mapp dissent into a
manifesto against Supreme Court imposition of any and all exclusionary
rules on the states. What we get instead is Harlan's attempt to keep this
break in the simple Wigmorian orthodoxy from carrying the whole position away. One finds Harlan defending, so to speak, the Supreme Court's
confessions precedents against Wigmore and trying to give reasons why
that defense does not apply as well to illegally seized evidence.
Harlan's principal problem is to find a rationale for the confessions
rule-something legitimate for the rule to do. He abandons the Wigmore
reliability criterion and eschews a deterrence or judicial review role for
the rule-a role designed one way or another to confront "independent
Constitutional violations." 367 U.S. at 685. See text accompanying notes
231-33 infra. Harlan is therefore driven, albeit willingly, to assign the
confessions rule the office of protecting the accusatorial nature of our
criminal procedure. The unpleasantness of the fact that this analysis of
the rule involves a departure from the Wigmorian orthodoxy is offset
for Harlan both by the fact that he has found something for the rule
to do, and because what he has it do is to enhance the fairness of the
trial-as that fairness has been redefined along non-Wigmorian lines. As
a fair trial phenomenon, the confessions rule is clearly disanalogized
from the search and seizure exclusionary rule. See text accompanying
notes 225-28 infra.
The irony of the confessions rule, as Harlan reconstructs it, is that
it is indistinguishable from the privilege against self-incrimination. Not
only does Harlan completely ignore the Wigmorian rationale for the confessions rule, and hence collapse the distinction that Wigmore had labored to maintain ("[T]he confession-rule aims to exclude self-incriminating statements which are false, while the privilege-rule gives the
option of excluding those which are true." 3 J.WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §

823 (1940)), but he also asks his colleagues to accept the confessions rule
as the privilege against self-incrimination in this very Mapp dissent where
he emphatically reminds them that the privilege is not applicable to the
states. 367 U.S. at 686. In his eagerness to disallow the confessions analogy, Harlan makes the argument of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966), five years before it is made by Chief Justice Warren-with the

difference that Harlan seems more concerned to protect the trial than
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are only two kinds of rights in the premises-fair trial and privacy; that the only way for courts to honor the right of privacy
the defendant, more concerned for the accusatorial system than for the
accused.
Harlan's initial statement on the accusatorial theme is borrowed
from Justice Frankfurter, writing in a coerced confession case:
The operative assumption of our procedural system is that "Ours
is the accusatorial as opposed to the inquisitorial system. Such
has been the characteristic of Anglo-American criminal justice
since it freed itself from practices borrowed by the Star Chamber
from the Continent whereby the accused was interrogated in
secret for hours on end."
367 U.S. at 684, quoting Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 54 (1949). But
this statement is not ideal from Harlan's point of view because by mentioning secret interrogation it reminds too much of the police, who, someone may argue, are committing "independent Constitutional violations"
by eliciting confessions through coercive interrogation. And this recollection might then make one wonder why the submission of that confession in evidence would not be a case of "the way evidence was obtained,
and not just its relevance .

.

. [being] Constitutionally significant . ..

."

367 U.S. at 683. See text accompanying note 299 infra. To avoid that
thought, Justice Harlan, in the most tortuous turn of his argument, now
directs attention away from the police and toward the trial:
What is crucial is that the trial defense to which an accused is
entitled should not be rendered an empty formality by reason
of statements wrung from him, for then "a prisoner .

.

. [has

been] made the deluded instrument of his own conviction." 2
Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown .
367 U.S. at 685. It is convenient for Justice Harlan to quote Hawkins
on this point because most American expressions of the same sentiment
would be from cases or commentaries involving the privilege against
self-incrimination; and, as we have seen, Justice Harlan is in no position
to invoke the privilege because in this very Mapp dissent, id. at 686, he
finds it expedient to reiterate his contention that the privilege is not enforceable against the states. Harlan makes the confessions rule, as surrogate for the privilege against self-incrimination, integral to any trialand therefore to state trials-by labeling it a "fair trial" right, a right
cognizable under the fragmentary model in that it has strictly to do with
the court's own "proper" or "intrinsic" function:
That this is a procedural right, and that its violation occurs at
the time [the defendant's] improperly obtained statement is admitted at trial, is manifest. For without this right all the careful
safeguards erected around the giving of testimony, whether by
an accused or any other witness, would become empty formalities, in a procedure where the most compelling possible evidence of guilt, a confession, would have already been obtained
at the unsupervised pleasure of the police.
This, and not the disciplining of the police, as with illegally
seized evidence, is surely the true basis for excluding a statement of the accused which was unconstitutionally obtained. In
sum, I think the coerced confession analogy works strongly
against what the Court does today.
Id. at 685. This passage is a good illustration of Harlan's unexamined
assumption that disciplining the police is of course what the search and
seizure exclusionary rule is for. It is easy for the reader to forget that
this fundamental ipse dixit of the Mapp dissent is unexamined, because
it is so easy to get caught up in Harlan's anxiety to find an acceptable
rationale for the confessions rule.
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is to deter the police; and that, since the exclusionary rule in

search and seizure is obviously not related to a fair trial right,
it must be a deterrent remedy.
Although we disagree with Harlan's characterization of the
exclusionary rule as a deterrent, we just as emphatically agree
with him that it is not a fair trial right. Indeed, the beginning
of wisdom about the search and seizure exclusionary rule is the
realization that it is not a fair trial requirement, 225 as are, for
example, two guarantees mentioned by Justice Clark-the requirement that notice be given and the provision that the trial
be public. 226 Correctly understood, the exclusionary rule in
search and seizure cases is rather the expression of the right to
a fair prosecution, which means, at a minimum, constitutional
behavior throughout the whole course of governmental conduct,
which in turn means, for example, observance of the fourth
amendment by the executive and review of executive conduct
in light of that amendment at trial. Justice Clark does not insist
on this point; he fails to fully articulate and then consistently
dwell on the connection between the right of privacy and the
proper judicial review function of the exclusionary rule. 227 Like
Justice Harlan, he assumes that the only rights enforceable at
trial are rights to a fair trial.
But the failure properly to characterize the exclusionary
rule in search and seizure cases is not Clark's only mistake.
For his immediate purpose of asserting the confessions analogy,
his characterization of the confessions rule is the more disastrous. The analogy is ruptured before it leaves Clark's hands;
he ruins it in the very statement of the stepchild argument,
when he lists only two classes of rights possibly analogous to
fourth amendment rights-first amendment rights of expression
and the right to a fair trial, "including, as it does, the right not
to be convicted by use of a coerced confession ... ,228 By making the confessions exclusionary rule a fair trial rule, he virtually destroys any possibility of drawing an analogy between the
confessions and the search and seizure exclusionary rules, because
it is very hard to maintain that the fairness of the trial, understood as an isolated truth-seeking event according to the fragmentary fair trial doctrine, could be vitiated by admission of un225.
226.
227.
is made

See text accompanying notes 30-31 supra.
See text accompanying note 214 supra.
It must be said in Justice Clark's defense that the connection
implicitly and intermittently throughout his opinion. E.g., 367

U.S. at 655-57, 660.

228. Id. at 656, quoted in text accompanying note 214 supra.
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constitutionally obtained reliable evidence. Clark's error is in
saying that the confessions right is "included" in the fair trial
right. What he should have done-what he had to do to retain
any hope of sustaining the analogy-was to deny that the confessions rule is a fair trial rule and to follow that denial with the
assertion that both the confessions and the search and seizure
exclusionary rules are species of judicial review of executive
misconduct. He needed to say that one has a right not to be
convicted by use of unconstitutionally seized evidence, just as
one has "the right not to be convicted by use of a coerced confession"-but that neither of these rights is an element of the
right to a fair trial. Rather, they are expressions of the right
one has to a fair prosecution, or to constitutional conduct by the
government in its entire criminal proceeding. To succeed in
making exclusion of either seized or confessional evidence a constitutional requirement, Clark had to rid himself of the idee fixe
that the motion to suppress reliable evidence invokes a fair trial
right, and to realize instead that the trial is simply the time
when the court is asked to validate executive conduct by accepting its fruits, and hence is the time when one invokes the right
to judicial invalidation of executive misconduct.
But that correction would have been only a necessary and
not a sufficient condition to success with the confessions/seizure
analogy, because for judicial review to be appropriate in a case
it must be possible to allege some unconstitutional nonjudicial
governmental conduct. At this point Justice Clark's analogy is
confronted by Justice Harlan's insistence that coercion per se is
not prohibited by the Constitution.
b. The Constitutional Status of Coercion
The exclusionary argument from the alleged confession analogy is, as rephrased by Justice Harlan, that because by "established doctrine ... the admission in evidence of an involuntary
confession renders a state conviction Constitutionally invalid,"
it should follow that "[s]ince such a confession may often be
entirely reliable, and therefore of the greatest relevance to the issue of the trial," the confessions doctrine "is ample warrant in
precedent that the way evidence was obtained, and not just its
relevance, is Constitutionally significant to the fairness of a
'2 30
trial." 229 But Harlan believes "this analogy is not a true one.
229. Id. at 683.
230. Id.
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For one thing, he thinks that "[t]he pressures brought to bear
against an accused leading to a confession, unlike an unconstitutional violation of privacy, do not, apart from the use of the confession at trial, necessarily involve independent Constitutional
violations."123 1 Our tentative response to Harlan's suggestion is
that it is mistaken. Indeed, we suspect studies would show that
those confessions Justice Harlan himself actually voted to exclude did "involve independent Constitutional violations," or
what Justice Frankfurter, in an opinion concurred in by Harlan,
described as "constitutionally impermissible methods in their inducement. '232 But, for purposes of the present argument, we
think it should be granted that Justice Harlan has proven that
coercive interrogation as such is not an "independent Constitutional violation" or "unconstitutional primary activity" 2 3 "apart from the use of the confession at trial." This proposition
should be granted because to do so liberates one from Justice
Clark's faulty analogy.
The mistake committed in tying the fate of seized evidence
to that of confessional evidence is that it makes a strong independent candidate for judicial review dependent by analogy on
a weak candidate. If one says that "as confessions go, so should
seized evidence go," and then is presented, as we are by Justice
Harlan, with an argument militating against the exclusion of
confessions on judicial review grounds, one has gratuitously
thrown away the case for excluding seized evidence. In fact, if
Justice Harlan is correct in asserting the weakness of the case
for excluding confessions on judicial review grounds, the very
argument he employs ought to demonstrate the strength of the
case for excluding seized evidence. The case for excluding seized
evidence is strong because, as all-including Justice Harlan-emphatically agree, the seizure is an "independent Constitutional
violation"; but, supposing Justice Harlan is correct, the case for
excluding confessions is weak, because the coercive inducement
of the confession is not necessarily an "independent Constitutional violation." If Justice Harlan is correct, the confessions
231.

Id. at 684-85.

232. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1960).
233. The emphasis in cases such as Rogers on the presence in

the record of claims of "coercion" has led many courts and com-

mentators to interpret the exclusionary rule of the Supreme
Court confession cases as analogous to the rule excluding the
products of an unlawful search or seizure. The Court hasbeen
seen as treating "outrageous" or "illegal" conduct during interrogation as the unconstitutional primary activity of the police

Developments, supra note 224, at 969 (footnotes omitted).
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doctrine does not supply "warrant in precedent that the way evidence was obtained ... is Constitutionally significant," because
-if he is correct-the manner of obtaining evidence in the confessions cases is not necessarily unconstitutional. But what the
confessions doctrine lacks in precedential value, it makes up in
heuristic value. Reflecting on the reason why a coerced confession does not qualify for judicial review, we see why an unreasonable search and seizure does qualify, namely, that it is an "independent Constitutional violation" by the executive-one
which, furthermore, the court is asked to validate. Precisely by
the way it fails to serve as a precedent for judicial review of
unconstitutionally seized evidence does the defunct confessions
analogy point to the reason why judicial review and exclusion
are constitutionally necessary in the case of unconstitutionally
seized evidence.
Although Justice Harlan's admissionist thesis is not strengthened by his successful attack on the analogy between confessions
and seized evidence, neither is his inadvertent vindication of the
judicial review ground for exclusion of seized evidence necessarily a setback for that thesis. For what we perceive as damage
to his argument he need not from his perspective even acknowledge as a germane consideration. This is so because our perception of damage to his argument is predicated on our assumption
that judicial review of executive misconduct in criminal proceedings is legitimate. Harlan cannot be said to concede the legitimacy of judicial review at the trial, because, in Mapp at least,
he barely adverts to the possibility that the exclusionary rules
could be examples of judicial review. But the possibility that
they are not legitimate specimens of judicial review-that judicial review does not belong in criminal proceedings-should be
systematically confronted. We shall consider that possibility by
comparing judicial review in a criminal proceeding to the way
it looks in the legislative setting, where all agree it is appropriate. At this point Justice Clark's other question is pertinent.
2.

The FirstAmendment Analogy

Justice Clark cannot understand why the pre-Mapp Court
treated the right of privacy and the rights to free expression differently. Why, he asks, when "[t]his Court has not hesitated
to enforce as strictly against the States as it does against the
Federal Government the rights of free speech and of a free
press," and when it agrees that "[t] he right to privacy [is] no
less important than any other right carefully and particularly
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reserved to the people," 23 4 has the Court nevertheless given the
right of privacy second-class treatment? Why should the "right
to privacy . . stand in marked contrast to all other rights declared as 'basic to a free society' -1?235
It cannot be denied that a prosecution under, say, a new
Smith Act would be different from a prosecution for burglary
involving introduction of unconstitutionally seized evidence.
The unconstitutional actions are perpetrated by different
branches at different stages of the criminal process. In the
fourth amendment case the defendant's criminality persists despite the state's inability to convict him; the evidence of the burglary is a "real thing" in the world, which is not used against
the burglar only because the court will not admit it-whereas
there is nothing left to be held against a person when unconstitutional legislation is struck down. 236 The question is whether
these undeniable differences place suppression hearings in a
realm of conduct and discourse so different from a Marbury-like
review of a Smith Act prosecution that two fundamentally different kinds of requests are being made when the judiciary is
asked to pass on first and fourth amendment violations.
In support of the proposition that they are different-that
there is no analogy-one can point to an awkward linguistic fact.
Whereas it can be said of the first and fourth amendments and
of the Smith Act that courts give them "force and effect" or "implement" them, we cannot idiomatically say of searches and seizures that the government asks the court to give them "force
and effect." Consider, for example, Chief Justice Marshall's
question in Marbury: "If an act of the legislature, repugnant
to the constitution, is void, does it, notwithstanding its invalidity,
bind the courts, and oblige them to give it effect?" 237 To frame
the corresponding question about search and seizure using this
question as a strict model would be neither accurate nor idiomatic. For example, granted the "repugnancy" of an illegal
search or seizure to the Constitution, it may not be "void" in
234. 367 U.S. at 656.
235. Id.
236. This massive difference will surely affect our moral assessment
of the two situations and may even threaten to destroy the analogy. In
the Smith Act case the "criminality" of the defendant's conduct depends
on an unconstitutional legislative act, and judicial review in his favor
totally absolves him of such criminality-indeed makes it impossible
even to suspect him of this "crime" because there is no crime. After
unfavorable review of the legislation, the moral ledger is decisively in
the defendant's favor; he has been hurt, not the state.
237. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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the sense that a new Smith Act would be, or that section 13
of the Judiciary Act of 1789238 was declared to be. Admission
of evidence seems like quite a different kind of "giving of effect"
to a governmental act, because, even if the search and seizure
is "invalid," its product does not "go away" as a void statute does.
But, conceding that somewhat different language must be
used to describe congressional violations of the first amendment
and executive violations of the fourth amendment, we nevertheless think there is enough substantive similarity between the two
situations to compel application of classical judicial review to
searches and seizures, even if not all its terminology is comfortable. Indeed, in the case of search and seizure, just as in
the unconstitutional legislation situation, one speaks of "invalidity": it is accurate and idiomatic to characterize a search as
either "valid" or "invalid." As for substance, whether it be Congress abridging the freedom of speech or police officers making
unreasonable searches and seizures, the fact is that governmental
actors are doing something repugnant to the Constitution, and
in each case the courts are being asked to cooperate and therefore
condone that repugnant act. What is at stake in each case is
the meaningfulness of the Constitution; the tendency of judicial
acceptance of either kind of act is to make the Constitution meaningless.
Thus, the issue is not whether the introduction of unconstitutionally seized evidence makes an occasion discussable in quite
the same terms as Marbury or a new Smith Act, but whether
courts are derelict in their duty to uphold the Constitution if
they do not review executive conduct and, where appropriate,
exclude evidence. Various grounds for denial of such a duty
have been suggested by fragmentary theorists, some of which,
like the "nonconcurrency" argument of Justice Gibson 239 and the
"ignoring" advice of Dean Wigmore, 240 we have already examined. Perhaps the most important disclaimer, however, is that
the court is not responsible for the way evidence is gathered,
either because the government as litigant is like any other party,
i.e., like any private party, or because the offending officer cannot be understood as an officer but must be seen as a private
burglar.
238. Ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. 80 (1789), as amended 28 U.S.C. § 1651
(1970).

239. See text accompanying notes 187-90 supra.

240. See text accompanying notes 190-99 supra.
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3. The Government as PrivateParty or the Officer as
Free-LanceBurglar
Wigmore put his imprimatur on the government-as-privateparty approach when he repeated the common-law rule to the
effect that "the admissibility of evidence is not affected by the
illegality of the means through which the party has been enabled
to obtain the evidence."'241 In Wigmore's view the fact that "the

party" is the government makes no difference-an opinion shared
by Justice Cardozo, who made the point more explicitly:
Evidence is not excluded because the private litigant who offers
it has gathered it by lawless force. By the same token, the
the peace and order
State, when prosecuting an offender against
24 2
of society, incurs no heavier liability.

Comparing the government to a private party is one way
of absolving the court of responsibility for the way evidence is
gathered; treating the law-breaking officer as a private person
is another possible way to accomplish the same objective; for,
so it could be argued, if the government as executive is not
responsible for the unauthorized conduct of the officers it hires,
then a fortiori the courts are not responsible for acts committed
in violation of the terms of those officers' employment. Surprisingly, Justice Brandeis gives some aid and comfort to this argument-at least he momentarily gives way to the temptation of
treating the officer as a private person. At one point he says
that the "unlawful acts [perpetrated in Olmstead] . . . [were]
crimes only of the officers individually . . . [because] no federal

official is authorized to commit a crime on [the government's]
behalf. '243 But Justice Brandeis's one-government motive for
saying this is precisely the opposite of the fragmenting motive
Wigmore and Cardozo have for treating the government as a
private party. Whereas they wish to absolve the judge of responsibility, he relegates the officers to the status of private persons
in order to ascribe final responsibility for the evidentiary transaction to those higher in the government-the prosecutor and
especially the judge. 244 Nevertheless, whatever Brandeis's motive, his analysis could have had mischievous effects if taken
literally. 4 5 Yet Brandeis did not take it literally. He did not
241. Wigmore, supra note 16, at 479.
242. People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 22, 150 N.E. 585, 588 (1926).
243. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 483 (1928).
244. Id.

245. For example, Brandeis's analysis has a certain affinity with the

argument of the offending officers in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), as characterized
and refuted by Justice Brennan:
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mean after all to treat the officers as if they were not officers
when violating anti-wiretapping statutes. Their illegal acts, unlike those of private parties, had the potential of being "ratified"
and made the government's own through prosecutorial and judicial action. 246 More simply, it is of the utmost significance to
Justice Brandeis that the persons in question just were not private persons:
[T]he evidence obtained by crime was obtained at the Governments expense, by its officers, while acting on its behalf: ...
the crimes of these officers were committed for the purpose of
securing evidence with which to obtain an indictment and to
secure a conviction. ...
As Judge Rudkin said below: "Here
we are concerned with neither eavesdroppers nor thieves. Nor
are we concerned with the acts of private individuals.... We
are concerned only with the acts of federal agents whose powers
are limited
and controlled by the Constitution of the United
States." 247

Although these words were written by judges-Brandeis and
Rudkin-in a case that Justice Brandeis eventually treated as
nonconstitutional,2 48 they were clearly written by judges working
from a constitutional perspective wherein the government is not
just another party, and wherein the acts of governmental agents
are subject to judicial review. If all one can do in the end to
support the conclusion that the exclusionary rule is a species of
judicial review is to say one is adopting the perspective of Brandeis and Rudkin, then that is what we are saying and doing here.
And in that perspective there are no salient differences between
review of a prosecution brought under unconstitutional legislation and review of an unconstitutional procurement of evidence.
If the concerns are governmental disregard of the Constitution
and judicial condonation of that disregard, it does not matter
whether the governmental actor being challenged is the legislature expecting the judge to participate in an unconstitutional
prosecution, or the executive asking the judge to accept unconstitutional evidence.
Respondents seek to treat the relationship between a citizen and
a federal agent unconstitutionally exercising his authority as no
different from the relationship between two private citizens. In
so doing, they ignore the fact that power, once granted, does not
disappear like a magic gift when it is wrongfully used.
Id. at 391-92.
246. 277 U.S. at 483.
247. Id. at 482. Even if Rudkin was thinking primarily of the eighteenth amendment when he referred to the "Constitution of the United
States," we believe that the general applicability of the proposition for
which we have quoted Brandeis and Rudkin is not diminished.
248. See text accompanying notes 94-99 supra.
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B. THE FouRTH A ENDMENT AS A RULE OF RECOGNITION
We have been following up Justice Brennan's statement that
[tihe exclusionary rule is needed to make the Fourth Amendment something real; [because] a guarantee that does not carry
with it the exclusion of evidence obtained by its violation is a
249
chiMera.

We have also assumed that he endorses the remark he quotes
that "[t] he advantage of the exclusionary rule . . .is that it provides an occasion for judicial review .... ,,250 On reflection,
however, he might come to see that these statements are misleading to the extent that they suggest that the exclusionary rule
is some kind of separate legal entity. For that is not so. "Exclusionary rule" is just a term of convenience by which we refer
to the fact, and the way, that judges practice constitutionalism
and show their fidelity to the rule of law by observing the fourth
amendment. But even this characterization will mislead if it
suggests that the fourth amendment has a singular status among
constitutional rules. 251 It does not, for Justice Brennan at any
249. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 361 (1974).
250. Id. at 366, quoting Oaks, supra note 43, at 756. It is an indication of the poverty of the literature on exclusion as judicial review that
Justice Brennan should have to quote Professor Oaks, who is one of the
best known critics of the rule. In his evenhanded way, Oaks, as it were,
looks for some good things to say about the rule, and one he finds is
that it provides an "occasion" for what he calls judicial review-an occasion which he nevertheless intends to do away with by revoking the rule.
Oaks, supra note 43, at 755-56.
But, of course, Oaks cannot have classical Marbury judicial review
in mind anyway-because the only "occasion" for it is a "case or controversy" in which there is an allegation that a governmental act, sought
to be given "force and effect" or to be "recognized," is unconstitutional.
And the denial of the recognition, or the exercise of judicial review, when
prompted by the fourth amendment, is just called the "exclusionary
rule." The exclusionary rule is not the occasion for, or cause of, the review-it is the effect of it. Oaks is not talking about judicial review
in the strict sense, then, but about a kind of supervisory power oversight,
which, while nice, is not mandatory.
251. Beginning at least with Wolf, there has been a pronounced reluctance to accept the proposition that the fourth amendment should be
treated like any other constitutional rule, no more and no less, and that
exclusion is that treatment. Consider, as illustrative of this reluctance,
the fact that Justice Frankfurter and Professor Kaplan have found it pertinent to note that, in Frankfurter's words, the exclusionary rule is "not
derived from the explicit requirements of the Fourth Amendment ....
The [Weeks] decision was a matter of judicial implication," Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949); or, as Kaplan says, "the rule is not written
into the Constitution." Kaplan, supra note 55, at 1030. Now, what are
some of the assumptions on which these observations might make sense?
Perhaps the fifth amendment, with its exclusionary explicitness, is the
model with which the fourth is to be compared-and the fourth is thereby
found wanting. Or perhaps the assumption is that there are other occa-
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rate, because he does not subscribe to the evidentiary transaction
interpretation and therefore does not think of the fourth amendment as "language of the constitution ... addressed especially
to the courts. ' 25 2 Under the judicial review interpretation we
are ascribing to Brennan, the fourth amendment is one among
many constitutional rules addressed to other branches. The
courts observe it the way they must observe any constitutional
rule, and their observance is called the "exclusionary rule." We
are assuming that according to Justice Brennan the term "exclusionary rule" simply denotes the refusal by the courts to "sanction" or "validate" unreasonable searches and seizures-that it
denotes a response to unconstitutional executive behavior of the
same nature as Chief Justice Marshall's response to unconstitutional legislativebehavior in Marbury.
If that is what Justice Brennan means, then he also means
that Marbury's characteristic language of "repugnancy" and "invalidity" is appropriate to search and seizure. We are assuming,
in other words, that whatever else Justice Brennan thinks the
amendment is, he regards it as what H.L.A. Hart has called a
"rule of recognition" 25 3-a statement of validity criteria 254 that
must be met before the courts are empowered to allow legal consequences to flow from searches and seizures. Viewed thus,
giving force and effect to the fourth amendment would be coterminous with the decision whether to give "force and effect" to
the fruits of particular searches and seizures.
But, as Justice Brennan would be the first to insist, the
fourth amendment is not merely a statement of validity criteria
-it is that and something more. It is a constitutional validity
criterion, and a constitutional validity criterion of a peculiar
sions than the motion to suppress on which alleged governmental violations of the fourth amendment can more dependably be subjected to judicial review. Or, perhaps again, the assumption is that the fourth amendment is simply a part of the Constitution that does not contemplate that
there be judicial review in its name. If these assumptions are not supportable-and we think they are not-then the observation that the exclusionary rule is not written in the amendment in so many words assumes the absurdity that conduct challenged under any clause of the
Constitution must be impervious to judicial review unless there is a proviso attached to that clause authorizing the Court to invalidate or nullify
governmental conduct in violation of it. The kind of objection Justice
Frankfurter and Professor Kaplan are making would thus seem to be
nothing less than a challenge to the institution of judicial review itself.
252. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 179 (1803).
253. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 92 (1961) [hereinafter cited

as HART].

254. Id. at 103.
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sort; it performs a function additional to those performed by such
rules of recognition as, for example, the requirement of two witnesses to a will, or a minimum age to be eligible for elective
office, or different majorities for different legislative, constituent, or forensic purposes. In contrast to those rules, the
fourth amendment not only serves as a criterion of validity, but
it also imposes a duty. The fourth amendment not only tells
officials what conditions they must meet to make valid, constitutional, "admissible" seizures-it also imposes an obligation on officials to make only valid seizures.
Because the interpretation of exclusion as judicial review is
so widely disregarded, and because the little acknowledgment it
has received has been so cursory, we will pay it some systematic
attention here. Our discussion will rely heavily on distinctions
articulated by Hart.
Hart has tried to make sense of a legal system by seeing
it as a union of "power-conferring," "validity" rules and "dutyimposing," "obligation" rules. 25 5 His effort is meant as a counterpoise to what he takes to be a more or less permanent jurisprudential temptation to reduce all legal rules to a single type.
We find that his own dichotomization makes the mistake of regarding all rules as either power-conferring or duty-imposingan error leading those who make it to miss the complexity of
a rule like the fourth amendment. But that error is corrected
by simply speaking of two kinds of functions-which there arerather than of two mutually exclusive classes of rules-which
there are not-and of acknowledging that some rules-the fourth
amendment for example-perform both functions. We shall proceed first by exhibiting Hart's correction of the major mistakes
he found in the jurisprudential literature, and second by suggesting the adjustments that would be required in his analysis to account fully for the fourth amendment.
We turn, then, to the power-conferring, validity criterion
type of rule or, as we prefer to say, function. Hart explains
this type of rule by contrasting it with the obligation-imposing,
conduct-guiding rule found paradigmatically in the criminal law.
The mistakes he is concerned to criticize both have to do with
sanction-one an overemphasis on sanction, the other a misplacement of it. He wants to say, first, that the jurisprudential literature has made too much of the phenomenon of sanction in the
criminal law: conceding that sanction is a natural auxiliary of
255.

Id. at 27-33.
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conduct-guiding, duty-imposing rules-indeed insisting that sanction is logically possible only in connection with duty-imposing
rules-he nevertheless insists that sanctionless rules can also
guide conduct and impose obligations. Second, he says that any
mention of sanction in connection with power-conferring rules
reveals a misconception of what those rules are about. His second assertion is our concern here, but since its thrust is to expose
the mistake in trying to assimilate power-conferring, validity
rules to the criminal law or duty-imposing rules, clarity requires
comprehension of the properties of a criminal-law rule and hence
an awareness of Hart's first point as well. The most vivid sign
of the prevalence in the literature of the second mistake is256the
frequent use found there of the phrase "nullity as a sanction.1
Hart's analysis of the duty-imposing rule contains an implicit
critique of the first mistake:
In the case of the rules of the criminal law, it is logically possible.., that there should be such rules even though no punishment or other evil were threatened....
[W]e can distinguish
clearly the rule prohibiting certain behaviour from the provision
for penalties to be exacted if the rule is broken, and suppose the
first to exist without the latter. We can, in a sense, subtract the
standard of behaviour
sanction and still leave an intelligible
257
which it was designed to maintain.

Hart then states his understanding of power-conferring rules, as
he continues, without pause, to draw the contrast:
[W]e cannot [however] logically make such a distinction between the rule requiring compliance with certain conditions, e.g.
attestation for a valid will, and the so-called sanction of 'nullity.'
...
[Rather,] [t]he provision for nullity is part of this type of
rule itself in a way
which punishment attached to a rule impos258
ing duties is not.

Hart's discussion eventually involves him in an analogy to games,
which is at once informative about, and yet against the grain
of, American constitutionalism:
In the case of a rule of criminal law we can identify and distinguish two things: a certain type of conduct which the rule
prohibits, and a sanction intended to discourage-it. But how
could we consider in this light such desirable social activities
as men making each other promises which do not satisfy legal
requirements as to form? This is not like the conduct discouraged by the criminal law, something which the legal rules
stipulating legal forms for contracts are designed to suppress.
The rules merely withhold legal recognition from them. Even
more absurd is it to regard as a sanction the fact that a legislative measure, if it does not obtain the required majority, fails

256. Id. at 33. See generally id. at 32-35.
257. Id. at 34.
258. Id. at 34-35.
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to attain the status of a law. To assimilate this fact to the sanctions of the criminal law would be like thinking of the scoring
rules of a game as designed to eliminate all moves except the
kicking of goals. ... [The point of the scoring rules is solely to
tell the referee what counts: ] [i]f failure to get the ball between
the posts did not mean the "nullity"
of not scoring, the scoring
rules could not be said to exist.2 5 9
It will be objected, of course, that whatever the similarities between scoring a game and passing on the validity of contracts,
wills, and gifts, it is a sacrilege to speak of the grand public
institution of judicial review in the same breath with games, or
to call a valid search a "score." But, as disagreeable as the game
reference may be, we think a different kind of outrage might
be felt if the connection between invalidity and nullity, which
the analogy is meant to clarify, were eliminated from our constitutional practice.
The "point" of the game analogy is that duties and sanctions
simply are not part of the picture in the case of one kind of
law-related conduct. To be sure, the coach may tell his team
that it is their duty to score and threaten them with his displeasure should they go scoreless, and the district attorney may
say there is a law against point shaving, but the official scorer
does not impose a duty upon players to score or a sanction for
not scoring; he just counts the points. Similarly with a legislature, there is a duty not to proceed in defiance of quorum requirements, but there is no duty to achieve the "required majority"--any more than there is a duty to have two witnesses
for a will. There is just the fact-as Justice Gibson would put
it, for even he allows a modicum of judicial review-that the
court, as the scorer, has nothing to observe or enforce because
no "law has been passed according to the forms established in
the constitution. 2 60 And when Chief Justice Marshall wanted
to move from concern with forms to concern for substantive con261
sistency, he spoke the language of "invalidity" and "voidness.
259. Id.
260. Eakin v. Raub, 12 S. & R. *330, *354 (Pa. 1825) (Gibson, J., dissenting).
261. Certainly all those who have framed written constitutions
contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount
law of the nation, and consequently the theory of every such
government must be, that an act of the legislature, repugnant
to the constitution, is void.
If an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution,
is void, does it, notwithstanding its invalidity, bind the courts,
and oblige them to give it effect?
Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the
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Similarly now, when the Supreme Court finds a legislative act
repugnant to the governing rule of recognition, the Court, as
Hart phrases it, "withhold [s] legal recognition from [the act] ,"262
saying in effect, as barbarous as it sounds, "you didn't score";
"the ball, as it were, went wide and it is as if you had never
kicked it."
Our misgiving about Hart's analysis is that his harsh dichotomization of rules suggests that invalidity is all that obtains in
the case of unconstitutional legislation. Writing about American
constitutional practice, Hart says merely that legislation "inconsistent with the federal division of powers or with the individual
rights protected . . . is liable to be treated as ultra vires, and
declared legally invalid by the courts to the extent that it conflicts with the constitutional provisions." 263 We know of no place
in 'his main presentation where Hart allows that by voting for
what they believe to be legislation abridging, say, freedom of
the press, legislators violate a duty to uphold the Constitution. 26 4
But in defense of Hart, we suggest that in neglecting constitutional duty he is simply imitating what a court does when it
exercises judicial review. He is led to ignore the duty-imposing
side of the Bill of Rights, for example, because in constitutional
adjudication the Court ignores that side. While the Court may
sometimes lecture another branch on its duty, or otherwise show
its indignation, its holding amounts only to an invalidation.
There is a duty in the premises, we believe, but we have to concede that it is not made visible by the practice of judicial review;
this low profile of the constitutional duty is due to the fact that
the duty is not enforced by the constitutional court-although,
United States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed
to be essential to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant
to the constitution is void; and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177, 180 (1803).
262. HART, supra note 253, at 34, quoted in text accompanying note
259 supra.
263. Id. at 70.
264. By "main presentation" we mean The Concept of Law. The fact
that Hart could write that book without having to confront thematically
the prospect that officials have duties is perhaps owing in part to the
fact that there is very little in The Concept of Law about the individual's
rights-rights that would seem to be correlative to the official duties for
whose existence we are contending. Needless to say, however, Hart is
not oblivious of rights, for even in the passage quoted he mentions "individual rights." Elsewhere he has written extensively on rights. One
of his most illuminating discussions is H.L.A. Hart, Bentham on Legal
Rights, in OxroRD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE, 2d ser. 171, 198-201 (A
Simpson ed. 1973). See also H.L.A. Hart, Are There Any Natural
Rights?, in PoITcAL PHmosoPHY 53 (A. Quinton ed. 1967).
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to be sure, the Constitution itself is being given force and effect.
When the Supreme Court strikes down an act for violating the
first amendment it is not punishing congressmen for violating
their duty to uphold the Constitution but is simply declaring
the statute invalid-thereby itself upholding the Constitution.
Yet, although few will say that congressmen are being
punished by adverse judicial review of their handiwork, many
seem to think that the policeman is being punished or "sanctioned" by exclusion. Indeed, this view is so prevalent that one
could say it prevents entertainment of the hypothesis that exclusion is judicial review. The correct understanding of judicial
review as something other than punishment is confronted in the
minds of commentators by the incorrect view that exclusion is
punishment; the resulting assumption is that exclusion cannot
be judicial review. One of the first things we must understand
is why it is so easily assumed that exclusion is punishment or
a sanction rather than mere nullification.
That exclusion is regarded as punishment or sanction by
Justice Powell and other deterrence theorists is obvious. One
such theorist, the late Professor Herbert Packer, even used in
reference to the exclusionary rule exactly the term that Hart
had been at pains to call a mistake. Packer spoke of "courts
... interven[ing] in the criminal process ...

to impose the

sanction of nullity ... ."265 "[B]ut," he went on to say, "the
sanction of nullity has its limitations. A court cannot ordain,
administer, and finance [a criminal justice system] .... It can

only refuse to validate criminal proceedings that are the product
of inadequate systems or of no systems at all.' 266 Although Professor Packer would presumably not have thought of judicial review primarily, if at all, as a deterrent to legislative violation
of the first amendment, it was easy for him to think of the exclusionary rule as a "sanction of nullity," i.e., as a deterrent. Our
concern here is to try to account for these disparate reactions
to the two examples of judicial review.
One factor which may account for these different reactions
is that Wigmore and others have repeatedly called exclusion
punishment.2 67 Another and more influential factor is that the
265. PACKER, supra note 48, at 240. See also id. at 171 ("the rules
and the sanctions for their breach").
266. Id.
267. Wigmore appears to have viewed exclusion literally as punishment of the policeman, for he complains that
[n] ecessity does not require, and the spirit of our law does forbid, the attempt to do justice incidentally and to enforce penal-

19741

EXCLUSIONARY RULE

fourth amendment duty the police are under has always been
more visible than the first amendment duty imposed on legislators, because imprisonment of the policeman has always been
conceivable, 26 8 whereas no one has suggested jailing congressmen. Perhaps the punishability of fourth amendment violations
affects our view of exclusion and makes us think of it merely
as an alternative to, say, incarceration. But no amount of explaining why we are led to think of exclusion as punishment
will make it punishment if it is not. And if it is not punishment
or some other deterrent sanction, it is judicial review. That is
the dominant and sufficient constitutional fact. If it is also a
fact that exclusion deters, then whatever deterrence there is, as
Justice Brennan says, is "only a hoped-for effect of the exclusionary rule, not its ultimate objective.

' 26 9

But that is not yet the whole story. We believe Hart is mistaken to deny that "power-conferring rules [might be] designed
ties by indirect methods .... [A] judge does not hold court
in a street-car to do summary justice upon a fellow-passenger
who fraudulently evades payment of his fare; and, upon the
same principle, he does not attempt, in the course of a specific
litigation, to investigate and punish all offences which incidentally cross the path of that litigation. Such a practice might be
consistent with the primitive system of justice under an Arabian
sheikh; but it does not comport with our own system of law
....

The judicial rules of Evidence were never meant to be

an indirect process of punishment. It is . .. improper . . . to
enlarge the fixed penalty of the law, that of fine or imprisonment, by adding to it the forfeiture of some civil right through
loss of the means of proving it. The illegality is by no means
condoned; it is merely ignored.
Wigmore, supra note 16, at 479. We do not claim fully to understand
everything Wigmore says here. We repeat it as much because it is part
of the core argument of a classic (rather, the classic) admissionist essay.
Indeed, the passage is from the very essay in which Wigmore addresses
Titus and Flavius:
Titus, you have been found guilty of conducting a lottery;
Flavius, you have confessedly violated the constitution. Titus
ought to suffer imprisonment for crime, and Flavius for contempt. But no! We shall let you both go free. We shall not
punish Flavius directly, but shall do so by reversing Titus' conviction.
Id. at 484. As careful a thinker as Justice Harlan has said that the "exclusionary rule is but a remedy which, by penalizing past official misconduct, is aimed at deterring such conduct in the future." Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643, 680 (1961) (dissenting opinion).
268. "The natural way to do justice here would be to ... [impose]
a thirty-day imprisonment [on the marshal who had searched without
a warrant]." Wigmore, supra note 16, at 484. This, of course, would
seem to be an obvious example of what, at the beginning of his article,
Wigmore had characterized and condemned as "punish[ing] all offences
which incidentally cross the path of that litigation." Id. at 479, quoted
in note 267 supra.
269. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 356 (1974).
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to make people behave in certain ways and [have] 'nullity'
[added] as a motive for obedience ....270 We think on the
contrary that precisely such a design is obviously behind many
power-conferring rules of private law; 27 1 and we think it plaus270. HART,supra note 253, at 34.

271. One source of difficulty in the quoted passage is the way it runs
two thoughts together--"behavior" and "obedience"-forgetful that "nullity" can work as a motive for one, but not for the other. The only kind
of utterance a person can obey is one which, like a duty-imposing rule,
prescribes categorically what to do or forbear. This is just a fact about
the concept of obedience. In contrast, power-conferring rules-or rules
performing a power-conferring function-are not categorical but hypothetical: they say only, "Have two witnesses if you want to make a valid
will," or "Reduce that agreement to writing if you want it to be enforceable." Nullity is not employed to secure obedience-and the "nullity"
that ensues upon failure to exercise, or exercise correctly, the power conferred is not a sanction for disobedience-because the actor has not been
told to do or omit anything. But molding behavioris another thing. The
fact that the legislature is conceptually barred from using nullity to secure obedience does not stop it from using nullity to induce people to
behave in ways it thinks desirable-as do those legislatures which adopt
the attestation requirements of wills acts or the writing requirement of
the Statute of Frauds. In short, the fact that no duty attaches in connection with private-law rules of recognition does not forbid the conclusion
that legislatures can, without violating the logic of those rules, use them,
and use nullity as a motive, to encourage people to behave in ways the
legislatures wish them to behave. And, indeed, Hart does make brief
if somewhat grudging acknowledgment of the fact that nullity could be
a "lever" if not a sanction:
No one could deny that there are, in some cases ... associations
between nullity and such psychological factors as disappointment of the hope that a transaction will be valid. Nonetheless
the extension of the idea of a sanction to include nullity is a
source (and a sign) of confusion.
Id. at 33.
Professor Fuller might have made a similar objection in his criticism
of what he characterizes as Hart's basically Hohfeldian analysis. Having
lived through the disillusionment that followed the initial claims made
for the analytical power of Hohfeld's categories, Fuller reacts rather
dourly to Hart's attempt to renew enthusiasm for them. It seems to us,
however, that he overreacts when-to cite one of his major counter-examples-he finds a duty to mitigate damages on repudiation of a contract. For surely the Hohfeldians have been correct to deny such a duty
and to insist instead that, after the notice of repudiation, the plaintiff has
simply lacked power to aggravate the defendant's obligation. Nevertheless, there is a sound instinct behind Fuller's impulse to speak of a duty
to mitigate. Ascription of such a duty is a confused way of drawing attention to a fact which the Hohfeldians may have ignored and of which
Fuller is acutely mindful, namely, that the promulgators of the mitigation rule wish to influence the behavior of potential plaintiffs. The
promulgators of the rule prefer one form of plaintiff behavior over another and are endeavoring to bring behavior into conformance with that
preference by withholding power from the plaintiff to aggravate the defendant's obligation. Promulgators of the rule wish to discourage waste
of society's resources on undesired objects; but instead of imposing a
duty and seeking obedience, they have sought to induce non-wasteful
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ible to assume that many parts of the United States Constitution
were designed, among other purposes, to encourage people to behave in certain ways. Furthermore, we do not see why concern
272
about nullity might not be an incentive built into that scheme.
What we deny is that influencing people to behave in certain
ways is a necessary or sufficient ground for declaring either an
act of a legislature or a search and seizure invalid-we deny that
influencing people is part of the practice of judicial review.
Whatever were John Marshall's motives for supporting the Constitution in the Virginia Convention and whatever were his motives as judicial statesman for establishing the practice of judicial
review, the Constitution as "given force and effect" by the Marshall of Marbury v. Madison in his role as judge requires only
that unconstitutional behavior of a governmental actor be declared invalid and void if brought before a court. The Supreme
Court, qua reviewer of governmental action, is neither designer
nor manipulator of the "sanction of nullity," but is only a stew273
ard of a rule of recognition,
The fact is, as Hart says, that "the provision for nullity is
part of this [power-conferring, validity criterion] type of rule
itself in a way which punishment attached to a rule imposing
duties is not.12 74 And this is true in cases both where, as with
the fourth amendment, a single rule performs the dual function
of providing the criteria of validity and of imposing duties, and
where a rule merely confers powers, as is the case with rules
governing the making of wills or gifts. It is ludicrous to think
that the legislature meant to place the would-be testator under
a duty of having two witnesses. It is not ludicrous to think that
the framers intended by the fourth amendment to put the executive under a duty of respecting privacy. But, in both cases, the
sole duty of the court is to validate or invalidate.
We have discussed the exclusionary rule as a "provision for
nullity ... [and therefore as] part of" the fourth amendmentplaintiff behavior by employing the "nullity" called for by the mitigation
rule. See L. FuLt, MoRAITy OF LAW 135-37 (1964).

272. There is this much, but no more, truth in the deterrence theory
of the exclusionary rule. As Justice Brennan says, deterrence is "only
a hoped-for effect of the exclusionary rule, not its ultimate objective."
Calandra v. United States, 414 U.S. 338, 356 (1974).
273. One can even say that the motive of the reviewing court is to
coerce, manipulate, or deter another branch-if that happens to be so
in a particular case-provided one also says that the only germane reason
the reviewing court can give is that the governmental action is unconstitutional.
274. HART,supra note 253, at 34-35.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:251

with the amendment understood as a power-conferring (and
power-limiting) rule of recognition. And we have seen that, although this is a sufficient account of the rule, it is not an adequate account of the amendment, because the fourth amendment
does more than state conditions of validity-it also places the
executive under a solemn duty to respect the rights of the people.
To the extent that Hart means to suggest that rules must be
either obligation-imposing or power-conferring, his proposition
is undone by the example of the fourth amendment itself. This
amendment, and much of the rest of the Constitution, not only
states conditions of validity but also ascribes rights and duties.
These constitutional rules vindicate our suggestion that, instead
of there being two kinds of rules, there are two functions that
rules can perform.
One of those functions--"recognition"--accounts for the
similarity between the testator, the congressman, and the evidence-gathering policeman: they all aspire to perform a valid,
judicially cognizable act. Beyond that, however, the situations
of the testator on the one hand and the government officials on
the other are dissimilar because the testastor is not, and the officials are, affected by the other function rules may perform
-imposition of a duty. Whereas the testator strives to make
a valid will because he wants to determine the devolution of
his property, the legislator and the policeman act in response
to a set of expectations in addition to their private desires. Not
only do public officials presumably want to perform valid gov
ernmental acts, they are also charged with the constitutional
duty of performing such acts, and only such acts, whether they
want to or not.
For example, we have said that a congressman is placed under an obligation by the first amendment not to vote for legislation he thinks abridges freedom of speech. Although the Supreme Court has indeed taken upon itself a special stewardship
of the Constitution, the fact is that the congressman also takes
an oath to support the Constitution. This presumably means
that he has obligated himself not to subvert the Constitutionnot, for example, to condemn and defy it by voting for a law
he knows the first amendment states "Congress shall [not]
make." And there is a similar dualism in the fourth amendment.
The fact that the amendment operates as a rule of recognition
for the courts does not preclude its serving another function for
the police and imposing a duty on them to conduct only reasonable searches. As for the courts, every account but the prevail-
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ing fragmentary understanding of judicial responsibility, with
its corollary, the "invasion" theory of the amendment, places
them under a fourth amendment imperative of some kind. And,
according to the thesis of this Article, not only do courts have a
direct and immediate obligation to abstain from evidentiary
transactions involving unreasonable searches and seizures, but
they are also under an obligation to apply faithfully the fourth
amendment as a rule of recognition, and not to validate invalid
governmental action.
This latter obligation may seem indistinguishable from a
court's duty, for example, not to probate an unattested willand for some purposes of analysis the two obligations are indeed
indistinguishable. But there are differences, one being that the
fourth amendment is a constitutional rule of recognition whereas
the wills rule is an ordinary statutory provision. Another is that
an invalid search and seizure is itself a violation of a person's
right and of an officer's duty, whereas the unsuccessful testator
infringes no legal rights and violates no legal duties. A third
difference is that the invalid seizure occurs in the government's
prosecution of a defendant, whereas the invalid will is made by
a person who simply fails to use correctly the facilities afforded
by the government.2 7 5 A fourth difference involves the burden
on the court in the two cases: in the will case the court is standing between those who would take under the will and those who
would take under the law of intestacy. In the search and seizure
case, on the other hand, the court indeed stands between the
defendant and the government-but it is also a part of the government that is prosecuting him. In the case of the will the stakes
are inheritable wealth, whereas in the search and seizure case
the stakes are not just property but guilt or innocence, life perhaps, or liberty, reputation, happiness, and the defendant's right
to a fair prosecution. In the will case the court has the duty
of observing the law of wills, and the litigants have a right that
it should do so. But in the search and seizure case the court
has an additional, more acute, obligation. In addition to the ruleof-law assumption that the judge will observe and apply the relevant rules of recognition and only those rules, there is imposed
on the court in criminal cases the obligation to see that the defendant is not "deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." At the very least, this means that a court shall
not facilitate such deprivations by itself disregarding the law,
which is to say that it shall scrupulously follow all applicable
275.

Id. at 27.
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rules of recognition, prominent among which is the fourth amend-

ment.276 The court, then, is under a due process exclusionary

276. Having said why we think exclusion is a constitutional requirement, we now might profitably consider a recent explanation of why it
is not. We shall here discuss Professor Kaplan's argument, certain aspects of which we touched on in notes 55 and 171 supra.
It will be recalled that Kaplan urges a restructuring of the exclusionary rule, and that one of the innovations he proposes is to admit unconstitutionally seized evidence in certain serious cases. Kaplan, supra note
55, at 1046. Part of his defense of this suggestion consists of the assertion
that "[e]ntirely apart from the [utilitarian] case that may be made for
or against the exclusionary rule [as it now stands], its restriction is
hardly a radical step." Id. at 1030. He means that whereas "[c]ourts
could make a direct connection to fourth amendment values by holding
that the government is not permitted to benefit from the fruits of an
unconstitutional search and seizure," id. (emphasis added), in fact they
have not-"the exclusionary rule does not fully adhere to this tenet." Id.
Because the exclusionary rule does not "look" like a constitutional doctrine, Kaplan concludes that it is not a constitutional doctrine, but at
most a "'quasi-constitutional' law." From the fact that the exclusionary
rule does not "fully adhere" to the "no governmental benefit" tenet, Kaplan infers "that the exclusionary rule is merely one arbitrary point on
a continuum between deterrence of illegal police activity and conviction
of guilty persons." Id. More generally, "the Constitution demands
something that works-presumably at a reasonable cost. The content of
the particular remedial or prophylactic rule is thus a pragmatic decision
rather than a constitutional fiat." Id.
The text of this Article is principally a disputation with just this
way of looking at the exclusionary rule, so we shall not in this note try
to say everything that can be said against it. But a useful purpose will
perhaps be served if we examine some of the observations Kaplan makes
to support his contention that one more "restriction [of the rule] is
hardly a radical step," id.-observations of lacunae that have never been
filled and inroads and limitations on the rule that have already been permitted. Let us first note the most egregious limitation he mentionsthe personal jurisdiction and bad arrest exception. Id. at 1030 n.24. Professor Oaks describes this limitation more fully than does Kaplan when
he notes that "federal courts have not yet been forbidden from entering
a valid judgment of conviction against a defendant who was brought before the court by illegal means such as kidnapping, arrest without probable cause, or arrest upon a warrant that was illegal or insufficient."
Oaks, supra note 43, at 669. That this is shocking cannot be gainsaidthe person is fair game for any form of body-snatching while the courts
occupy themselves with chattels!
It seems to us, however, that Kaplan is on somewhat weaker ground
when he considers one kind of chattel, namely contraband. He says that
"if courts strictly enforced the notion that the government could not benefit from an illegal search and seizure by its police officers, we would
return to persons subjected to an illegal search the contraband seized
from them-presumably giving them a head-start with their heroin,
sawed-off shotguns, or stolen property." Kaplan, supra note 55, at 1030
n.24. Wigmore also supposed that a constitutional exclusionary doctrine
necessarily calls for the return of contraband, and he came up with a
scenario-incalculably more frightening now than when he wrote it-to
illustrate the grotesqueness of the rule understood as a rule of restitution:
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obligation-an obligation one discovers (a) by taking seriously
the notion of judicial review, (b) by acknowledging the fourth
amendment as a rule of recognition, (c) by comprehending that
exclusion is simply the appropriate form for unfavorable review
If the officials, illegally searching, came across an infernal machine, planned for the city's destruction, and impounded it, shall
we say that the diabolical owner of it may appear in court
brazenly demand process for its return, and be supinely accorded
by the Court a writ of restitution, with perhaps an apology for
the "outrage"? Such is the logical consequence of the doctrine
of Weeks v. U.S ...

Wigmore, note 16 supra, at 481.
Wigmore and Kaplan seem to believe that, to the extent the exclusionary rule is really treated as a constitutional doctrine, courts will necessarily become accessories before the fact to the commission of crime.
Their belief is instructive, for it shows the degree to which a constitutional exclusionary rule is subject to misconception. According to Kaplan, a constitutional exclusionary rule would deny to the government all
"benefits" accruing from the illegal seizure of evidence, and since the
rule as presently enforced does not deny every conceivable benefit (pecuniary, crime preventive, etc.), it therefore must not be a constitutional
rule. But the consequences of the exclusionary rule when properly interpreted as a constitutional requirement are unpalatable enough, without
ascribing absurd consequences to it. The exclusionary rule is not a specification of some general "no benefit" principle. It is rather judicial review of executive conduct, prompted only when the fruits of that conduct
are sought to be validated and incorporated into the process of conviction.
Justice Day speaks of the return of seized items in Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914), but the items in issue there were letters
the prosecutor proposed to introduce in evidence. Whether or not the
law of property puts letters and infernal machines in the same category,
Justice Day would have been astounded to see someone try to justify
Wigmore's writ of restitution by invoking the Weeks opinion-an opinion
which is based on the notion of an "evidentiary transaction" between
the executive and the court. See Part IV supra. So far as we can see,
there is nothing in the Weeks opinion inconsistent with the rule that
"[if the motion [for return of property] is granted the property shall
be restored unless otherwise subject to lawful detention and it shall not
be admissible in evidence at any hearing or trial." FED.R. Camr. P. 41(e)
(emphasis added).
From a legitimate crime control perspective it is regrettable enough
that the "owner" of the "infernal machine" or the former possessors of
the "heroin, sawed-off shotguns, or stolen property" cannot be tried for
possession when the possession is discovered through an unconstitutional
search. This serious and unpalatable consequence the constitutional doctrine does require. But we are not clear why it should also require
return of contraband, for the gravamen of the exclusionary rule is exclusion, not restitution. The criminal court is not responsible to see that
the government does not "benefit" from its illegality in every possible
way, but only that it does not benefit through the peculiar processes of
the criminal court.
As for the other restrictions mentioned by Kaplan-"[tihe rule is
limited by such constructs as standing, the attenuation of taint from illegal searches, and the admissibility of illegally seized evidence for impeachment," Kaplan, supra note 55, at 1030-do these vitiate the rule as
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to take under this rule of recognition, and (d) by recalling the
fundamental meaning of "deprivation by due process of law,"
i.e., deprivation by and only by the law of the land, which in
turn requires, at a minimum, application of constitutional rules
of recognition.

277

a constitutional doctrine? The issue is not whether the courts have been
steadfast enough to apply the rule systematically across the board on
the "neutral principle" model, see Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles
of ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1959), but whether, according
to the best understanding of the Constitution, that instrument contains
or gives rise to a rule calling for such application.
Kaplan seems to argue that when a rule logically covers two cases,
and the Supreme Court refrains from applying it to one case, the Court
must be deemed not to be invoking the rule as a constitutional rule when
it applies it to the other. But this does not follow. The failure of
the Court to apply the exclusionary doctrine to nonparadigmatic cases
arguably included in the constitutional rationale is not ground for denying that the Court is enforcing the Constitution when-in paradigmatic
evidentiary cases-it does invoke the exclusionary rule as a constitutional requirement.
277. We say "at a minimum" because we do not wish to preclude
the possibility that a defendant has a due process constitutional right to
application of statutory as well as constitutional rules of recognition.
Consider in this connection our favorable reference to Professor Hill's
proposal for the "constitutionalization" of certain issues heretofore unsatisfactorily handled under the rubric of judicial integrity. See Hill,
supra note 65, at 199-200, 210-12, discussed in note 100 supra. If Hill's
suggestion were adopted, and a conviction were presented for review in
which, for example, the state trial court had admitted evidence gained
through violation by state officers of section 605 of the Federal Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1970), any reversal would be
predicated on fourteenth amendment due process grounds, rather than
on the "imperative of judicial integrity," which was the actual rationale
employed when this fact pattern was presented. Lee v. Florida, 392 U.S.
378, 385 (1968). Likewise, the Hill proposal would dictate that reversal
of a federal conviction because of a violation of prompt arraignment legislation would be based on the force of the legislation itself and on the
fifth amendment due process clause, rather than, as in McNabb v. United
States, 318 U.S. 332, 341 (1943), on the Supreme Court's "supervisory authority over the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts"
or on the "judicial integrity" rationale also invoked in that case. Id. at
345, 347.

The move from the "supervisory power" and "judicial integrity" to

due process is advisable, not only for the reasons Hill gives, see note
100 supra, but also because of the destructive impact invocation of the
supervisory power can have on the conception of due process-an impact
vividly illustrated by Justice Frankfurter's opinion in McNabb. In that
case, petitioners urged reversal of their convictions because the incriminating statements used against them were elicited during an extended
period of intensive questioning (in violation, it must be added, of congressional prompt-arraignment legislation). It is impossible to tell from
Justice Frankfurter's description precisely what constitutional claim the
petitioners made: he said that they were "[rielying upon the guaranties
of the Fifth Amendment that no person 'shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty,
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Rejection of the evidentiary transaction interpretation does
not necessitate adherence to the deterrence-supervisory power
understanding of the exclusionary rule, for one finds an exclusionary imperative in the fourth amendment treated as a rule
of recognition. One may hold that the fourth amendment does
not speak directly to the courts and yet find the courts under
an exclusionary obligation, because the courts are under an obligation to apply the fourth amendment and all constitutional rules
of recognition faithfully, especially in a criminal prosecution.
However he would phrase it, we think Justice Brennan would
agree to as much, indeed insist upon it. What is not clear is
or property, without due process of laws .... " 318 U.S. at 338-39. But
what is clear is that any straight due process argument they might have
been making was futile, given the peculiar conception of due process from
which Justice Frankfurter worked in writing the McNabb opinion.
As is well known, Frankfurter found it "unnecessary to reach the
Constitutional issue," id. at 340, finding it possible instead to dispose of
the case through the supervisory power. Or perhaps it should be said
that his confidence in the availability of the supervisory power encouraged him to assume a heedless attitude toward at least one constitutional protection-the due process provision. Frankfurter's reliance in
McNabb on the supervisory power has the effect of rating due process
standards at a shockingly elemental level--as will be seen by considering
the implications of the following passage from the opinion:
[Tlhe scope of our reviewing power over convictions brought
here from the federal courts is not confined to ascertainment of
Constitutional validity. Judicial supervision of the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts implies the duty
of establishing and maintaining civilized standards of procedure
and evidence. Such standards are not satisfied merely by observance of those minimal historic safeguards for securing trial
by reason which are summarized as "due process of law" and
Id. below which we reach what is really trial by force.
Justice Frankfurter thus reduces due process to an echelon just above
trial by force and, in the same motion, assigns to the supervisory power
the higher office of "establishing and maintaining civilized standards of
procedure and evidence." The implications of this passage for the Supreme Court's concern about civilized standards in the states, where the
Court has no supervisory power (but see Lee v. Florida, supra), is something to reflect on. It is on the basis of this reflection, and because we
are persuaded by Professor Hill of the illegitimacy of judicial "door-closing" on supervisory "integrity" grounds, see note 100 supra, that we follow Hill in favoring disposition of cases of statutory violation like McNabb on (more generously conceived) due process grounds alone. The
Hill position is, to repeat, that if the conviction cannot be faulted on due
process-or at any rate on statutory-grounds, it must be allowed to
stand. See id. In seconding Hill's proposition, we are in fact urging
a return to the stance Justice Frankfurter had taken earlier, in the
"second" Nardone case, when writing for the Court he had said that
"[a]ny claim for the exclusion of evidence logically relevant in criminal
prosecutions is heavily handicapped. It must be justified by an overriding public policy expressed in the Constitution or the law of the land."
Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 340 (1939).
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whether he would go a step further and acknowledge not only
that judges are obligated to observe the fourth amendment as
a rule of recognition but also that the defendant has a personal
constitutional right that they do so.
At this juncture we could summarize Justice Brennan's options as follows: rejecting the deterrence rationale and not picking up the evidentiary transaction interpretation, he might either
develop the personal exclusionary right we think is implicit in
the notion of the fourth amendment as a rule of recognition,
or he could try to occupy one or another of two nonpersonalright exclusionary imperative positions that might tempt him.
Both positions are ultimately illusory and untenable. One is
simply the first half of the thought we have just canvassednamely, that the exclusionist court would be understood as impersonally engaging in judicial review by applying the fourth
amendment as a rule of recognition in a way that acknowledges
a judicial duty of exclusion without any corresponding right.
The other position invokes the judicial integrity rationale, according to which the court protects itself and the moving party
is a mere triggering mechanism. These two nonpersonal approaches make the same mistake: they fail to attach significance
to the fact that the violation of the Constitution or the threat
to the court's integrity is occurring in the defendant's case.
The integrity rationale makes the additional mistake of basing itself on the supervisory power. Since it is more in error,
and since, by his quotations from the Olmstead dissents and by
his own remarks, Justice Brennan indicates that the integrity
rationale was more on his mind when he wrote the Calandra
dissent, we shall now turn our attention entirely in that direction. By criticizing that rationale, we shall arrive at a fuller
statement of the personal exclusionary right for which we are
arguing.
VII. JUDICIAL INTEGRITY, THE SUPERVISORY POWER,
AND A DUE PROCESS PERSONAL RIGHT TO
EXCLUSION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALLY SEIZED
EVIDENCE
We began this Article by first commending and then criticizing the judicial integrity rationale, and we have repeatedly taken
our bearings by Justice Brennan's statement that "the vital function of the [exclusionary] rule [is] to insure that the judiciary
avoid ...

sanctioning illegal government conduct.

'278

278. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 360 (1974).
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the integrity rationale commendable because, being based on
"one-government" or unitary thinking, it is not, in Holmes's
word, "rudimentary." 27 9 But our enthusiasm for the rationale
is tempered by the fact that, although it does not necessarily
fragment the government,28 0 it severs another moral-indeed
constitutional-connection: the right/duty relationship between
the defendant and the court. Instead of concern for the defendant's right to have the government proceed constitutionally
throughout the whole prosecution, we find concern for the
court's own integrity. "[Tihe Court protects itself"; 281 and it
does so, moreover, by invoking not the power of judicial review,
2 82
but the "supervisory power'--or at any rate some "remedial"
or "quasi-constitutional"28 s3 power to the exercise of which the
defendant has no right. The judicial integrity rationale relies
on the very same supervisory power that gives rise to the "judicially created remedy" 28 4 discussed by deterrence theorists like
Justice Powell. This is one reason to doubt that the exclusionary
rule is given much real support by the judicial integrity rationale,28 5 for the point of many references to the supervisory power

in discussions of the exclusionary rule is to remind that what
28 6
the court has given the court, or the legislature, can take away.
The supervisory power is one of the less rooted branches of our
279. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470-71 (1928).
280. But see notes 44, 100, and 115 supra.
281. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928).
282. See text accompanying notes 157-66 supra.
283. See notes 109 and 276 supra.
284. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).
285. Another reason is discussed in Part II supra; see text accompanying notes 43-56 supra.
286. See, e.g., 414 U.S. at 348 (Powell, J.) .("[T]he rule is a judicially
created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional
right of the party aggrieved."); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 679-80 (1961)
(Harlan, J., dissenting) ("[W]hat the Court is now doing is to impose
upon the States not only federal substantive standards of 'search and
seizure' but also the basic federal remedy for violation of those standards.
For I think it entirely clear that the Weeks exclusionary rule is but a
remedy .... "); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 33 (1949) (Frankfurter,
J.) ("And though we have interpreted the Fourth Amendment to forbid
the admission of such evidence, a different question would be presented
if Congress under its legislative powers were to pass a statute purporting
to negate the Weeks doctrine. We would then be faced with the problem
of the respect to be accorded the legislative judgment on an issue as
to which, in default of that judgment, we have been forced to depend
on our own."); id. at 39-40 (Black, J., concurring) ("I agree with-what
appears to be a plain implication of the Court's opinion that the federal
exclusionary rule is not a command of the Fourth Amendment but is
a judicially created rule of evidence-which Congress might negate.").
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jurisprudence; mysterious in origin, sudden in appearance or at
least in recognition, ill-defined 28 7 and unpredictable, it is simply
an ineligible recourse when a sturdier alternative is available,
as it is in the unconstitutionally seized evidence situation, where
a judicial wrong against a particular person is threatened. Indeed, the very incoherence of the supervisory power approach
used, for example, by Justice Brandeis points beyond that ap28 8
proach to the more promising personal rights argument.
Some of the problems inherent in Justice Brandeis's reasoning are revealed if we think of the motion to suppress as a convenient triggering mechanism enabling the court "to maintain
respect for law . . [and] to preserve the judicial process from
contamination," 28 9 without having frequently to take the unseemly initiative of excluding evidence on its own motion. The
two situations Brandeis envisages in his opinion are suppression
of the fruits of illegality on the motion of the defendant, and
suppression by the court on its own motion "despite the wish
to the contrary of all the parties to the litigation. ' 290 But another possibility is of interest here: the court may deny the defendant's motion to suppress. And-supposing the evidence has
indeed been seized unconstitutionally-the question is whether
to characterize denial of the motion as merely refusal by the
court to allow itself to be "triggered," or as a denial of the defendant's exclusionary right: whether, in other words, to view
the defendant as merely a "private attorney general, ' 20 1 or instead as a holder of a right. If he has a right, the court's recognition of it will not be an exercise of the supervisory powerthe supervisory power is redundant in the presence of a right.
Two connections have to be exhibited and kept clear to make
plausible the existence of what we are calling in this Article the
due process exclusionary right.292 (Or, one could say, these two
connections had to be severed in the fragmentary model to make
the exclusionary rule seem an unnatural interference with the
proper administration of justice.) The first is the tie of respon287. See Note, The Supervisory Power of the Federal Courts, 76

HA- v. L.REv.1656 (1963).

288. The argument we shall be making here against the uncorrected
Brandeis judicial integrity thesis is different from, but compatible with,
Professor Hill's cogent argument that judicial "door-closing" on grounds
other than a constitutional or statutory violation is illegitimate. See
notes 44, 100, and 115 supra.
289. 277 U.S. at 484. See note 64 supra.
290. Id. at 485.
291. See note 64 supra.
292. See text accompanying notes 15, 71, and 138 supra.
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sibility that makes the government an indivisible whole and the
court part of it, or the prosecution a whole and the trial part
of it. We have already said enough on this subject.29 3 The second connection is the one Justice Brandeis neglects, and which
deserves the closest attention. It occurs at a juncture between,
on the one hand, the wrong seen by Justice Brandeis to be committed by the admissionist court and, on the other hand, the defendant to whom that wrong may be said to have been done.
We characterize this connection as a personal constitutional right
of the defendant-a due process right not to have the judicial
wrong of admission committed in the government's prosecution
of him. In short, we are saying there is a personal right waiting
to be articulated out of the interstices of the judicial integrity
argument, a right that Justice Brandeis passes over.
Our argument in this Part is addressed to those who, like
Justice Brennan, are attached to the judicial integrity way of
phrasing the exclusionary imperative. This argument is not a
defense of every possible application of the integrity rationale;
it simply brings to light the veiled affinity between the integrity
concern and a rights analysis. It is not a defense of indiscriminate judicial "door-closing,"2914 but is rather a defense of the proposition that there is a near equivalence between the personal
right to try one's case before a law-abiding judge and a personal
right to the exclusion of evidence-where that evidence has been
obtained by illegal means.
The right of which we speak is perhaps easier to see in
Holmes's idiom of "dirty business" and of "not. . . allow[ing]
such iniquities to succeed" 295 than in Brandeis's metaphor of
"contamination. ' 29
The apparent implication of the latter is,
as Brandeis says, that "the court protects itself. ' 29 7 But a Brandeis-instructed court must be protecting itself from somethingpresumably from an actual or apparent loss of integrity. Now
either that integrity is intrinsically valuable, or it is instrumental, or it is both. If it has intrinsic worth, the court is protecting itself from doing wrong in the present moment just for
the sake of being righteous in the present moment. But a court's
present moments are always in present cases and related to present parties. If integrity is instrumental, on the other hand, then
presumably the present concern is to ensure that the court can
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.

See, e.g., Part I supra.
See notes 44, 100, 115, and 288 supra.
277 U.S. at 470.
Id. at 484.
Id. at 485.
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do its job in the future. But its future job is the same as its
present job-to do justice to parties. Courts do not make sense
without parties, and whether one thinks about judicial integrity
in connection with the present case or a future case, it always
reduces, or rises, to doing justice to parties. But, that being
granted, why must integrity be preserved solely, or primarily,
with a view to future parties-why mu5t preservation of integrity be understood primarily as instrumental? We question the
implication that the court must be concerned for the rule of law
in the present defendant's case only for the sake of future defendants, because that would mean the court would never be
obligated to have regard for integrity and the rule of law in
the case of any present defendant, just for the sake of being
righteous in that case. This is not only preposterous, it is en-,
tirely alien to the concept of integrity, which is not instrumentalist but, of all moral concepts, perhaps the least "future" or "consequence" oriented.
We are suggesting, then, that the main concern of the Brandeis-educated court cannot be the court's future, but must be
its present. Yet, its present is the defendant's case. And so there
is after all a vast difference between the deterrence-supervisory
power approach of Justice Powell and the integrity-supervisory
approach of a Brandeis or Brennan. Whereas the deterrence rationale is necessarily future-oriented and must issue from the
supervisory power, the logic of the integrity rationale orients it
to the present and provides the self-corrective by which that rationale frees itself from its ties to the supervisory power. This
is just another way of saying that the deterrence theory is not,
and the integrity rationale is, fundamentally rights-oriented.
It might be objected that a court in the present instance
could jeopardize its integrity in away that does no harm to the
present defendant,- and yet cripples the court for the future. For
example, in a trial eventually resulting in acquittal, the court
might be so unfair that it irreparably damages its reputation for
impartiality. We do not deny that departures from judicial integrity can occur in the defendant's case without violation of the
defendant's rights. But where the defendant is the victim of
unconstitutional searches and seizures perpetrated by the government, we think there is good reason for a unitary model
theorist like Brandeis to find the court's "ratification" of that
paradigmatic misconduct 298 to be not only judicial sanction of
298. Here we are talking about a search and seizure that is by hypothesis unconstitutional; that is, we are talking about a situation in
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a "doctrine [against which a court] should resolutely set its
face,"290 but also a concrete constitutional wrong to the defendant-the denial of a due process right to have the government
in all its parts obey and respect its own constitutional laws in
its prosecution of him.
We have tried to bring out the meaning of Justice Brennan's
declaration in Calandrathat "the vital function of the [exclu,
sionary] rule [is] to insure that the judiciary avoids ... sanctioning illegal government conduct." In Part VI we glossed the
passage as if it were a judicial review statement to the effect
that "the vital function of the rule is to insure that the judiciary
avoids validating unconstitutional governmental conduct." Here
in Part VII we have read it as it was undoubtedly intended by
Justice Brennan, i.e., as a simple repetition of the Brandeis judicial integrity rationale, We think the judicial review and
judicial integrity arguments as we have followed them out in
these two discussions do compel the claims we make at the end
of each, namely, that the defendant has a due process personal
right to have the government observe its own laws, at any rate
its own constitution, in its prosecution of him-and therefore to
have the court exclude unconstitutionally seized evidence from
his trial.
That result can be stated in the two ways appropriate to
the emphases of the two discussions. One can say that the court,
as part of the government, and because of its special office in
that government and its special function in a prosecution, must
enforce constitutional rules of recognition, one of which is the
fourth amendment; one can say that this is simply what the rule
of law and the practice of constitutionalism require, and that
anything short of this is a denial to the defendant of due process
of law. Or one can say that if judicial integrity means anything,
it must mean judicial observance of the law and a fortiori of
which the constitutional grounds for exclusion are presumably more evident than they were in Olmstead, where, on the understanding of the
case the majority drove Brandeis to adopt, the search and seizure was
not unconstitutional but merely illegal. See text accompanying notes 9499 supra. But see notes 100 and 277 supra, for a fledgling argument that
there is a constitutional ground for excluding evidence obtained through
mere violation of a statute.
299. To declare that in the administration of the criminal law
the end justifies the means-to declare that the government may
commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private
criminal-would bring terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this court [i.e., the United States Supreme Court]
should resolutely set its face.
277 U.S. at 485.
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the Constitution; and, since judging is a party-related activity,
judicial integrity means law observance in the defendant's case,
which means in turn that the defendant has a due process right
to law observance. Whatever the starting point, then, the
conclusion is the same-the defendant has a due process right
to exclusion as an expression of both judicial review and judicial integrity.
VIII.

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

Our thesis is that the defendant has both an immediate, evidentiary transaction, fourth amendment exclusionary right,
described in Part IV; and a mediated, due process exclusionary
right, described in Parts VI and VII. We are therefore leaving
ourselves vulnerable to a complaint we made against the Warren
Court. That Court betrayed, it seemed to us, a lack of confidence
in either the deterrence or the integrity rationale by its tendency
to rely indiscriminately on both without indicating how much
weight either could bear, or was being asked to bear, individually.30 0 There is probably something to saying, "The more, the
less": there is unquestionably something to the proposition that
two or more insufficient arguments aggregated do not necessarily amount to sufficiency. Recollection of the impression left
by the Warren Court should, then, give pause to those like us
who attempt a plural justification of the exclusionary rule.
But there are differences. We ground the rule in two personal rights, whereas the Warren Court-or Justice Clark speaking for it-made a heterogeneous appeal, relying on deterrence,
integrity, and even, if obscurely, on a personal right.3 0 1 And
when Clark did recognize a personal right to exclusion, he did
not seriously consider the possibility that the right itself might
entirely account for the rule. Justice Clark did not place due
reliance on the fact that the rights rationale stands in a logical
and constitutional relationship with the exclusionary rule for
which utilitarian rationales are not eligible. But, as readers of
this Article are by now aware, we do place that reliance-we
do take seriously the rights we claim to perceive.3 0 2 Indeed, we
assert that either the fourth amendment or the due process exclusionary right is itself a sufficient reason for the rule. And
our presentation is not influenced by such considerations as the
300. See text accompanying notes 35-42 supra.
301. See note 40 supra.
302. See Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, in Is LAw DEAD? 168
(E. Rostow ed. 1971).
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appearance of redundancy or the persuasiveness of the argument.
If there is one right, it will be a sufficient reason for the rule.
If there are two, there is not more sufficiency of argument; there
are rather two individually sufficient reasons for the rule,
neither of which can be denied or ignored because the other will
suffice. These riches are not an embarrassment, and our presentation is not, after all, guilty of the kind of self-defeating multiplicity of appeal we think characterized the Warren Court exclusionary opinions.
Each right we have described is a sufficient reason for the
rule because enforcement of the rule is simply the only way to
give expression to the right. The rule is one with each of the
Tights. They are rights to the rule only in a manner of speaking
-only because "the rule" is just another term for (1) having
the court in one's case respect the security of one's person, house,
papers, effects, and privacy, by declining to participate in an illicit evidentiary transaction-the fourth amendment here understood as performing its duty-imposing function of obligating the
courts to eschew that transaction; and (2) having the court, in
recognition of its duty to sanction only valid governmental acts,
invalidate executive misconduct by excluding the products of
that misconduct from one's trial-the fourth amendment here
understood as one among many power-conferring and powerlimiting rules of recognition. At stake here is the individual's
right to have the court apply the relevant rules of recognition,
which is, in turn, a specification of his more general right to
have the government obey its own laws in its prosecution of him.
The subject is the individual's right to enjoy the rule of law,
and the government's duty to afford it-a right and duty presumably guaranteed by the due process clauses 30 3 and not to be
303. Professor Herman Schwartz has shown a "link between exclusion and the rule of law," by uncovering the rule of law, due process
concern that lies behind the Brandeis-Holmes judicial integrity doctrine.
Schwartz, Retroactivity, Reliability, and Due Process: A Reply to Professor Mishkin, 33 U. Cm. L. REv. 719, 751 (1966). Schwartz is not persuaded by either the "contagion" or the "contamination" arguments of
the Olmstead dissents. Id. Instead, he says,
[t]he real reason for the Brandeis-Holmes notion seems to
rest on a broad and fundamental principle: in a constitutional
democracy of limited powers, a government agency has no authority over an individual except that which is conferred upon
it by law; if such authority is exceeded, the fruits of such excess should not be recognized by any branch of government, especially that branch which has the foremost role in furthering
the rule of law. The law sets limits to the state's exercise of
power over the individual, and, regardless of mitigating circumstances, a substantial overstepping of those limits should not be
legally cognizable. A court sworn to uphold and promote ob-
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neglected because of the more fashionable preoccupation with
privacy.
Given either right, the rule cannot be a "remedy" for a violation of privacy, or for a departure from the rule of law and constitutionalism. It is the rule of law and constitutionalism in
action. Of course, even the faintest suggestion of the kind we
are making, that the exclusionary rule is a manifestation of the
rule of law, will be greeted with scorn and derision. But when
we say that the exclusionary requirement is part of the rule of
law, we do not mean that the rule of law is destined to share
the fate of the exclusionary rule. We mean rather that the constitutional exclusionary rights are conceptually part of the rule
of law, and that for a court to admit unconstitutionally obtained
evidence is to do violence to the concept of the rule of law. 304
As for empirical consequences, on the other hand, the course of
least resistance for us would be, first, simply to note that reasonable men-such as Brandeis and Burger,30 5 or Brennan and
Powell-have differed about what is likely to happen to the
servance of the law cannot adequately perform its function if
it ignores illegality in the enforcement of the law.
Id. at 751-52 (footnotes omitted).
304. Professor Allen's comment seems as appropriate as when he
wrote it 25 years ago:
[P]erhaps it may be urged that any process of law which sanctions the imposition of penalties upon an individual through the
utilization of the fruits of official lawlessness tends to the destruction, not only of the rights of privacy, but of the whole system of restraints on the exercise of the public force which would
seem to be inherent in the concept of civil liberty.
Allen, The Wolf Case: Search and Seizure, Federalism, and the Civil
Liberties, 45 Nw. U.L. REV. 1, 20 (1950). When Professor Oaks quotes
this passage, he says it is Professor Allen giving "modern voice" to the
Brandeisian concern that the government as lawbreaker "breeds contempt for law; ... it invites anarchy." Oaks, supra note 43, at 669 n.11,
quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928). If we are
not mistaken, however, Allen bespeaks at least as much concern for the
conceptual state of an admissionist legal system as he exhibits for the
effects on law-abidingness of an admissionist policy.
Professor Dellinger also presumably addresses the following statement at least in part to the idea of constitutionalism and the rule of law:
To abolish the exclusionary rule and replace it with an action
for damages against the governmental treasury is to have the
law speak with two voices. In the absence of the exclusionary
rule, the law enforcement officer and the public generally are
enticed to view the Constitution as Justice Holmes' "bad man"
viewed the obligation of contracts. However one resolves the
question of whether a valid contract creates a normative duty
or merely presents an option to breach and pay damages, it is
inconsistent with a constitutional system to view duties imposed
by basic guarantees in the latter way.
Dellinger, supra note 78, at 1563 (footnotes omitted).
305. See text accompanying notes 48-55 supra.
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administration of justice as a result of admission or exclusion;
and, second, to correct any misapprehension that this Article
has been written as a treatment of consequences, salutary or
pernicious. But, though our argument is indeed a construction
of the Constitution and is therefore conceptual rather than
utilitarian, and though until now we have almost totally
eschewed the appeal to consequences, we must nevertheless mention the possible consequences of one particular act-our own.
Writers are not free of responsibility for the possible consequences of an utterance merely because it is based on nonutilitarian premises. One surely does not evade that responsibility
merely by incantation of those premises. So if it were said
that an argument like our own tends to fasten a rigid and impolitic view of the exclusionary rule3 06 on the courts and therefore on the country, it would not be sufficient to reply-though
we think it is true-that the Constitution itself is "rigid and impolitic" with respect to unconstitutionally seized evidence. That
would not be a sufficient disclaimer because the existence of a
true argument may not be adequate grounds for stating it. The
constitutional argument for the exclusionary rule might-and,
from a utilitarian point of view, perhaps should-be allowed to
fade from memory for lack of repetition. Or, to make the matter
personal, we might have decided that, had we any intellectual
or rhetorical influence, we would not mobilize it. We could have
been content to see the exclusionary rights remain in or fall into
the oblivion that seems to be their inevitable habitat or destination.
In defense of our contrary decision, however, it must be said
that one may also bear responsibility or take credit for the state
of affairs that results from his omissions. Discredit and oblivion
for the rights rationale would be as much a consequence of the
option exercised by this generation of scholars as would use of
that rationale to "decide cases. ' 30 7 The significant question is
306. See note 55 supra.
307. Oaks, supra note 43. See also note 276 supra. The question of
scholarly responsibility can be posed economically by asking whether we
really want Professor Oaks's characterization of and epitaph for the personal right rationale to be the last word. In a footnote, he mentions
three rights-related theories of the exclusionary rule as possible alternatives to the deterrence theory. We have criticized two of them. One
is the notion that exclusion is compensation. Oaks, supra note 43, at 671
n.25; see note 158 supra. Another is the Boyd type fourth and fifth
amendment rationale. Oaks, supra note 43, at 671 n.25; see note 97 supra.
Oaks's third alternative is the theory we propound in this Article-that
"a defendant [has] a personal right not to be convicted by means of il-
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not whether there would be responsibility for the failure to state

the rights argument-there would be-but whether the consequences of the omission would be good or bad. There is no doubt
in the minds of critics like Chief Justice Burger and Professor
Kaplan that the country is or would be better off without the

rights rationale, because acceptance of it would fix in our jurisprudence a rule that is in their opinion an insupportable social
and political burden. As the Chief Justice has put it, the exclusionary rule has left "a sour and bitter feeling that is psychologic-

ally and sociologically unhealthy."3 0 8 Or, as Professor Kaplan
has more recently said, in computing "the political price of the
exclusionary rule":3 09
The solid majority of Americans rejects the idea that "[tihe
criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered."
Indeed, this public dissatisfaction has recently become a major
political force. Public opinion polls have shown an extremely
high rate of disapproval of the courts for their role in "coddling
criminals," and the prototype of these complaints is enforcement
of the exclusionary rule.310
The facts marshalled here need not and for the most part cannot be disputed; and we do not deny the importance of the opinions of our fellow citizens. We do think, however, that some other
considerations must be brought into the picture to make an adequate "utilitarian calculation of the cost [or, as the case may
be, the benefit] of the exclusionary rule."31 ' In what follows
we shall not be theoretically discussing anything about the rule
other than its effect on the opinions and habits of the public3 1 2 not its rightness and only this one aspect of its badness or goodness. Yet, as we shall see, it is hard to keep the rightness of
the rule out of the discussion, because belief or disbelief in the
existence of an exclusionary right will influence the way the rule
lodges itself in the public mind and affects the public character;
reflection on the fact may lead us to consider more reasons than
Burger and Kaplan mention for taking an interest in the public's
opinion of the exclusionary rule.
The argument we are considering here is not that the rule
legally obtained evidence." Oaks, supra note 43, at 671 n.25. According
to Oaks, "[all these alternative explanations have now been discredited." Id.
308. Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchman?, 14 Am. U.L. REV. 1,
22 (1964).
309. Kaplan, supra note 55, at 1035.
310. Id. at 1035-36.
311. Id. at 1035.
312. For a list of other dysfunctional aspects of the rule, see note
61 supra.
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"handcuffs" the police,3 13 or that it frequently lets dangerous
defendants go free,3 14 or finally, as Wigmore alleged, that "the
direct and immediate result . . . [of the rule is to make] Justice inefficient, and . . . [to coddle] the criminal classes of the
population."' 31 5 The argument under consideration is rather that,
because the rule is perceived by the public as doing one or more
of these things, it must be repealed or drastically modified 316
-and therefore that, at all costs, exclusion must not be characterized as a right. Since we are no more indifferent to consequences than the next person, and since we can conceive of circumstances not so remote from the present in which something
would have to be done about the exclusion of evidence to placate
popular passions, we cannot reject the argument out of hand.
We can even understand why sensible persons might counsel
anticipatory concessions to "a popular need for retribution" 317
or to "political hostility." 31.8 But what we want noted is that
313. The clearest repudiation of the "handcuff" argument is by Professor Oaks:
The whole argument about the exclusionary rule "handcuffing" the police should be abandoned. If this is a negative effect,
then it is an effect of the constitutional rules, not an effect of
the exclusionary rule as the means chosen for their enforcement.
Police officials and prosecutors should stop. claiming that the ex-

clusionary rule prevents effective law enforcement. In doing so
they attribute far greater effect to the exclusionary rule than the
evidence warrants, and they are also in the untenable position
of urging that the sanction be abolished so that they can continue to violate the rules with impunity. If the constitutional
rules concerning arrest and search and seizure really prevent effective law enforcement, then law enforcement officers should
demonstrate that fact and forthrightly attempt to have those
rules changed by appropriate authority.
Oaks, supra note 43, at 754.
314. "It is undeniably true," Professor Kaplan says,
that in practice the exclusionary rule rarely allows dangerous
defendants to go free. In serious cases, there are often other
charges not weakened by the- exclusionary rule, or sufficient evi- .
dence of the crime charged apart from that unconstitutionally.
seized. Moreover, the courts have shown a remarkable ability"
in the most serious cases to stretch legal doctrine to hold doubtful searches and seizures legal. The courts have often avoided
applying the exclusionary rule in situations in which the consequences of so doing would offend their own sense of proportionality or reach beyond their view of what the public would tolerate.
Kaplan, supra note 55, at 1036. He then adds, however, that although
"[s]uch decisions may actually lower any adverse impact of the exclusionary rule on crime control," they do not lower the "political price"
of the rule: "since the reasoning behind .. . [these decisions] is unacknowledged, covert, and usually disingenuous, public dissatisfaction with
the rule is not reduced." Id. at 1037.
315. Wigmore, supra note 16, at 482.
316. See note 55 supra.
317. Id.
318. Id.
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this would be a concession to an impulse that does not necessarily
do a people credit, that is hard to distinguish from an appetite
for vengeance that grows by what it feeds on.3 19 To this objection the response will no doubt be that a repressed or "frustrated" 320 need is more likely to seek release in savage behavior
than is a need that is routinely satisfied. Without taking a position on the factual accuracy of this contention, we shall only
note that relief from the frustration through routine satisfaction
of the need would also be a denial to the American people of
what has been an important opportunity for them to learn and
practice moderation.
The exclusionary rule has been misrepresented. Labelled by
Wigmore as "misguided sentimentality," 321 it is condemned as the
emotional indulgence of persons "soft on crime" when in fact
it is old-fashioned self-denial. And it is this-its refusal to cater
and gratify-that gives the rule its impolitic look, because contemporary politics-the only politics we know-is the politics of
gratification. But, other conceptions of politics are available, and
political ends beyond bare institutional survival are conceivable
-ends to be sought by means other than gratification of the
people.3 22 Whoever can bring himself to believe there could be
a "long run" in store for our institutions might wish to consider
these alternative forms of politics and, as an earnest of commitment to the politics of modest self-restraint, might wish to ask
the American people to continue practicing procedural justice.
We mean literally to practice-i.e., to perform acts of procedural
justice, and hence of exclusion-and to practice often, to keep
up proficiency.3 23 We commend this as a course of action that
could be at least as important to the long-term quality of our
lives as would be the passivity of having substantive justice done
319. Id.

320. Id.

321. Wigmore, supra note 16, at 482. See also Note, Search and
Seizure in the Supreme Court: Shadows on the Fourth Amendment, 28
U. Cmr. L. REv. 664, 673 n.49 (1961).

322. A convenient and authoritative introduction to some of the al-

ternatives is H. CLOR, OBSCENITY AND PUBLIC MORALITY 182-202 (1969).
For those dissatisfied with the raw political pragmatism of Professor
Kaplan's argument, but nevertheless persuaded by him that the political
dimension cannot be ignored, we would recommend Professor Clor's recent contribution to political and legal philosophy. Clor, On the Moral
Authority and Value of Law: The Province of Jurisprudence Undetermined, 58 MINN. L. REy. 569 (1974).
323. On the "substantive" and "educational" effects of criminal procedure, see Griffiths, Ideo-ogy in CriminalProcedure or A Third "Model"
of the Criminal Process, 79 YALs L.J. 359, 365-67, 385 n.95, 388-91, 401,
409. But see id. at 416.
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for us in accord with our "need for retribution." 324
But we cannot expect the public any more than the police
to regard a procedural requirement as worthy of the effort of
self-restraint it entails, when the specific self-denial requested is
justified only by the "arbitrary [positioning of a] point on a continuum.13 25

Pragmatic experiment does not compel respect. If

people are to accept exclusion, they must be approached neither
as witnesses to judicial manipulation of the police, 326 nor as incipient vigilantes whose favor must be curried by the courts, but
as fellow citizens ready to consider and perhaps to accept and
respect an exclusionary holding-as long as the ground of decision is more than the court's own fiat. As we have argued, that
ground is the defendant's exclusionary right. Invocation of the
defendant's right, nothing grand or awesome to be sure, is nevertheless an occasion for respect because it is not a self-seeking
claim by the citizenry, but is rather a denial by them of their
327
own impulses in favor of someone else's due.
The difficulty may be described as follows: either we are
serious about exclusion and want to request a commitment of
self-restraint from the public, in which case we shall have to
appeal to it in terms of the defendant's rights-which after all
are the principal reasons for being serious about exclusion; or
we are pragmatic exclusionists, in which case our reasons for
appeal to either the public or the police have minimal moral content and therefore are likely to have minimal impact.
When a discussion moves, as ours has in this concluding section, from the relatively firm ground of rights and principle to
the shifting and contingent ground of good and bad consequences, it necessarily becomes speculative. And, though we can
correctly say that the "political price" argument is also speculative, the response might reasonably be that the stakes are so high
that doubts must be resolved in favor of safety and survival.
When the issue is thus joined, we have gone beyond the competence of either the rights proponent or the pragmatic "social
engineer": 32 8

we have gone beyond the place in the discussion

where one becomes qualified by knowing about-rights and the
rule of law or by mastering a manipulative technique-or, for
that matter, by experiencing fears of anarchy. In short, discursive
324.
325.
326.
327.
of duty.
328.

Kaplan, supranote 55, at 1035.
Kaplan, supranote 55, at 1030, quoted in note 171 supra.
See note 171 supra.
In short, it is an occasion for the people to recover their sense
See note 72 supra.
Kaplan, supra note 55, at 1055.
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argumentation has exhausted itself and statesmanship or judgment is now required.
An appeal to statesmanship and judgment, rarely enough
openly made in our time, will be taken as either a muddled reference to the very pragmatism it is supposed to transcend, or
as a pretentious way to evade taking either of the stands that
retain respectability in our time: the unbudging stand of the
sincere moralist or the budging flux of the realistic politician.
And, pretentiousness aside, that is indeed what the appeal to
statesmanship and judgment is: a recognition that neither doctrinaire insistence on rights 329 nor concerned preoccupation with

what people will put up with is sufficient. There is no formula
or litmus by which to tell whether exclusion is a reasonable risk
in the cause of justice and moderation or a reckless gamble with
the nation's future. It is because formulas are not available at
this juncture that it is necessary to hope that we have extra330
ordinarily reasonable men in positions to make the judgment.
The office of the scholar is not to play at statesmanship, but
to keep all the relevant considerations before the public and before -the potential statesman-and, in particular, not to let a consideration like justice, defendant's rights, or the rule of law, be
annihilated by neglect. Of course it is not out of place for scholars to point out that people frequently surprise those who sell
them short, by responding to a higher appeal when it is made
to them. Nor are we exceeding the limits of our competence
if we note that how a matter is discussed may make a considerable difference in how it is received and understood. At any
rate, the acceptability of an imposition like the exclusionary rule
will depend in considerable part on how it is presented-whether,
for example, it is presented as a right that accrues as a matter
329. Persons like ourselves, who make rights a central constitutional

concern, must recur periodically to the corrective language of Justice

Jackson:
The choice is not between order and liberty. It is between

liberty with order and anarchy without either. There is danger
that, if the Court does not temper its doctrinaire logic with a
little practical wisdom, it will convert the constitutional Bill of
Rights into a suicide pact.
Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (dissenting opinion). But
see text accompanying note 74 supra.
330. By all standards, the most elevating-and liberating-discussion
of the relationship between principle and public necessity is from the
pen of the late Professor Leo Strauss. L. STRAuss, NATURAL RIGHTS Am
IsToRY 159-63 (1953).
On the place of judgment in constitutional law, see the excellent remarks of Professor Snowiss. Snowiss, The Legacy of Justice Black, 1973
Sup. CT. REv. 187, 238-52.
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of course, or as a remedial device that "works." 33 1 That acceptability will be affected by the attitude that influential jurists
like the Chief Justice of the United States and influential commentators like Professor Kaplan take toward the rule. There
is a considerable amount of self-fulfillment in the prophecies
made about the rule. It is one thing simply to tell people what
the rights are in the premises and to expect them to understand
that the according of rights is ordinarily the proper thing to do;
it is another to approach people through a sophisticated apologetics that obscures the existence and meaning of rights and
gives people every excuse to violate rights by obliging their pas332
sions.
331. Kaplan, supra note 55, at 1030.

332. Consider, as illustrations of different types of discourse, the dif-

fering ways two men of the law have responded to the invocation of
"technicalities" in criminal procedure. First, this from an off-the-bench
address by Chief Justice Burger:
If a majori~ty... come to believe that law enforcement is being
frustrated by what laymen call "technicalities," there develops
a sour and bitter feeling that is psychologically and sociologically unhealthy ....
I do not challenge these rules of law. But I do suggest that
...
a vast number of people are losing respect for law and the
administration of justice because they think that the Supression
Doctrine is defeating justice. That much of this reaction is due
to lack of understanding does not mean we can ignore it ....
*
I suggest judges had a right to assume that other
branches of government, and police in particular, would recognize that this mechanism of suppression was not an end in itself
but a means ....
The public has accepted-largely on faith in the Judiciarythe distasteful results of the Suppression Doctrine; but the wrath
of public opinion may descend alike on police and judges if we
persist in the view that suppression is a solution. At best it is
a necessary evil and hardly more than a manifestation of sterile
judicial indignation even in the view of well motivated and well
informed laymen.
Burger, supra note 308, at 22-23. Then, this from an out-of-court statement by a prosecutor, who had been asked whether lawyers who "get
defendants off on technicalities" serve the cause of justice:
Every time I hear a report like that, I look to see what the
technicality was. Usually, it was that some police officers violated the Constitution in gathering evidence. Then the defense
lawyer quite properly filed a motion to suppress this evidence
and the judge upheld it. Nothing was left to support the case,
so the defendant had to be ruled not guilty.
I don't think that man was freed on a technicality. He got
off because his constitutional rights were violated.
It's true that our legal system sometimes goes awry and a
defendant escapes his just desserts because of a true technicality.
A misspelled word in an indictment, say. But, if everything is
on the up-and-up, a prosecutor has his remedies. He can ap-peal, or he can bring a new indictment. The chances of somebody escaping justice on a genuine technicality are mighty slim.
Robinson, How Well Do Lawyers Serve the Cause of Justice?, PARADE,
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We do not find it a matter for despair that "arguments are
constructed in one way, and governments in another,"33 3 or that,
as Macaulay goes on to say,
[whereas in] logic, none but an idiot admits the premises and
denies the legitimate conclusion . .. in practice, we see that
great and enlightened communities often persist, generation
after generation, in asserting principles, and refusing to act upon

those principles. It may be doubted whether any real polity
that ever existed
has exactly corresponded to the pure idea of
334
that polity.

And, although what the historian says may be preeminently true
of his own country-or at least of the judges in it 335-there
are ample indications, noted by Professor Kaplan

36

and others

and visible in the exclusionary cases, that American judges are
also capable of "asserting principles, and refusing to act upon
those principles." That there are problems with this kind of judicial inconsistency, we do not deny. 337 That these problems are
anywhere near as serious as attacks on "those principles" in their

established and paradigmatic applications, we do deny. It is one
thing to be innocent of the principle, 338 or, realizing the principle, to refuse "exactly" to fulfill its "pure idea"; it is quite another to have made the principle a part of the polity's jurisprudence, and to have routinized application of the principle to paradigmatic cases, and then to announce that there is no principle
Aug. 11, 1974, at 11 (quoting James R. Thompson, United States Attorney
for the Northern District of Illinois).
333. T. MACAULAY, 4 TnE HISTORY OF ENGLAND 124 (1879).
334. Id. at 124-25.
335. Professor Williams has made the following comments on the

English practice of excluding coerced confessions and admitting the products of illegal searches:
[O]ne would like to know the reason for not applying the general rule of admissibility to the special case of induced confes-

sions. There must be some reason why an induced confession

is excluded, though relevant, while evidence obtained by an illegal search is admitted. Some consideration other than that of
relevancy must create this distinction ....

In the absence of

an explanation, one does not know whether English law is fun-

damentally consistent with itself ...

There are other grounds for dissatisfaction with the
[English decisions on illegally seized evidence]. The American
decisions which hold the contrary were not properly considered,
and their basis was quite possibly misunderstood ....
Williams, The Exclusionary Rule Under Foreign Law: England, 52 J.

Cnm . L.C. & P.S. 272, 273 (1961) (emphasis added). See text accompanying notes 215-33 supra.
336. See notes 276 and 314 supra.

337. See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principlesof ConstitutionalLaw,
73 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1959).

338. Professor Williams may be saying that this is the state of the
English judges. See note 335 supra.
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after all. That is especially disturbing when, as we claim to have
shown about the exclusionary requirement, the principle in question is inseparable from two constitutional rights and from the
rule of law.
If in this Article we have convincingly stated either or both
claims of right for which we have argued, we have shifted the
burden of argument to the critics of the exclusionary rule. To
describe the argument they might make to justify repeal or modification of the rule despite the defendant's constitutional exclusionary rights would be nothing less than to discourse on the
concept of a constitutional right 339 and the rule of law; to master
the doctrines of public necessity and the general welfare; and
to discuss in detail and with statesmanlike comprehension the
circumstances and needs of our civilization. This Article is
meant only to shift that burden, not carry it.

339. See generally J. FEINBEa, SocrL PmILosoPmY 55-83 (1973);
Dworkin, supra note 302; Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance,
71 YALE L.J. 1425 (1962); Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 THE
MONIST 475 (1968).

